Search results for 'Jerry Gladson' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jerry Gladson & Ron Lucas (1989). Hebrew Wisdom and Psychotheological Dialogue. Zygon 24 (3):357-376.score: 120.0
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  2. Chakib Jerry & Nadia Raissi (forthcoming). Optimal Exploitation for a Commercial Fishing Model. Acta Biotheoretica.score: 60.0
    Abstract A two non-linear dynamic models, first one in two state variables and one control and the second one with three state variables and one control, are presented for the purpose of finding the optimal combination of exploitation, capital investment and price variation in the commercial fishing industry. This optimal combination is determined in terms of management policies. Exploitation, capital and price variation are controlled through the utilization rate of available capital. A novel feature in this model is that the (...)
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  3. H. Ashby Philip, K. Robbins Jerry, Ronald Massimo Rubboli & S. Laura (1980). Books in Review. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (1).score: 30.0
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  4. Kurlandski Jerry (2003). Secular Humanists by Any Other Name. Free Inquiry 23 (3).score: 30.0
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  5. Robert H. Jerry (2007). Life, Health, and Disability Insurance: Understanding the Relationships. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 35 (s2):80-89.score: 30.0
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  6. Harris Jerry (2003). The Conflict for Power in Transnational Class Theory. Science and Society 67 (3).score: 30.0
     
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  7. Joseph Raz, Rescuing Jerry From (Basic) Principles.score: 18.0
    I will say something on two or three related but distinct topics. First, something on the grounding of normative beliefs, a topic – as I see it – in moral epistemology, and then after a brief remark on explanation, something against a certain understanding of basic principles. My observations were prompted by reflection on Jerry’s desire to rescue justice from the facts.
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  8. Robert A. Wilson (2008). What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind.score: 15.0
    Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, Fodor has developed the dark message of The Modularity of Mind regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent (...)
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  9. Jerry Fodor (2008). Interview - Jerry Fodor. The Philosophers' Magazine 40 (40):40-41.score: 15.0
    Jerry Fodor is one of the leading philosophers of mind and language in the world today. He is best known for his work developing two theses which give theirnames to his books The Modularity of Mind and The Language of Thought. He teaches philosophy at Rutgers and at the CUNY Graduate Center.
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  10. Katalin Balog (2009). Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content. Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320.score: 12.0
    Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent (...)
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  11. Andre Ariew (2003). Natural Selection Doesn't Work That Way: Jerry Fodor Vs. Evolutionary Psychology on Gradualism and Saltationism. Mind and Language 18 (5):478-483.score: 12.0
    In Chapter Five of The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, Jerry Fodor argues that since it is likely that human minds evolved quickly as saltations rather than gradually as the product of an accumulation of small mutations, evolutionary psychologists are wrong to think that human minds are adaptations. I argue that Fodor’s requirement that adaptationism entails gradualism is wrongheaded. So, while evolutionary psychologists may be wrong to endorse gradualism—and I argue that they are wrong—it does not follow that they (...)
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  12. David Cole (2009). Jerry Fodor, Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited , New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, X+228, $37.95, Isbn 978-0-119-954877-. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 19 (3):439-443.score: 12.0
    Jerry Fodor, LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited , New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, x+228, $37.95, ISBN 978-0-119-954877-4 Content Type Journal Article Pages 439-443 DOI 10.1007/s11023-009-9164-4 Authors David Cole, University of Minnesota-Duluth Department of Philosophy 369 A B Anderson Hall Duluth MN 55812 USA Journal Minds and Machines Online ISSN 1572-8641 Print ISSN 0924-6495 Journal Volume Volume 19 Journal Issue Volume 19, Number 3.
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  13. Daniel Weiskopf (2002). A Critical Review of Jerry A. Fodor's the Mind Doesn't Work That Way. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551 – 562.score: 12.0
    The "New Synthesis" in cognitive science is committed to the computational theory of mind (CTM), massive modularity, nativism, and adaptationism. In The mind doesn't work that way , Jerry Fodor argues that CTM has problems explaining abductive or global inference, but that the New Synthesis offers no solution, since massive modularity is in fact incompatible with global cognitive processes. I argue that it is not clear how global human mentation is, so whether CTM is imperiled is an open question. (...)
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  14. Bradley Rives (2010). Jerry Fodor. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 12.0
    Jerry Fodor is one of the principal philosophers of mind of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. In addition to having exerted an enormous influence on virtually every portion of the philosophy of mind literature since 1960, Fodor’s work has had a significant impact on the development of the cognitive sciences. In the 1960s, along with Hilary Putnam, Noam Chomsky, and others, he put forward influential criticisms of the behaviorism that dominated much philosophy and psychology at the time. (...)
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  15. Kenneth R. Livingston (1993). What Fodor Means: Some Thoughts on Reading Jerry Fodor's A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):289-301.score: 12.0
    Jerry Fodor's Asymmetric Dependency Theory (ADT) of meaning is discussed in the context of his attempt to avoid holism and the relativism it entails. Questions are raised about the implications of the theory for psychological theories of meaning, and brief suggestions are offered for how to more closely link a theory of meaning to a theory of perception.
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  16. Kleber Bez Birolo Candiotto (2011). Fundamentos epistemológicos da teoria modular da mente de Jerry A. Fodor. Trans/Form/Ação 31 (2):119-135.score: 12.0
    Este artigo é uma apresentação dos fundamentos da teoria modular desenvolvida por Jerry A. Fodor e uma reflexão sobre seus principais desafios. A noção de modularidade da mente de Fodor, por um lado, procura superar as insuficiências metodológicas e epistemológicas do associacionismo e do localizacionismo a respeito das explicações da estrutura e do funcionamento mental; por outro lado, é uma oposição à postura culturalista de Vygotsky, para o qual as funções superiores da mente, como a cognição, são produtos artificiais, (...)
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  17. Ben Cohen, Jerry Greenfield & Meredith Maran (1998). [Book Review] Ben & Jerry's Double-Dip, Lead with Your Values and Make Money, Too. [REVIEW] Business Ethics Quarterly 8:187-189.score: 12.0
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  18. Jerry A. Fodor (1994). Posebne Nauke, Ili Nejedinstvo Nauke Kao Radna Hipoteza-Jerry A. Fodor: Special Science, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis', Synthese, 28 (1974), Pp. 97-115. [REVIEW] Theoria 37 (1):67-84.score: 12.0
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  19. Jerry A. Fodor (1979). In Reply to Philip Johnson-Laird's What's Wrong with Grandma's Guide to Procedural Semantics: A Reply to Jerry Fodor. Cognition 7 (March):93-95.score: 12.0
     
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  20. Jerry Fodor (1991). Special Sciences Jerry Fodor. In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. Mit Press. 429.score: 12.0
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  21. Steven Pinker (2005). A Reply to Jerry Fodor on How the Mind Works. Mind and Language 20 (1):33-38.score: 9.0
  22. H. Paul Grice, [In: Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, Speech Acts, Ed. By Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan.score: 9.0
    [p. 45] I wish to represent a certain subclass of nonconventional implicatures, which I shall call CONVERSATIONAL implicatures, as being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, (...)
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  23. Paul M. Churchland (1988). Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87.score: 9.0
    The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: (1) to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; (2) to show that his views on impenetrability are (...)
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  24. Mark Wilson (2009). Review of Jerry A. Fodor, Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).score: 9.0
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  25. Hans-Johann Glock (2010). Reviews Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited by Jerry A. Fodor Oxford University Press, 2008. Philosophy 85 (1):164-167.score: 9.0
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  26. Jesse Prinz (2011). Has Mentalese Earned Its Keep? On Jerry Fodor's LOT 2. [REVIEW] Mind 120 (478):485-501.score: 9.0
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  27. John M. Collins (2005). On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity. Minds and Machines 15 (1):1-22.score: 9.0
    Jerry Fodor argues that the massive modularity thesis – the claim that (human) cognition is wholly served by domain specific, autonomous computational devices, i.e., modules – is a priori incoherent, self-defeating. The thesis suffers from what Fodor dubs the input problem: the function of a given module (proprietarily understood) in a wholly modular system presupposes non-modular processes. It will be argued that massive modularity suffers from no such a priori problem. Fodor, however, also offers what he describes as a (...)
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  28. Christopher D. Viger (2005). Learning to Think: A Response to the Language of Thought Argument for Innateness. Mind and Language 20 (3):313-25.score: 9.0
    Jerry Fodor's argument for an innate language of thought continues to be a hurdle for researchers arguing that natural languages provide us with richer conceptual systems than our innate cognitive resources. I argue that because the logical/formal terms of natural languages are given a usetheory of meaning, unlike predicates, logical/formal terms might be learned without a mediating internal representation. In that case, our innate representational system might have less logical structure than a natural language, making it possible that we (...)
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  29. Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Review of Jerry Fodor, LOT 2. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.score: 9.0
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  30. Susan Schneider (2007). Yes, It Does: A Diatribe on Jerry Fodor's the Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Psyche.score: 9.0
    The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way is an expose of certain theoretical problems in cognitive science, and in particular, problems that concern the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). The problems that Fodor worries plague CTM divide into two kinds, and both purport to show that the success of cognitive science will likely be limited to the modules. The first sort of problem concerns what Fodor has called “global properties”; features that a mental sentence has which depend on how the (...)
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  31. Robert A. Wilson (2005). What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp 30:407-425.score: 9.0
    Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In _The Mind Doesn't Work That Way_, Fodor has developed the dark message of _The Modularity of Mind_ regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent (...)
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  32. Robert C. Solomon (2002). Emotions, Cognition, Affect: On Jerry Neu's A Tear is an Intellectual Thing. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):133-142.score: 9.0
    Jerome Neu has been one of the most prominent voices in the philosophy of emotions for more than twenty years, that is, before the field was even a field. His Emotions, Thought, and Therapy (1977) was one of its most original and ground-breaking books. Neu is an uncompromising defender of what has been called the cognitive theory of emotions (as am I). But the ambiguity, controversy, and confusions own by the notion of a cognitive theory of emotion is what I (...)
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  33. John E. Roemer (2010). Jerry Cohens Why Not Socialism? Some Thoughts. Journal of Ethics 14 (3-4):255-262.score: 9.0
    In his book Why Not Socialism? , G.A. Cohen described several kinds of inequality that would be acceptable under socialism, yet nonetheless harmful to community. I describe another kind of inequality with this property, deriving from the legitimate transmission of preferences and values from parents to children. In the same book, Cohen proposes that the designing of a socialist allocation mechanism is a key problem for socialist theory. I maintain this is less of a problem than he believes. Finally, some (...)
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  34. Dale Jacquette (2011). Intentionality as a Conceptually Primitive Relation. Acta Analytica 26 (1):15-35.score: 9.0
    If conceptual analysis is possible for finite thinkers, then there must ultimately be a distinction between complex and primitive or irreducible and unanalyzable concepts, by which complex concepts are analyzed as relations among primitive concepts. This investigation considers the advantages of categorizing intentionality as a primitive rather than analyzable concept, in both a historical Brentanian context and in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind. Arguments in support of intentionality as a primitive relation are evaluated relative to objections, especially a recent (...)
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  35. John Sarnecki (2006). Retracing Our Steps: Fodor's New Old Way with Concept Acquisition. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (40):41-73.score: 9.0
    The acquisition of concepts has proven especially difficult for philosophers and psychologists to explain. In this paper, I examine Jerry Fodor’s most recent attempt to explain the acquisition of concepts relative to experiences of their referents. In reevaluating his earlier position, Fodor attempts to co-opt informational semantics into an account of concept acquisition that avoids the radical nativism of his earlier views. I argue that Fodor’s attempts ultimately fail to be persuasive. He must either accept his earlier nativism or (...)
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  36. Jack M. C. Kwong (2006). Why Concepts Can't Be Theories. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):309-325.score: 9.0
    In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor's recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the 'theory-theory' of concepts. I argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the 'theory-theory' is (...)
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  37. John Sutton (2001). Review of Jerry Fodor, the Mind Doesn’T Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 5 (7).score: 9.0
    This review sketches Fodor's critique of evolutionary psychology and the 'massive modularity' thesis; queries his views on abduction in central processes; and suggests that his pessimism about the scope of computational psychology undermines his realism about folk psychology.
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  38. Jay David Atlas, Some Remarks on Jerry Fodor's Arguments for a Language of Thought.score: 9.0
    The arguments that Fodor (1987: 150-52) gives in support of a Language of Thought are apparently straightforward. (1) Linguistic capacities are "systematic", in the sense that if one understands the words 'John loves Mary' one also understands the form of words 'Mary loves John'. In other words, sentences have a combinatorial semantics, because they have constituent structure. (2) If cognitive capacities are systematic in the same way, they must have constituent structure also. Thus there is a Language of Thought. The (...)
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  39. Robert J. Stainton & Christopher D. Viger (2000). Review of Jerry A. Fodor's Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. [REVIEW] Synthese 123 (1):131-151.score: 9.0
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  40. Steven Gross (2001). Book Review. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong Jerry Fodor. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):469-475.score: 9.0
  41. Pierre Jacob (1995). Belief-Attribution and Rationality: A Dilemma for Jerry Fodor. In. In D. Andler (ed.), Facets of Rationality. Sage Publications. 19--34.score: 9.0
  42. Todd Jones (1991). Staving Off Catastrophe: A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's Psychosemantics. Mind and Language 6 (1):58-82.score: 9.0
  43. M. J. Cain (2002). Fodor: Language, Mind, and Philosophy. Polity Press.score: 9.0
    Jerry Fodor is one of the most important philosophers of mind in recent decades. He has done much to set the agenda in this field and has had a significant influence on the development of cognitive science. Fodor's project is that of constructing a physicalist vindication of folk psychology and so paving the way for the development of a scientifically respectable intentional psychology. The centrepiece of his engagement in this project is a theory of the cognitive mind, namely, the (...)
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  44. David Cole (2002). Jerry Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 12 (3):443-448.score: 9.0
  45. Eric Dietrich (2001). It Does So: Review of Jerry Fodor, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. [REVIEW] AI Magazine 22 (4):121-24.score: 9.0
    Objections to AI and computational cognitive science are myriad. Accordingly, there are many different reasons for these attacks. But all of them come down to one simple observation: humans seem a lot smarter that computers -- not just smarter as in Einstein was smarter than I, or I am smarter than a chimpanzee, but more like I am smarter than a pencil sharpener. To many, computation seems like the wrong paradigm for studying the mind. (Actually, I think there are deeper (...)
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  46. Gabriel M. A. Segal (1997). Content and Computation: Chasing the Arrowsa Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's the Elm and the Expert. Mind and Language 12 (3&4):490–501.score: 9.0
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  47. Will Kymlicka (2010). In Memory of G. A “Jerry” Cohen (1941–2009). Social Philosophy Today 26:151-152.score: 9.0
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  48. Alex Rosenberg (2013). How Jerry Fodor Slid Down the Slippery Slope to Anti-Darwinism, and How We Can Avoid the Same Fate. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):1-17.score: 9.0
    There is only one physically possible process that builds and operates purposive systems in nature: natural selection. What it does is build and operate systems that look to us purposive, goal directed, teleological. There really are not any purposes in nature and no purposive processes ether. It is just one vast network of linked causal chains. Darwinian natural selection is the only process that could produce the appearance of purpose. That is why natural selection must have built and must continually (...)
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  49. Wayne A. Davis (2005). On Begging the Systematicity Question. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:399-404.score: 9.0
    Robert Cummins has argued that Jerry Fodor’s well-known systematicity argument begs the question. I show that the systematicity argument for thought structure does not beg the question, nor run in either explanatory nor inferential circles, nor illegitimately project sentence structure onto thoughts. Because the evidence does not presuppose that thought has structure, connectionist explanations of the same interconnections between thoughts are at least possibilities. Butthey are likely to be ad hoc.
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  50. Michael J. Kennedy & Leland C. Horn (2007). Thoughts on Ethics Education in the Business School Environment: An Interview with Dr. Jerry Trapnell, AACSB. [REVIEW] Journal of Academic Ethics 5 (1):77-83.score: 9.0
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