In this paper I want to present the guiding lines of a research programme into the economics of scientific knowledge, a programme whose ultimate goal is to develop what I would like to call a contractarian epistemology. The structure of the paper is as follows: in the first section I will comment on two conflicting approaches to the topic of rationality in science: the view of the rationality of scientific knowledge as deriving from the employment of sound methodological norms, and (...) the view of scientists as rational agents pursuing the optimisation of their own personal and professional interests. In section 2 I will try to make both approaches mutually consistent by showing that a competition among rational "recognition-seekers" is only possible if they agree in accepting some system of methodological norms. Section 3 will be devoted to analyse the main kinds and properties of these norms. Finally, in section 4 I will discuss a question which is far from being easy and innocent: why are scientific norms obeyed by researchers, once they have been established in a scientific discipline? (shrink)
: Being scientific research a process of social interaction, this process can be studied from a game-theoretic perspective. Some conceptual and formal instruments that can help to understand scientific research as a game are introduced, and it is argued that game theoretic epistemology provides a middle ground for 'rationalist' and 'constructivist' theories of scientific knowledge. In the first part ('The game theoretic logic of scientific discovery'), a description of the essential elements of game of science is made, using an inferentialist (...) conception of rationality. In the second part ('Sociology of science and its rational reconstructions'), some ideas for the reconstruction of case studies are introduced, and applied to one example: Latour's analysis of Joliot's attempt to build an atomic bomb. Lastly, in the third part ('Fact making games'), a formal analysis of the constitution of scientific consensus is offered. (shrink)
This volume represents the state of the art in research on the controversial Muslim legal scholar, theologian and man of letters Ibn azm of Cordoba (d. 456/1064), who is widely regarded as one of the most brilliant minds of Islamic Spain.
In recent years there have been ever-growing concerns regarding environmental decline, causing some companies to focus on the implementation of environmentally friendly supply, production and distribution systems. Such concern may stem either from the set of beliefs and values of the company’s management or from certain pressure exerted by the market – consumers and institutions – in the belief that an environmentally respectful management policy will contribute to the transmission of a positive image of the company and its products. Sometimes, (...) however, ethics and market rules are not enough to deal with this situation and specific laws must be considered. This is the case when companies base their activity on the ‹ethics of self-interest’ concentrating their efforts on projecting an adequate image – e.g. environmental respect – rather than fundamentally behaving in environmentally respectful ways. This article, taking as reference the SME context, discusses the reasons for implementing environmentally friendly systems. Both ethics and business seem to be relevant and, therefore, a certain balance between market and interventionism seems to be necessary. (shrink)
This article explores the influence that an organisation’s corporate values have on employees’ behaviour and values both within and outside the work environment. In particular, it focuses on the impact of these values on the personal buying behaviour of employees. The empirical research was undertaken within a case study organisation that produces wine in Spain and involved interviews with senior management, an analysis of company documentation, as well as group discussions with employees supported by an employee survey. The article argues (...) that an organisation’s corporate values influence not only its employees’ behaviour within the work environment, but also impacts on their global values system outside of the work environment. In particular, this was evident within the employees’ buying behaviour practices in relation to supplier loyalty and environmental concern. This has implications for business ethics as an organisation’s value system may go beyond the purely business context. Organisations need to be aware of their impact on employees’ behaviour outside of the work environment; this is particularly the case for multinational companies working across many cultures. (shrink)
Reprinted in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, Volume 1: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, Oxford 2009, ed. Michael Rea. A popular argument for the divinity of Jesus goes like this. Jesus claimed to be divine, but if his claim was false, then either he was insane (mad) or lying (bad), both of which are very unlikely; so, he was divine. I present two objections to this argument. The first, the dwindling probabilities objection, contends that even if we make generous probability assignments (...) to the relevant pieces of evidence for Jesus’ divinity, the probability calculus tell us to suspend judgement on the matter. The second, and more telling objection in my opinion, the merely mistaken objection, contends that it is no less plausible to suppose that Jesus was neither mad nor bad but merely mistaken than that he was divine. (shrink)
This is a critical assessment of today presentations of Jesus of Nazareth’ Kingdom of God in so-called historical-exegetical books. Three of them are selected for a minute criticism. It follows a brief exegesis of all then important Gospel texts about the Kingdom of God as a «future event» or as «present» and «already come» in Jesus ministry. After a close scrutiny, only one Gospel passage (Luke 17:20-21) can be used with some doubts for sustaining that Jesus has proclaimed a Kingdom (...) of God already present. The article concludes with a brief exposition of the conceptions of the historical Jesus view about the Kingdom, and some consequences for the modern transpositions of his view. (shrink)
The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testamentdocuments alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima (...) facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed—a principle I call the contamination principle—entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of good independent evidence for an historical Jesus, remain sceptical about his existence. (shrink)
This article explores Karl Barth's early and later understanding of the incarnation with a view toward answering two very important theological questions: did Barth so historicize his Christology in his doctrine of Reconciliation that he could no longer accept his own earlier view that “His Word would still be His Word apart from this becoming [incarnate], just as Father, Son and Holy Spirit would be none the less eternal God, if no world had been created”? Or did his earlier view (...) enable him to present a more powerful understanding of how God himself was at work in the history of Jesus of Nazareth and in human history effecting the reconciliation of the world both from the side of God and from the human side? This article argues that Barth never historicized his Christology to such an extent that he ever would have espoused the idea that Jesus' human history “constituted” his being as the second person of the Trinity, since any such thinking undermines Barth's belief that Jesus' divinity must be recognized as “definitive, authentic and essential” if it is to be truly recognized at all. It is further argued that those who do espouse this view have confused epistemology and ontology by mistakenly assuming that since we cannot know the eternal Trinity except through the human history of Jesus as the incarnate Word, that must mean that the eternal Word never existed without that human history so that, strictly speaking, we can no longer distinguish between the immanent and the economic Trinity and the logos asarkos and logos incarnandus . This article suggests that those who hold that God realizes his own eternal being by suffering and dying for us have missed a crucial point of Barth's trinitarian doctrine which is that God realizes his purposes for us in the suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus, but that he did not thereby realize his own being as the triune God, since God's eternal being and act does not need any realization by virtue of the fact that God is perfect and acts toward us in the overflow of that perfect love in perfect freedom. (shrink)
Being 'biblical' : contexts and starting points -- Jesus of Nazareth : great moral teacher or friend of sinners? -- Paul : follower or founder? -- Mark : suffering for the kingdom -- Matthew : being truly righteous -- Luke-Acts : a universal concern -- John : teaching the truth in love -- Apartheid : an ethical and generic challenge to reading the New Testament.
A number of Christian philosophers, most recently Gary R. Habermas and William Lane Craig, have claimed that there is sufficient historical evidence to establish the resurrection of Jesus conceived as the transformation of Jesus’ corpse into a living supernatural body that possesses such extraordinary dispositional properties as the inability to ever die again. I argue that, given this conception of resurrection, our only source of potential evidence, the New Testament Easter traditions, cannot provide adequate information to enable us to establish (...) the historicity of the resurrection---even on the assumption that these traditions are completely historically reliable. (shrink)
That�s how we ought to think about Jesus. It�s usually agreed by both Christians and non Christians, even by vehement anti-Christians, that Jesus as presented in the four gospels is perfectly ideal, morally. Many of his most simple teachings (e.g., the "Golden Rule") seem brilliant, and many of the actions that seem most natural to him (e.g., seeking to forgive those who crucify him because "they know not what they do") are, at times, amazing. But we should scour the record (...) before signing on the dotted line. (Box 1 and Box 2 give other reasons it�s important to think this through.). (shrink)
I model an attempt by radical parties to topple a modus vivendi between a ruling government and a moderate opposition group. Cooperation between the regime and the moderate opposition is possible if each player prefers mutual cooperation to mutual confrontation. If each player also prefers mutual confrontation to cooperating while the other defects then radical parties have a chance at breaking up this accord. Radical parties can succeed in bringing the government and opposition to mutual confrontation if they can agree (...) on power-sharing arrangements after regime change. This paper also resolves central questions surrounding the trial and crucifixion of Jesus Christ. I use an institutional approach to infer player preferences from historical and biblical sources and then use game theory to model the interactions between participants in these events. In so doing, I clarify aspects of the Gospel narrative that have puzzled readers for the past 2000 years. (shrink)
Lucifer and Jesus may be used as historical ‘archetypes’ responding to a Father who makes excessive demands on his sons. The one rebels, the other obeys. I discuss the evolution of these archetypes through Plato's ‘Forms’, Plotinus' account of the mistaken and regrettable ‘fall’ of soul into matter, Milton's Paradise Lost (he expands Lucifer's rebellion from not accepting Jesus as the highest creature to disavowing the Father and usurping his place), and finally Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamasov, where all the sons (...) but Alyosha rebel against their overbearing father. Lucifer thus becomes an archetype to the modern imagination encapsulating one response to the inadequate father, or the father perceived as making excessive, and perhaps unacceptable, demands. Christ functions as a contrasting archetype, carrying forward an earlier, alternative response to a father filing an extraordinary request. (shrink)
What, if anything, has Jesus to do with philosophy? Although widely neglected, this question calls for attention from anyone interested in philosophy,whether Christian or non-Christian. This paper clarifies how philosophy fares under the teaching of Jesus. In particular, it contends that Jesus’slove (agape) commands have important implications for how philosophy is to be done, specifically, for what questions may be pursued. The paper,accordingly, distinguishes two relevant modes of being human: a discussion mode and an obedience mode. Philosophy done under the (...) authority ofJesus’s love commands must transcend a discussion mode to realize an obedience mode of human conduct. So, under Jesus’s teachings, we no longer have business as usual in philosophy. The discipline of philosophy then takes on a purpose foreign to philosophy as we know it, even as practiced by Christian philosophers. Under the authority of Jesus, philosophy becomes agape-oriented ministry in the church of Jesus and thus reflective of Jesus himself. In this respect, Jesus is Lord of philosophy. (shrink)
Jesus’ teachings on neighborliness, frugality, support for the poor, and nonviolence should become more central to Christian environmental ethics. His actionoriented teachings do not explicitly mention nature, yet should have a beneficial collateral effect on environments when practiced by Christian communities. This issue affects Christian economics, simple causality models of environmental beliefs and impacts, and “love of nature” theology.
To appear in Charles Quarles, ed., Buried Hopes or Risen Savior: The Search for Jesus’ Tomb (B&H Publishing Group). For supporting math see www.jesustombmath.org.
Dan Jaffé | : Cet article se propose d’étudier les conceptions talmudiques relatives à la croyance chrétienne en la conception et en la naissance virginale de Jésus. L’approche consiste principalement en une étude philologique et historique du cognomen ben Pantera affilié à Jésus dans de nombreux textes talmudiques principalement tannaïtiques. On propose de voir dans le nom ben Pantera une raillerie à l’encontre de la croyance chrétienne en la conception et en la naissance virginale de Jésus. L’accusation d’union illégitime énoncée (...) et véhiculée en monde juif ainsi qu’en monde païen se retrouve dans la littérature talmudique. Le christianisme y est souvent assimilé à la séduction exercée par la prostitution. Ainsi, c’est à un même univers conceptuel qu’il convient de se référer dans l’étude de cette question : la relation dialectique entre l’attirance exercée par le christianisme et celle exercée par la prostituée, dans le processus historique de séparation entre juifs et chrétiens. | : This article proposes a philological and historic analysis of the Talmudic name Ben Pantera. It is suggested that this ancient expression has to be understood as corresponding to a period in which the Jews wished to think of Christianity, choosing the person of Jesus as an emblematic figure of this reality. The expression Ben Pantera expresses mockery and even scorn towards Jesus. It must be placed back in a period in which, on account of the doctrinal controversies between Jews and Christians, the two religions had consummated a Parting of the Ways and acknowledged each other as rivals. Thus, Ben Pantera appears to be the oldest mention of Jesus in the Talmudic literature. (shrink)
In this groundbreaking study, Stephen H. Webb offers a new theological understanding of the material and spiritual: that, far from being contradictory, they unite in the very stuff of the eternal Jesus Christ. -/- Accepting matter as a perfection (or predicate) of the divine requires a rethinking of the immateriality of God, the doctrine of creation out of nothing, the Chalcedonian formula of the person of Christ, and the analogical nature of religious language. It also requires a careful reconsideration of (...) Augustine's appropriation of the Neo-Platonic understanding of divine incorporeality as well as Origen's rejection of anthropomorphism. Webb locates his position in contrast to evolutionary theories of emergent materialism and the popular idea that the world is God's body. He draws on a little known theological position known as the ''heavenly flesh'' Christology, investigates the many misunderstandings of its origins and relation to the Monophysite movement, and supplements it with retrievals of Duns Scotus, Caspar Scwenckfeld and Eastern Orthodox reflections on the transfiguration. Also included in Webb's study are discussions of classical figures like Barth and Aquinas as well as more recent theological proposals from Bruce McCormack, David Hart, and Colin Gunton. Perhaps most provocatively, the book argues that Mormonism provides the most challenging, urgent, and potentially rewarding source for metaphysical renewal today. -/- Webb's concept of Christian materialism challenges traditional Christian common sense, and aims to show the way to a more metaphysically sound orthodoxy. (shrink)
Evan’s Fales’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the origin of the empty tomb narrative in the gospels of the New Testament is shown to be flawed in taking pagan mythology rather than Palestinian Judaism as the proper interpretive context for the life of Jesus.
arguments in favor of, say, Jesus, as the final revelation of God will ultimately undermine that appeal to Jesus by making any arguments deployed the final norm of truth in theology. To use conventional rhetoric, reason will have ...
Hegel’s early essay called “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate” contains his longest analysis of the resurrection of Jesus, which he attributes to the spirit of the early Christian communit y. To represent its practice of the love he taught, the community made him into a god. Furthermore, because it withdrew from life in the world, the communit y knew its love as deficient, and portrayed this defect by adding the separate human individuality of its teacher to his divinity. (...) The risen Christ (both human and divine) lives only in the subjective mind of the communit y, as an expression of its feeling. However, Hegel does recognize divine objectivity in the “one” source of theuniverse, the Father of Jesus. (shrink)
Introduction I : Who is this book for? -- Introduction II : How is Jesus a philosopher? -- Introduction III : What are the four great questions of philosophy? -- Jesus' metaphysics (What is real?). Jesus' Jewish metaphysics ; Jesus' new name for God ; The metaphysics of love ; The moral consequences of metaphysics ; Sanctity as the key to ontology ; The metaphysics of "I am" -- Jesus' epistemology (How do we know what is real?) -- Jesus' anthropology (...) (Who are we who know what is real?) -- Jesus' ethics (What should we be to be more real?). Christian personalism : seeing "Jesus only" ; The overcoming of legalism ; The refutation of relativism ; The secret of moral success ; Jesus and sex ; Jesus and social ethics : solidarity ; Jesus and politics : is he left or right? -- Conclusion. (shrink)
Although Kant had a high regard for Jesus as a moral teacher, interpreters typically assume that his philosophy disallows belief in Jesus as God. Those who regard Kant as a moral reductionist are especially likely to offer a negative construal of the densely-argued subsection of his 1793 Religion that relates directly to this issue. The recent “affirmative” trend in Kant-scholarship provides the basis for an alternative reading. First, theologians must regard Jesus as human so that belief in Jesus can empower (...) believers to become good. Second, theologians may refer to Jesus as divine by identifying his disposition as exemplifying the “archetype of perfect humanity.” Third, Judeo-Christian history poses an empirical problem that theologians can solve by interpreting Jesus’s divinity according to the schematism of analogy. While this does not constitute a robust (identifiably Christian) doctrine of Jesus’s divinity, it does provide clear guidelines for formulating such a tenet of historical faith. (shrink)
The orderliness of the universe and the existence of human beings already provides some reason for believing that there is a God - as argued in Richard Swinburne's earlier book Is There a God ? Swinburne now claims that it is probable that the main Christian doctrines about the nature of God and his actions in the world are true. In virtue of his omnipotence and perfect goodness, God must be a Trinity, live a human life in order to share (...) our suffering, and found a church which would enable him to tell all humans about this. It is also quite probable that he would provide his human life as an atonement for our wrongdoing, teach us how we should live and tell us his plans for our future after death. Among founders of religions, Jesus satisfies uniquely well the requirement of living the sort of human life which God would need to have lived. But to give us adequate reason to believe that Jesus was God, God would need to put his 'signature' on the life of Jesus by an act which he alone could do, for example raise him from the dead. There is adequate historical evidence that Jesus rose from the dead. The church which he founded gave plausible interpretations of his basic message. Therefore Christian doctrines are probably true. (shrink)
Yoder rearranges the theological landscape -- North American Mennonite experience -- Amsterdam 1952 -- American church and society in the postwar era -- Mennonite mentors at Goshen College -- European experience and the debate about war -- A European assignment -- Relating to European Mennonite churches -- Confronting the moral question of war -- The world council of churches debate -- Doctoral studies with Barth and Cullman -- The theology of Karl Barth -- Oscar Cullmann and biblical studies -- Other (...) European conversations -- Disseration on the Swiss anabaptists -- Historical anabaptist research -- The core of anabaptist beliefs -- Constructing an anabaptist theology -- Understanding the "politics of Jesus" -- Characterizing theologies -- Yoder's theological language -- Yoder's constructive theology -- A lived praxis -- The "politics of Jesus" as social practice -- The challenge of just peacebuilding -- Basic principles of the "politics of Jesus' -- A conversation with Catholic peace traditions -- Just peacebuilding collaboration -- The social praxis of the Christian community -- A religious peacebuilding program. (shrink)
But still, I had heard it. It must have been in the New English Bible and the New English E 'o)# f&# Bible is sound on scholarship, so there must be good manuscript authority for s..
According to the Christian religion, Jesus was “crucified under Pontius Pilate; he suffered death and was buried. On the third day he rose again”. I take it that this rising again—the Resurrection of Jesus, as it’s sometimes called—is, according to the Christian religion, an historical event, just like his crucifixion, death, and burial. And I would have thought that to investigate whether the Resurrection occurred, we would need to do some historical research: we would need to assess the reliability of (...) the New Testament documents and related manuscripts; we would need to look into the credibility of the witnesses to his post-mortem appearances, the empty tomb, and the like. The task looks rather daunting. But, according to David Hume, we don’t have to do anything of the kind. For no matter how strong the testimony in favor of a miracle is—indeed, even if we “suppose…that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof”—we have at our disposal a “full proof…against the existence of any miracle”. So we can avoid all that tedious historical work. We can simply use Hume’s shortcut, a proof against the existence of any miracle, and hence a proof against the Resurrection. So Hume says he has a “a decisive argument,” “an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion,” superstitious delusions like the Resurrection. There is good news and bad news in Hume’s proclamation. The good news is that he really has two arguments, not just one—or, at any rate, many scholars discern in his writings two arguments. The bad news is that neither succeeds; at any rate, try as I might, I can’t see how they do. (shrink)
A new form of visual representation of divine others is emerging: photography. I examine here a set of photos of deities related to an apparition claim. The goal I pursue is to analyze the self-constitutive features of these pictures – how they produce what they claim to be. I argue that the “presence' of the deities in the photos is achieved through “incarnation practices.' But these pictures are not just a factual representation of alleged mystical events. They constitute an update (...) and a variation on the “Grand Christian Narrative' wherein the factual poses the moral problem of belief. In that sense, divine photography does not modify the epistemology of religious belief. (shrink)
Impossible love -- Between nature and culture -- Surviving, forever foreign -- Cryptic crossing -- Touching transcendence, in the flesh -- The tragedy of Christianity.
This book argues that the uniquely dynamic and propulsive character of Western Civilization, for better and worse, has been generated by a creative argument ...
Although the following essay is literary-philosophical, it arose from a practical interest. I have been struck by how widespread today is the complaint about the ‘inadequate father’. Of course a father may be inadequate in diverse ways, either absconding, absent and weak, or overbearing, tyrannical and bullying, or some combination of these. Further, I am not restricting the term ‘father’ to its narrow biological sense, but using it rather as a metaphor for any institution or structure which an individual or (...) a group feels should have been in place to guide, direct, and protect them in important situations, but did not do its job properly. Consequently they are willing to concede they are not all they could have been, but they insist it is not their fault, rather the fault of the ‘father’ who should have done his job better. This ties in with the fashionable appeal of ‘victimhood’. Everybody today seems to want to cast themselves as a ‘victim’, for reasons similar to those mentioned above. If you are a ‘victim’, then there must have been an ‘oppressor’– and some ‘parent’ organization that should have guided, directed, and protected you against the oppressor, but again did not do its job adequately. It is striking how many individuals and groups around the world choose to perceive themselves, and to present themselves to others, as ‘victims’; it has indeed become the preferred characterization of our age, for it carries with it a rhetoric that trumps all others. If you are able to cast yourselves as a ‘victim’, and have others accept this, you disarm and neutralize criticism, not only of what you are, but of what you are currently doing – because the latter is a just ‘compensation’ for what you have suffered. As with guilt, there is no built-in limit or statute of limitations. This rhetoric was not as established thirty or forty years ago. Where did these terms, and this style of self-presentation and arguing, come from? They didn't fall from the sky or materialize out of thin air. The following essay is an attempt at ‘intellectual archaeology’, that is, to lay bear and lift up the strand in the intellectual tradition that was mined to produce these categories and justify this way of construing our situation; thereby to expose a serious and surprising presupposition or ‘archetype’ behind this rhetoric and to place this at arm's length alongside an alternative foil, to allow us to decide dispassionately whether we want to be committed to the former. (shrink)
