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Profile: Jesper Kallestrup (University of Edinburgh)
  1. J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup (forthcoming). Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC (...)
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  2. J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (forthcoming). Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues.
    Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first (...)
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  3. Jesper Kallestrup (forthcoming). Review of Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
    The debate between the reductive and emergent materialist is still very much a live one. (Antony and Levine 1997; Auyang 2000; Bechtel and Richardson 1992; Block 1997; Boyd 1999; Crane 2001; David 1997; Fodor 1989; Fodor 1997; Kim 1993b; Kim 1994; Kim 1996; Kim 1999; Le Pore and Loewer 1987; Millikan 1999; Pereboom 2002; Rueger 2000; Van Gulick 2001; Yablo 1992). We argue that the best way to settle this debate is to take a step back and consider the metaphysics (...)
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  4. Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.) (forthcoming). New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  5. Mark Sprevak & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.) (forthcoming). New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave.
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  6. Jesper Kallestrup (2013). Scepticism and Reliable BeliefBy José Zalabardo. Analysis 73 (4):809-811.
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  7. Jesper Kallestrup & D. H. Pritchard (2013). The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue Epistemology. In Ruth Groff & John Greco (eds.), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. Routledge. 248--269.
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  8. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Jesper Kallestrup (2013). The Epistemology of Absence-Based Inference. Synthese 190 (13):2573-2593.
    Our main aim in this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the epistemology of absence-based inferences. Many absence-based inferences are classified as fallacies. There are exceptions, however. We investigate what features make absence-based inferences epistemically good or reliable. In Section 2 we present Sanford Goldberg’s account of the reliability of absence-based inference, introducing the central notion of epistemic coverage. In Section 3 we approach the idea of epistemic coverage through a comparison of alethic and evidential principles. The (...)
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  9. Jesper Kallestrup (2012). Bootstrap and Rollback: Generalizing Epistemic Circularity. Synthese 189 (2):395-413.
    Reliabilists accept the possibility of basic knowledge—knowledge that p in virtue of the reliability of some belief-producing process r without antecedent knowledge that r is reliable. Cohen (Philos Phenomenol Res 65:309–329, 2002 , Philos Phenomenol Res 70:417–430, 2005 ) and Vogel (J Philos 97:602–623, 2000 , J Philos 105:518–539, 2008 ) have argued that one can bootstrap knowledge that r is reliable from basic knowledge. This paper provides a diagnosis of epistemic bootstrapping, and then shows that recent attempts at embracing (...)
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  10. Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard (2012). Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):84-103.
    According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as agents epistemically (...)
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  11. Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard (2012). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
    A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate (...)
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  12. Mikkel Gerken, Jesper Kallestrup, Klemens Kappel & Duncan Pritchard (2011). Introduction: Social Cognitive Ecology and Its Role in Social Epistemology. Episteme 8 (1):1-5.
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  13. Jesper Kallestrup (2011). Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism Revisited. Dialectica 66 (1):5-21.
    In response to Kripke's modal argument contemporary descriptivists suggest that referring terms, e.g., ‘water’, are synonymous with actually-rigidified definite descriptions, e.g., ‘the actual watery stuff’. Following Scott Soames, this strategy has the counterintuitive consequence that possible speakers on Perfect Earth cannot be ascribed water-beliefs without beliefs about the actual world. Co-indexing the actuality and possibility operators has the equally untoward result that possible speakers on Twin Earth are ascribed water-beliefs. So, Soames's dilemma is that the descriptivist can account for either (...)
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  14. Jesper Kallestrup (2011). Semantic Externalism. Routledge.
    Descriptivism -- Referentialism -- From language to thought -- Varieties of narrow and wide content -- Self-knowledge -- Scepticism -- Mental causation.
     
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  15. Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Conceivability, Rigidity and Counterpossibles. Synthese 171 (3):377 - 386.
    Wright (In Gendler and Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility, 2002) rejects some dominant responses to Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-body identity theory, and instead he proposes a new response that draws on a certain understanding of counterpossibles. This paper offers some defensive remarks on behalf of Lewis’ objection to that argument, and it argues that Wright’s proposal fails to fully accommodate the conceivability intuitions, and that it is dialectically ineffective.
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  16. Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Knowledge-Wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):468-476.
  17. Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Perspectival Thought. Analysis 69 (2):347-352.
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  18. Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Reliabilist Justification: Basic, Easy, and Brute. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (3):155-171.
    Process reliabilists hold that in order for a belief to be justified, it must result from a reliable cognitive process. They also hold that a belief can be basically justified: justified in this manner without having any justification to believe that belief is reliably produced. Fumerton (1995), Vogel (2000), and Cohen (2002) have objected that such basic justification leads to implausible easy justification by means of either epistemic closure principles or so-called track record arguments. I argue that once we carefully (...)
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  19. Jesper Kallestrup (2009). The Mind-Body World-Not. Think 8 (21):37-51.
    Here Kallestrup presents a succinct introduction to some of the latest thinking about the notorious mind-body problem.
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  20. Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard (2009). Introduction. Synthese 171 (3):357-358.
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  21. Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.) (2008). Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    There are few more unsettling philosophical questions than this: What happens in attempts to reduce some properties to some other more fundamental properties?
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  22. Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup, Introduction.
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  23. Jesper Kallestrup (2008). Three Strands in Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Theory. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.
    Kripke's argument against the identity theory in the philosophy of mind runs as follows. Suppose some psychophysical identity statement S is true. Then S would seem to be contingent at least in the sense that S seems possibly false. And given that seeming contingency entails genuine contingency when it comes to such statements S is contingent. But S is necessary if true. So S is false. This entry considers responses to each of the three premises. It turns out that each (...)
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  24. Jesper Kallestrup (2007). If Omniscient Beings Are Dialetheists, Then so Are Anti-Realists. Analysis 67 (295):252–254.
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  25. Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):1-23.
    This paper offers a new solution to the knowledge argument. Both a priori and a posteriori physicalists reject the claim that Mary does not know all the facts, but they do so for different reasons. While the former think that Mary gains no new knowledge of any fact, the latter think that Mary gains new knowledge of an old fact. This paper argues that on a broad understanding of what counts as physical, it is consistent with physicalism that Mary does (...)
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  26. Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities. Synthese 151 (2):273-295.
    David Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism relies on the entailment from a priori conceivability to metaphysical possibility. The a posteriori physicalist rejects this premise, but is consequently committed to psychophysical strong necessities. These don't fit into the Kripkean model of the necessary a posteriori, and they are therefore, according to Chalmers, problematic. But given semantic assumptions that are essential to the conceivability argument, there is reason to believe in microphysical strong necessities. This means that some of Chalmers' criticism is unwarranted, (...)
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  27. Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
    Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument says that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. In addition, Kim has argued that the nonreductive physicalist must give up completeness, and embrace the possibility of downward causation. This paper argues first that this extra argument relies on a principle of property individuation, which the nonreductive physicalist need not accept, and second that (...)
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  28. Jesper Kallestrup (2005). Contextualism Between Scepticism and Common-Sense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):247-266.
    This paper examines two recent objections against contextualism. The first is that contextualists are unable to assert their own position, and the second is that contextualists are forced to side with common-sense against scepticism. It is argued that once we get clear on the commitments of contextualism, neither objection succeeds in what it aims to show.
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  29. Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content (...)
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  30. Jesper Kallestrup (2003). Paradoxes About Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):107-117.
    Referentialism is the view that all there is to the meaning of a singular term is its referent. Referentialism entails Substitutivity, i.e., that co-referring terms are intersubstitutable salva veritate . Frege's Paradox shows that Referentialism is inconsistent given two principles: Disquotation says that if S assents to 'P', then S believes that P, and Consistency says that if S believes that P and that not-P, then S is not fully rational. Kripke's strategy was to save Substitutivity by showing that those (...)
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  31. Jesper Kallestrup (2000). Puzzles About Apriori Contingencies. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):37-48.
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