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Jerry A. Fodor [112]Jerry Fodor [54]
  1. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore, Morphemes Matter; the Continuing Case Against Lexical Decomposition (Or: Please Don't Play That Again, Sam).
    The idea that quotidian, middle-level concepts typically have internal structure -- definitional, statistical, or whatever -- plays a central role in practically every current approach to cognition. Correspondingly, the idea that words that express quotidian, middle-level concepts have complex representations "at the semantic level" is recurrent in linguistics; it's the defining thesis of what is often called "lexical semantics," and it unites the generative and interpretive traditions of grammatical analysis. Recently, Hale and Keyser (1993) have provided a budget of sophisticated (...)
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  2. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore, Reply: Impossible Words.
    It matters to a number of projects whether monomorphemic lexical items (‘boy’, ‘cat’, ‘give’, ‘break’, etc.) have internal linguistic structure. (Call the theory that they do the Decomposition Hypothesis (DC).) The cognitive science consensus is, overwhelmingly, that DC is true; for example, that there is a level of grammar at which ‘breaktr’ has the structure ‘cause to breakint’ and so forth. We find this consensus surprising since, as far as we can tell, there is practically no evidence to support it. (...)
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  3. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore, The Worry.
    This is a long paper with a long title, but its moral is succinct. There are supposed to be two, closely related, philosophical problems about sentences1 with truth value gaps: If a sentence can't be semantically evaluated, how can it mean anything at all? and How can classical logic be preserved for a language which contains such sentences? We are neutral on whether either of these supposed problems is real. But we claim that, if either is, supervaluation won't solve it.
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  4. Jerry Fodor (forthcoming). Introduction au Problème de la Représentation Mentale. Les Études Philosophiques.
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  5. Jerry A. Fodor (forthcoming). Review of Bermudez's Thinking Without Words. [REVIEW] The Guardian.
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  6. Jerry A. Fodor (2010). What Darwin Got Wrong. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
    What kind of theory is the theory of natural selection? -- Internal constraints : what the new biology tells us -- Whole genomes, networks, modules and other complexities -- Many constraints, many environments -- The return of the laws of form -- Many are called but few are chosen : the problem of 'selection-for' -- No exit? : some responses to the problem of 'selection-for' -- Did the dodo lose its ecological niche? : or was it the other way around? (...)
     
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  7. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (2010). Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 15 - 35.
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  8. Jerry Fodor & Julian Baggini (2010). Darwin's Empty Idea. The Philosophers' Magazine 49 (49):23-32.
    “It’s not good enough to say there’s some mechanism such that you start out with amoebas and you end up with us. Everybody agrees with that. The question is in this case in the mechanical details. What you need is an account, as it were step by step, about what the constraints are, what the environmental variables are, and Darwin doesn’t give you that.”.
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  9. Jerry Fodor (2009). Where is My Mind? [REVIEW] London Review of Books 31 (3).
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  10. Jerry Fodor (2008). Against Darwinism. Mind and Language 23 (1):1–24.
    Darwinism consists of two parts: a phylogenesis of biological species (ours included) and the claim that the primary mechanism of the evolution of phenotypes is natural selection. I assume that Darwin’s account of phylogeny is essentially correct; attention is directed to the theory of natural selection. I claim that Darwin’s account of evolution by natural selection cannot be sustained. The basic problem is that, according to the consensus view, evolution consists in changes of the distribution of phenotypic traits in populations (...)
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  11. Jerry Fodor (2008). Interview - Jerry Fodor. The Philosophers' Magazine 40 (40):40-41.
    Jerry Fodor is one of the leading philosophers of mind and language in the world today. He is best known for his work developing two theses which give theirnames to his books The Modularity of Mind and The Language of Thought. He teaches philosophy at Rutgers and at the CUNY Graduate Center.
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  12. Jerry Fodor (2008). Replies. Mind and Language 23 (1):50–57.
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  13. Jerry A. Fodor (2008). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford University Press.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  14. Andrew C. Connolly, Jerry A. Fodor, Lila R. Gleitman & Henry Gleitman (2007). Why Stereotypes Don't Even Make Good Defaults. Cognition 103 (1):1-22.
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  15. Jerry A. Fodor (2007). The Revenge of the Given. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 105--116.
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  16. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore (2007). Brandom Beleaguered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):677-691.
    We take it that Brandom’s sense of the geography is that our way of proceeding is more or less the first and his is more or less the second. But we think this way of describing the situation is both unclear and misleading, and we want to have this out right at the start. Our problem is that we don’t know what “you start with” means either in formulations like “you start with the content of words and proceed to the (...)
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  17. Jerry Fodor (2006). What Is Universally Quantified and Necessary and a Posteriori and It Flies South in the Winter? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 80 (2):11 - 24.
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  18. Jerry A. Fodor (2006). Logical Behaviorism [Selection From Language of Thought]. In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman and Littlefield. 27.
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  19. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore (2006). Analyticity Again1. In Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell Pub.. 19--114.
  20. David J. Buller, Jerry Fodor & Tessa L. Crume (2005). The Emperor is Still Under-Dressed. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (11):508-510.
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  21. Jerry A. Fodor (2005). Reply to Steven Pinker So How Does the Mind Work?. Mind and Language 20 (1):25-32.
  22. Jerry Fodor & Ernie LePore (2005). Impossible Words: A Reply to Kent Johnson. Mind and Language 20 (3):353–356.
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  23. Jerry Fodor (2004). Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century. Author's Reply. Mind and Language 19 (1):99-112.
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  24. Jerry Fodor (2004). Reply to Commentators. Mind and Language 19 (1):99–112.
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  25. Jerry A. Fodor (2004). Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century. Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
  26. Jesse Prinz, Andy Clark & Jerry Fodor (2004). Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the Twentyfirst Century. Author's Reply. Mind and Language 19 (1):99-112.
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  27. Jerry A. Fodor (2003). Hume's Program (and Ours). In Hume Variation. Clarendon Press.
  28. Jerry A. Fodor (2003). Hume Variations. Oxford University Press.
    Hume? Yes, David Hume, that's who Jerry Fodor looks to for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. Fodor claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study (...)
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  29. Jerry Fodor (2002). Reply to Beaman. Cognition 83 (2):221.
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  30. Jerry A. Fodor (2002). 18 Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science As. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. 126.
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  31. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (2002). The Compositionality Papers. Oxford University Press.
    Ernie Lepore and Jerry Fodor have published a series of original and controversial essays on issues relating to compositionality in language and mind; they have...
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  32. Peter Carruthers, Andrew Chamberlin & Jerry Fodor (2001). Reviews-Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):623-628.
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  33. Jerry Fodor (2001). Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition Peter Carruthers and Andrew Chamberlin. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):623-628.
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  34. Jerry A. Fodor (2001). Language, Thought and Compositionality. Mind and Language 16 (1):1-15.
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  35. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore (2001). Brandom's Burdens: A Review of Robert B. Brandom's Articulating Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63:465-82.
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  36. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore (2001). Brandom's Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):465-481.
  37. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore (2001). Why Compositionality Won't Go Away: Reflections on Horwich's 'Deflationary' Theory. Ratio 14 (4):350–368.
    Compositionality is the idea that the meanings of complex expressions (or concepts) are constructed from the meanings of the less complex expressions (or concepts) that are their constituents.1 Over the last few years, we have just about convinced ourselves that compositionality is the sovereign test for theories of lexical meaning.2 So hard is this test to pass, we think, that it filters out practically all of the theories of lexical meaning that are current in either philosophy or cognitive science. Among (...)
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  38. Ernie Lepore & Jerry Fodor (2001). Brandom's Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):465–481.
  39. Jerry Fodor (2000). Why We Are so Good at Catching Cheaters. Cognition 75 (1):29-32.
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  40. Jerry A. Fodor (2000). In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
  41. Jerry A. Fodor (2000). Replies to Critics. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):350-374.
  42. Jerry A. Fodor (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
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  43. Louise Antony Adler, Jerry Fodor, David Israel & Michael Lipton (1999). Concepts and Stereotypes Georges Key. In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. Mit Press.
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  44. Jerry Fodor (1999). A Critique of Physiological Reductionism. In Robert Klee (ed.), Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press. 131.
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  45. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1999). All at Sea in Semantic Space: Churchland on Meaning Similarity. Journal Of Philosophy 96 (8):381-403.
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  46. Jerry Fodor, Garrett A., F. Merrill, Edward Walker, Parkes C. T. & H. Cornelia (1999). Against Definitions. In E. Margolis & S. Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. The Mit Press. 263--367.
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  47. Jerry Fodor, Garrett A., F. Merrill, Edward Walker, Parkes C. T. & H. Cornelia (1999). Concepts: Core Readings. The Mit Press.
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  48. Jerry Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1999). Impossible Words? Linguistic Inquiry 30:445-453.
    The idea that quotidian, middle-level concepts typically have internal structure-definitional, statistical, or whatever—plays a central role in practically every current approach to cognition. Correspondingly, the idea that words that express quotidian, middle-level concepts have complex representations "at the semantic level" is recurrent in linguistics; it is the defining thesis of what is often called "lexical semantics," and it unites the generative and interpretive traditions of grammatical analysis. Hale and Keyser (HK) (1993) have endorsed a version of lexical decomposition according to (...)
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