Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincare's Philosophy of Science and The Conventionalist Tradition contains essays concerned with Henri Poincare's philosophy of science, physics in particular, and with the conventionalist tradition in philosophy that he revived and reshaped, simultaneously with, but independently of, Pierre Duhem. Separating five essays as chapters, the book discusses the main ideas of the philosophy (Essays 1 and 5), traces at least some of its historical background (Essays 1, 2, and 3), and provides some of its (...) developments (Essays 2 and 4). (shrink)

The present note is intended to draw the reader's attention to the analysis of the relation between Newtonian Mechanics and Special Relativity Mechanics (henceforth to be referred to as NM and SRM), given by Philipp Frank, one of the classics of Logical Empiricism (in Frank [1938]). Frank's analysis of the relation between NM and SRM is interesting in many ways. Firstly, it shows clearly that problems of disruptive changes and of conceptual disparity were known to and discussed by Logical Empiricists (...) and that, therefore, some of them at least were not at all blinded to 'dynamic' problems of changes in actual science by their view of physical theories as interpreted axiomatic systems and did not deal with those theories as 'static, frozen in logical mold'. Secondly, it reveals some of the reasons for the Logical Empiricist rejection of what came to be known later as the incommensurability claim. (shrink)

By 'positivism' its contemporary critics mean either (a) the comte-Mill views of science, Or (b) methodological naturalism, Or (c) phenomenalism and/or instrumentalism. However, Most philosophers of science are positivists on some of these criteria and antipositivists otherwise. For example, (b) may be combined with the rejection of (c), E.G., Popper; neo-Wittgensteinians, E.G., Wright, Toulmin, Kuhn, Winch, Like nineteenth century neo-Kantians and conventionalists hold instrumentalist views of language, Theories and explanation; 'positive economics' may be either instrumentalist, E.G., Friedman, Or realist; instrumentalism, (...) Contrary to popper's account, Occurs with any admixture of realism and has pioneered anti-Inductivism, Hypotheticism and theoretical pluralism. (shrink)

Quine's reasons for recommending naturalist epistemology are: (1) knowledge, Mind and meaning are part of the world they have to do with, (2) since the cartesian quest for certainty and reductionism of carnap's 'aufbau' type have failed, Rational reconstruction has no more any advantage over psychology, (3) since phenomenalist validation of science is no longer our concern, It is not circular to appeal to psychology. Against this it is argued that (a) no definite methodological policy can be based on (1) (...) alone; (b) certainty and phenomenalist reduction are not the only purposes of rational reconstruction; (c) it would be circular to appeal to psychology in developing a theory of rational method of acquiring knowledge: (d) logic and psychology of science are complementary not mutually exclusive. (shrink)