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  1. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  2.  73
    Jerry A. Fodor (2008). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford University Press.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  3.  99
    Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
  4. Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
  5. Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
    INTRODUCTION: TWO KINDS OF RLDUCTIONISM The man who laughs is the one who has not yet heard the terrible news. BERTHOLD BRECHT I propose, in this book, ...
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  6. Jerry A. Fodor (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
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  7. Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture. Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
    This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...)
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  8. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1992). Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Blackwell.
    The main question addressed in this book is whether individuation of the contents of thoughts and linguistic expressions is inherently holistic. The authors consider arguments that are alleged to show that the meaning of a scientific hypothesis depends on the entire theory that entails it, or that the content of a concept depends on the entire belief system of which it is part. If these arguments are sound then it would follow that the meanings of words, sentences, hypotheses, predictions, discourses, (...)
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  9.  89
    Jerry A. Fodor (1994). The Elm and the Expert. MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
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  10.  45
    Jerry A. Fodor (1968). Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Psychology. Ny: Random House.
  11. Jerry A. Fodor (1985). Precis of the Modularity of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.
    The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive (...)
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  12. Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1981). How Direct is Visual Perception? Some Reflections on Gibson's 'Ecological Approach'. Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
    Examines the theses that the postulation of mental processing is unnecessary to account for our perceptual relationship with the world, see turvey etal. for a criticque.
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  13.  82
    Jerry A. Fodor (2003). Hume Variations. Oxford University Press.
    Hume? Yes, David Hume, that's who Jerry Fodor looks to for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. Fodor claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study (...)
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  14. Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
    Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
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  15. Jerry A. Fodor (2007). The Revenge of the Given. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell 105--116.
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  16. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (2002). The Compositionality Papers. Oxford University Press.
    Ernie Lepore and Jerry Fodor have published a series of original and controversial essays on issues relating to compositionality in language and mind; they have...
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  17. Jerry A. Fodor (1981). The Mind-Body Problem. Scientific American 244:114-25.
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  18. Jerry A. Fodor (1974). Special Sciences. Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
  19.  95
    Jerry A. Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin (1990). Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work. Cognition 35 (2):183-205.
  20. Jerry A. Fodor (1988). A Reply to Churchland's `Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality'. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.
    Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
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  21. Jerry A. Fodor (2010). What Darwin Got Wrong. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
    What kind of theory is the theory of natural selection? -- Internal constraints : what the new biology tells us -- Whole genomes, networks, modules and other complexities -- Many constraints, many environments -- The return of the laws of form -- Many are called but few are chosen : the problem of 'selection-for' -- No exit? : some responses to the problem of 'selection-for' -- Did the dodo lose its ecological niche? : or was it the other way around? (...)
     
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  22. Jerry A. Fodor (1997). Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):149-63.
  23. Jerry A. Fodor (1983). The Modularity of Mind. MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
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  24. Jerry A. Fodor (2004). Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century. Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
  25. Jerry A. Fodor (1986). The Modularity of Mind. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), Philosophical Review. Ablex 101-108.
  26. Jerry A. Fodor (1968). The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.
  27. Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor (1972). What Psychological States Are Not. Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
  28. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation. Mind 100 (397):19-34.
  29. Jerry A. Fodor (2001). Language, Thought and Compositionality. Mind and Language 16 (1):1-15.
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  30. Jerry A. Fodor (1978). Propositional Attitudes. The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
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  31.  56
    Jerry A. Fodor (1978). Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother. Cognition 6 (September):229-47.
  32. Jerry A. Fodor (2000). In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
  33. Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Semantics, Wisconsin Style. Synthese 59 (3):231-50.
  34. Jerry A. Fodor (1980). On the Impossibility of Acquiring 'More Powerful' Structures. In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press
  35.  65
    Jerry A. Fodor (1986). Why Paramecia Don't Have Mental Representations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):3-23.
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  36.  65
    Jerry A. Fodor (1986). Information and Association. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (July):307-323.
  37. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content I. In A Theory of Content. MIT Press
  38. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
  39. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). A Modal Argument for Narrow Content. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.
  40. Jerry A. Fodor (1994). The Elm and the Expert Mentalese and its Semantics. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  41. Jerry A. Fodor (2005). Reply to Steven Pinker So How Does the Mind Work?. Mind and Language 20 (1):25-32.
  42. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1991). Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role. Mind and Language 6 (4):328-43.
    It's an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have arrived at a friendly, de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of (...)
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  43.  5
    Andrew C. Connolly, Jerry A. Fodor, Lila R. Gleitman & Henry Gleitman (2007). Why Stereotypes Don’T Even Make Good Defaults. Cognition 103 (1):1-22.
  44. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1999). All at Sea in Semantic Space: Churchland on Meaning Similarity. Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):381-403.
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  45. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1996). The Red Herring and the Pet Fish: Why Concepts Still Can't Be Prototypes. Cognition 58 (2):253-70.
    1 There is a Standard Objection to the idea that concepts might be prototypes (or exemplars, or stereotypes): Because they are productive, concepts must be compositional. Prototypes aren't compositional, so concepts can't be prototypes (see, e.g., Margolis, 1994).2 However, two recent papers (Osherson and Smith, 1988; Kamp and Partee, 1995) reconsider this consensus. They suggest that, although the Standard Objection is probably right in the long run, the cases where prototypes fail to exhibit compositionality are relatively exotic and involve phenomena (...)
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  46. Jerry A. Fodor (1981). The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy. In Jerry Fodor (ed.), Representations. MIT Press
     
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  47. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). There Are No Recognitional Concepts, Not Even RED. Philosophical Issues 9:1-14.
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  48. Jerry A. Fodor (1975). Imagistic Representation. In Ned Block (ed.), The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press 63--86.
     
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  49.  98
    Jerry A. Fodor (1982). Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (April):98-118.
    "Twim earth" examples have motivated a number of proposals for the lexicography of kind terms in natural languages. it is argued that these proposals create unacceptable difficulties for the analysis of de dicto propositional attitudes. a conservative solution of the twin earth problems is then proposed according to which they reflect pragmatic features of language use rather than semantic features of lexical content.
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  50. Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Why There Still has to Be a Language of Thought. In Psychosemantics. MIT Press
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