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Jesse J. Prinz [49]Jesse Prinz [48]Jessej Prinz [1]
  1. Jesse Prinz, Emotion and Aesthetic Value.
    Aesthetics is a normative domain. We evaluate artworks as better or worse, good or bad, great or grim. I will refer to a positive appraisal of an artwork as an aesthetic appreciation of that work, and I refer to a negative appraisal as aesthetic depreciation. (I will often drop the word “aesthetic.”) There has been considerable amount of work on what makes an artwork worthy of appreciation, and less, it seems, on the nature of appreciation itself. These two topics are (...)
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  2. Jesse Prinz, Can Critics Be Dispassionate? The Role of Emotion in Aesthetic Judgment.
    “A sentimental layman would feel, and ought to feel, horrified, on being admitted into [an expert art] critic's mind, to see how cold, how thin, how void of human significance, are the motives for favour or disfavour that there prevail.” Thus writes William James (1884: 202). The art-world is dominated by critics who sneer and sentimentality, resist evocation, and issue stale, dispassionate appraisals. Memorized standards are coolly deployed to scan works for the features that are currently in fashion, before (...)
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  3. Jesse Prinz, Mental Pointing.
    It is one thing to have phenomenal states and another thing to think about phenomenal states. Thinking about phenomenal states gives us knowledge that we have them and knowledge of what they are like. But how do we think about phenomenal states? These days, the most popular answer is that we use phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts are presumed to be concepts that represent phenomenal states in a special, intrinsically phenomenal, way. The special nature of phenomenal concepts is said to be (...)
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  4. Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz, Experimental Studies of Intuitions About Consciousness: Methodological and Statistical Details.
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  5. Jesse Prinz, Is Morality Innate?
    Thus declares Francis Hutcheson, expressing a view widespread during the Enlightenment, and throughout the history of philosophy. According to this tradition, we are by nature moral, and ourS concern for good and evil is as natural to us as our capacity to feel pleasure and pain. The link between morality and human nature has been a common theme since ancient times, and, with the rise of modern empirical moral psychology, it remains equally popular today. Evolutionary ethicists, ethologists, developmental psychologists, social (...)
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  6. Jesse Prinz, Regaining Composure: A Defense of Prototype Compositionality.
    Beginning in the late 1960s, psychologists began to challenge the view the definitional theory of concepts. According to that theory a concept is a mental representation comprising representations of properties (or “features”) that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for membership in a category. In place of the definitional view, psychologists initially put forward the prototype theory of concept, according to which concepts comprise representations of features that are typical, salient, and diagnostic for category membership, but not necessarily necessary. The (...)
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  7. Jesse J. Prinz, Mental Maintenance: A Response to the Knowledge Argument.
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  8. Jesse Prinz (forthcoming). Culture and Cognitive Science. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  9. Jesse J. Prinz (ed.) (forthcoming). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.
  10. Jesse Prinz (2014). The Aesthetics of Punk Rock. Philosophy Compass 9 (9):583-593.
    Philosophers should listen to punk rock. Though largely ignored in analytic aesthetics, punk can shed light on the nature, limits, and value of art. Here, I will begin with an overview of punk aesthetics and then extrapolate two lessons. First, punk intentionally violates widely held aesthetic norms, thus raising questions about the plasticity of taste. Second, punk music is associated with accompanying visual styles, fashion, and attitudes; this points to a relationship between art and identity. Together, these lessons suggest that (...)
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  11. Jesse Prinz (2013). Attention, Atomism, and the Disunity of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):215-222.
  12. Jesse Prinz (2013). Are Millikan's Concepts Inside‐Out? In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics. John Wiley & Sons. 198--220.
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  13. Jesse Prinz (2013). Siegel's Get Rich Quick Scheme. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):827-835.
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  14. Angelika Seidel & Jesse Prinz (2013). Sound Morality: Irritating and Icky Noises Amplify Judgments in Divergent Moral Domains. Cognition 127 (1):1-5.
    Theoretical models and correlational research suggest that anger and disgust play different roles in moral judgment. Anger is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against persons, such as battery and unfairness, and disgust is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against nature, such as sexual transgressions and cannibalism. To date, however, it has not been shown that induction of these two emotions has divergent effects. In this experiment we show divergent effects of anger and disgust. We use sounds to elicit (...)
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  15. Jesse Prinz (2012). Causes of Emotions. In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press. 193.
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  16. Jesse Prinz (2012). Singularity and Inevitable Doom. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (7-8):7-8.
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  17. Jesse Prinz (2012). The Conscious Brain. Oup Usa.
    The Conscious Brain brings neuroscientific evidence to bear on enduring philosophical questions. Major philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness are surveyed, challenged, and extended.
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  18. Jesse J. Prinz (2012). Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape the Human Mind. W.W. Norton.
     
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  19. Anya Farennikova & Jesse Prinz (2011). What Makes Something Fashionable? In Jessica Wolfendale & Jeanette Kennett (eds.), Fashion – Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking with Style. Blackwell. 13--30.
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  20. Jesse Prinz (2011). Against Empathy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):214-233.
    Empathy can be characterized as a vicarious emotion that one person experiences when reflecting on the emotion of another. So characterized, empathy is sometimes regarded as a precondition on moral judgment. This seems to have been Hume's view. I review various ways in which empathy might be regarded as a precondition and argue against each of them: empathy is not a component, a necessary cause, a reliable epistemic guide, a foundation for justification, or the motivating force behind our moral judgments. (...)
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  21. Jesse Prinz (2011). Has Mentalese Earned Its Keep? On Jerry Fodor's LOT 2. [REVIEW] Mind 120 (478):485-501.
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  22. Jesse Prinz (2011). Is Attention Necessary and Sufficient for Consciousness? In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. 174--204.
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  23. Jesse Prinz (2011). Morality is a Culturally Conditioned Response. Philosophy Now 82:6-9.
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  24. Jesse Prinz (2011). The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology. In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. OUP. 174--196.
  25. Jesse Prinz (2011). Wittgenstein and the Neuroscience of the Self. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):147-160.
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  26. Jesse Prinz (2011). When is Film Art? Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4:473-485.
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  27. Jesse J. Prinz (2011). Is Empathy Necessary for Morality. In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 211--229.
  28. Jesse Prinz (2010). Can Concept Empiricism Forestall Eliminativism? Mind and Language 25 (5):612-621.
    In this commentary, I focus on Machery's criticism of Neo-Empiricism. I argue that Neo-Empiricism can survive Machery's critique, and I show that there is an empiricist strategy for forestalling eliminativism.
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  29. Jesse Prinz (2010). For Valence. Emotion Review 2 (1):5-13.
    In a provocative and important article, Robert Solomon argues that emotion researchers should abandon the notion of valence: it is used many different ways, and no single construct captures the pretheoretical distinction between positive and negative emotions. I echo Solomon in arguing that some of the most popular theories of valence are unlikely to succeed, though my case against these constructs comes from a noncognitive, as opposed to cognitive, perspective. I then argue that there is one notion of valence, related (...)
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  30. Jesse Prinz (2010). How Do Perceptual States Become Conscious. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
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  31. Jesse Prinz (2010). Psychology. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.
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  32. Jesse J. Prinz (2010). When is Perception Conscious? In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. 310--332.
    Once upon a time, people thought that all perception was conscious. Indeed, it was widely believed that all mental states are conscious, so the problem of explaining consciousness collapses into the problem of explaining mentality. But things have changed. Most people now believe that a lot goes on unconsciously. Indeed, some people believe that mental states that are not perceptual in nature are never conscious. That’s a matter of controversy. Less controversial is the claim that perceptual states are conscious some (...)
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  33. Jesse J. Prinz & Shaun Nichols (2010). Moral Emotions. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
     
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  34. Jessej Prinz & Shaun Nichols (2010). 1. The Role ofEmotions in Moral Cognition. In John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. 111.
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  35. Frank Jackson, Jesse J. Prinz, Ernest Sosa & Kim Sterelny (2009). Viii Notes on Contributors Alvin Goldman is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. His Principal Research Areas Are Episte-Mology, Philosophy of Mind, and Cognitive Science. His Most Recent Book is Simulating Minds (2006). [REVIEW] In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  36. Jesse Prinz (2009). Emotions: Motivating Feelings. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  37. Jesse Prinz (2009). Is Consciousness Embodied. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge. 419--437.
  38. Jesse Prinz (2009). The Emotional Construction of Morals • by Jesse Prinz: Summary. Analysis 69 (4).
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  39. Jesse Prinz (2009). The Moral Emotions. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oup Oxford.
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  40. Jesse Prinz (2009). The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):117 - 144.
    Situationists argue that virtue ethics is empirically untenable, since traditional virtue ethicists postulate broad, efficacious character traits, and social psychology suggests that such traits do not exist. I argue that prominent philosophical replies to this challenge do not succeed. But cross-cultural research gives reason to postulate character traits, and this undermines the situationist critique. There is, however, another empirical challenge to virtue ethics that is harder to escape. Character traits are culturally informed, as are our ideals of what traits are (...)
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  41. Jesse Prinz (2009). The Significance of Moral Variation: Replies to Tiberius, Gert and Doris. Analysis 69 (4):731-745.
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  42. Jesse J. Prinz (2009). Against Moral Nativism. In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. 167--189.
  43. Maria Francisca Reines & Jesse Prinz (2009). Reviving Whorf: The Return of Linguistic Relativity. Philosophy Compass 4 (6):1022-1032.
    The idea that natural languages shape the way we think in different ways was popularized by Benjamin Whorf, but then fell out of favor for lack of empirical support. But now, a new wave of research has been shifting the tide back toward linguistic relativity. The recent research can be interpreted in different ways, some trivial, some implausibly radical, and some both plausible and interesting. We introduce two theses that would have important implications if true: Habitual Whorfianism and Ontological Whorfianism. (...)
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  44. Lera Boroditsky & Jesse Prinz (2008). What Thoughts Are Made Of. In G. R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press. 98--115.
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  45. Joshua Knobe & Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.
    When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can proceed either by thinking about the entity from a *functional* standpoint or by thinking about the entity from a *physical* standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people’s mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking asymmetry. It appears that ascriptions of states involving phenomenal consciousness are sensitive to physical factors in (...)
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  46. William G. Lycan & Jesse J. Prinz (eds.) (2008). Mind and Cognition: An Anthology. Blackwell Pub. Ltd.
    First published in 1990, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind.
     
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  47. Jesse Prinz (2008). Acquired Moral Truths. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):219-227.
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  48. Jesse Prinz (2008). Précis of Gut Reactions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):707–711.
  49. Jesse Prinz (2008). Response to D'Arms and Hills. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):729–732.
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  50. Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Is Emotion a Form of Perception? In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. 137-160.
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