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Jesse J. Prinz [50]Jesse Jonathan Prinz [1]
  1. Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
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  2. Jesse J. Prinz (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press.
    Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing (...)
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  3. Jesse J. Prinz (2002). Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. MIT Press.
  4. Joshua Knobe & Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.
    When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can proceed either by thinking about the entity from a *functional* standpoint or by thinking about the entity from a *physical* standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people’s mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking asymmetry. It appears that ascriptions of states involving phenomenal consciousness are sensitive to physical factors in (...)
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  5. Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception. Psyche 12 (1).
    Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception _offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, (...)
     
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  6. Jesse J. Prinz (2006). The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.
    Recent work in cognitive science provides overwhelming evidence for a link between emotion and moral judgment. I review?ndings from psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and research on psychopathology and conclude that emotions are not merely correlated with moral judgments but they are also, in some sense, both necessary and suf?cient. I then use these?ndings along with some anthropological observations to support several philosophical theories:?rst, I argue that sentimentalism is true: to judge that something is wrong is to have a sentiment of disapprobation (...)
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  7. Jesse J. Prinz (2011). Is Empathy Necessary for Morality. In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press 211--229.
  8. Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Is the Mind Really Modular? In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell 22--36.
    When Fodor titled his (1983) book the _Modularity of Mind_, he overstated his position. His actual view is that the mind divides into systems some of which are modular and others of which are not. The book would have been more aptly, if less provocatively, called _The Modularity of Low-Level Peripheral Systems_. High-level perception and cognitive systems are non-modular on Fodor’s theory. In recent years, modularity has found more zealous defenders, who claim that the entire mind divides into highly specialized (...)
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  9. Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Beyond Appearances : The Content of Sensation and Perception. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 434--460.
    There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally.
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  10. Jesse J. Prinz (2007). All Consciousness is Perceptual. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
  11.  78
    Jesse J. Prinz (2000). A Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):243-59.
    This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the (...)
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  12. Jesse J. Prinz (2005). A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press 381-396.
    Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are (...)
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  13. Andy Clark & Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the Twenty-First Century. Mind and Language 19 (1):57-69.
  14. Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Which Emotions Are Basic? In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press 69--87.
    There are two major perspectives on the origin of emotions. According to one, emotions are the products of natural selection. They are evolved adaptations, best understood using the explanatory tools of evolutionary psychology. According to the other, emotions are socially constructed, and they vary across cultural boundaries. There is evidence supporting both perspectives. In light of this, some have argued both approaches are right. The standard strategy for compromise is to say that some emotions are evolved and others are constructed. (...)
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  15. Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Is Emotion a Form of Perception? In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press 137-160.
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  16. Jesse J. Prinz (2005). Are Emotions Feelings? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.
    The majority of emotion researchers reject the feeling theory of emotions; they deny that emotions are feelings. Some of these researchers admit that emotions have feelings as components, but they insist that emotions contain other components as well, such as cognitions. I argue for a qualified version of the feeling theory. I present evidence in support William James's conjecture that emotions are perceptions of patterned changes in the body. When such perceptions are conscious, they qualify as feelings. But the bodily (...)
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  17. Jesse J. Prinz (2007). Can Moral Obligations Be Empirically Discovered? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):271-291.
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  18. Jesse J. Prinz (2004). The Fractionation of Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):40-57.
    Edward Titchener, one of the great champions of introspectionist psychology, declared that 'the term Introspection, as we find it used today, is highly equivocal, and that the procedure which it connotes may be scientifically illegitimate, or even wholly imaginary' . He made the point because he wanted to insulate his preferred method of doing psychological research from criticisms that were directed against forms of introspection that he conceded to be unreliable. The point, however, is not just that we can introspect (...)
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  19.  53
    Jesse J. Prinz (2007). Empirical Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy. In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press 189--208.
  20. Jesse J. Prinz (2005). The Return of Concept Empiricism. In H. Cohen & C. Leferbvre (eds.), Categorization and Cognitive Science. Elsevier
    In this chapter, I outline and defend a version of concept empiricism. The theory has four central tenets: Concepts represent categories by reliable causal relations to category instances; conceptual representations of category vary from occasion to occasion; these representations are perceptually based; and these representations are all learned, not innate. The last two tenets on this list have been central to empiricism historically, and the first two have been developed in more recent years. I look at each in turn, and (...)
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  21.  13
    Frank Jackson, Jesse J. Prinz, Ernest Sosa & Kim Sterelny (2009). Viii Notes on Contributors Alvin Goldman is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. His Principal Research Areas Are Episte-Mology, Philosophy of Mind, and Cognitive Science. His Most Recent Book is Simulating Minds (2006). [REVIEW] In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell
  22. Jesse J. Prinz (2012). Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape the Human Mind. W.W. Norton.
     
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  23.  88
    Jesse J. Prinz (2000). The Duality of Content. Philosophical Studies 100 (1):1-34.
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  24.  78
    Jesse J. Prinz (2010). When is Perception Conscious? In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press 310--332.
    Once upon a time, people thought that all perception was conscious. Indeed, it was widely believed that all mental states are conscious, so the problem of explaining consciousness collapses into the problem of explaining mentality. But things have changed. Most people now believe that a lot goes on unconsciously. Indeed, some people believe that mental states that are not perceptual in nature are never conscious. That’s a matter of controversy. Less controversial is the claim that perceptual states are conscious some (...)
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  25.  71
    Jesse J. Prinz & A. Clark (2004). Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the Twenty First Century. Mind and Language 19 (1):57-69.
    Fodor’s theory makes thinking prior to doing. It allows for an inactive agent or pure reflector, and for agents whose actions in various ways seem to float free of their own conceptual repertoires. We show that naturally evolved creatures are not like that. In the real world, thinking is always and everywhere about doing. The point of having a brain is to guide the actions of embodied beings in a complex material world. Some of those actions are, to be sure, (...)
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  26. Jesse J. Prinz, Mental Maintenance: A Response to the Knowledge Argument.
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  27.  17
    Jesse J. Prinz (2003). Emotions, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 69-86.
    There seem to be two kinds of emotion the rists in the world. Some work very hard to show that emotions are essentially cognitive states. Others resist this suggestion and insist that emotions are noncognitive. The debate has appeared in many forms in philosophy and psychology. It never seems to go away. The reason for this is simple. Emotions have properties that push in both directions, properties that make them seem quite smart and properties that make them seem quite dumb. (...)
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  28. Jesse J. Prinz (2009). Against Moral Nativism. In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell 167--189.
  29. Jesse J. Prinz & Shaun Nichols (2010). Moral Emotions. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press 111.
  30.  80
    Jesse J. Prinz (2003). Level-Headed Mysterianism and Artificial Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):111-132.
    Many materialists believe that we should, in principle, be able to build a conscious computing machine. Others disagree. I favour a sceptical position, but of another variety. The problem isn't that it would be impossible to create a conscious computer. The problem is that we cannot know whether it is possible. There are principled reasons for thinking that we wouldn't ever be able to confirm that allegedly conscious computers were conscious. The proper stance on computational consciousness is agnosticism. Despite this (...)
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  31.  20
    Jesse J. Prinz (2005). Emotions, Embodiment, and Awareness. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press 363-383.
  32.  64
    Jesse J. Prinz (2000). The Ins and Outs of Consciousness. Brain and Mind 1 (2):245-56.
    In Enchanted Looms , Rodney Cotterill defends the hypothesisthat conscious sensory experience depends on motor response. Thepositive evidence for this hypothesis is inconclusive, andnegative evidence can be marshaled against it. I present analternative hypothesis according to which consciousness involvesintermediate level sensory processing, attention, and workingmemory. The circuitry of consciousness can be dissociated fromaction systems and may mark an evolutionary advance from a priorphylogenetic stage in which motor outputs and sensory inputswere more intimately bound.
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  33. Jesse J. Prinz (2007). Thoughts of Real Kinds. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press
     
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  34.  63
    Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Sensible Ideas: A Reply to Sarnecki and Markman and Stilwell. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):419-430.
    In Furnishing the mind, I argued that concepts are couched in representational formats that are indigenous to sensory systems. I called this thesis "concept empiricism," because I think it is was a central tenet of the philosophical program defended by classical British empiricists, such as Locke and Hume. I still think that concept empiricism is true, and more empirical evidence has accrued since the book went to press. That's the good news. The bad news is that able critics have marshaled (...)
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  35. Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. OUP Usa.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions in a double sense. First of all, they are perceptions of changes in the body, but, through the body, they also allow us to literally perceive danger, loss, and other matters of concern. This proposal, which Prinz calls the embodied appraisal theory, reconciles the long standing debate between those who say emotions are cognitive and those who say they are noncognitive. The basic idea behind embodied appraisals is (...)
     
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  36.  38
    Jonathan M. Weinberg, Daniel Yarlett, Michael Ramscar, Dan Ryder & Jesse J. Prinz (2003). Jesse J. Prinz,Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. [REVIEW] Metascience 12 (3):279-303.
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  37. Jesse J. Prinz & Lawrence W. Barsalou (2000). Steering a Course for Embodied Representation. In Eric Dietrich Art Markman (ed.), Cognitive Dynamics: Conceptual Change in Humans and Machines. Lawrence Erlbaum 51--77.
     
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  38.  9
    Jesse J. Prinz (2007). The Intermediate Level Theory of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 248--260.
  39.  1
    Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Is Emotion a Form of Perception? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):137-160.
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  40. William G. Lycan & Jesse J. Prinz (eds.) (2008). Mind and Cognition: An Anthology. Blackwell Pub. Ltd.
    First published in 1990, _Mind and Cognition: An Anthology_ is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind. Brings together the most important classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of mind and cognition Completely revised and updated throughout, in response to feedback from teachers in the field Now includes 20 new readings Each updated part opens with a brief, synoptic introduction to the individual field and a comprehensive further (...)
     
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  41. Anthony I. Jack & Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Searching for a Scientific Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):51-55.
     
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  42.  13
    Jesse J. Prinz (2000). A Reply to Marcel. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):279-287.
  43.  18
    Jesse J. Prinz (2000). A Reply to Lormand. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):274-278.
  44. Michael Beaton, J. Bricklin, Louis C. Charland, J. C. W. Edwards, Ilya B. Farber, Bill Faw, Rocco J. Gennaro, C. Kaernbach, C. M. H. Nunn, Jaak Panksepp, Jesse J. Prinz, Matthew Ratcliffe, Jacob J. Ross, S. Murray, Henry P. Stapp & Douglas F. Watt (2006). Switched-on Consciousness - Clarifying What It Means - Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.
  45. William G. Lycan & Jesse J. Prinz (eds.) (2008). Mind and Cognition: An Anthology. Wiley-Blackwell.
    First published in 1990, _Mind and Cognition: An Anthology_ is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind. Brings together the most important classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of mind and cognition Completely revised and updated throughout, in response to feedback from teachers in the field Now includes 20 new readings Each updated part opens with a brief, synoptic introduction to the individual field and a comprehensive further (...)
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  46. Jesse J. Prinz (2002). Consciousness, Computation, and Emotion. In Simon C. Moore & Mike Oaksford (eds.), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins
  47. Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Empiricism and State-Space Semantics. In Brian L Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
     
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  48. Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. A Bradford Book.
    Western philosophy has long been divided between empiricists, who argue that human understanding has its basis in experience, and rationalists, who argue that reason is the source of knowledge. A central issue in the debate is the nature of concepts, the internal representations we use to think about the world. The traditional empiricist thesis that concepts are built up from sensory input has fallen out of favor. Mainstream cognitive science tends to echo the rationalist tradition, with its emphasis on innateness. (...)
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  49. Jesse J. Prinz & Anthony I. Jack (2004). Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Searching for a Scientific Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):51-56.
  50. Jesse J. Prinz (ed.) (forthcoming). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.