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Profile: Jesse Steinberg (University of Pittsburg at Bradford)
Profile: Jesse Steinberg (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
  1. Jesse Steinberg, Two Solutions to Kripke's Puzzle About Belief.
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  2. Jesse R. Steinberg (2012). Doubt and the Human Condition. In Jesse R. Steinberg & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Blues -- Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking Deep About Feeling Low. Wiley-Blackwell. 111--120.
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  3. Jesse R. Steinberg & Abrol Fairweather (eds.) (2012). Blues -- Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking Deep About Feeling Low. Wiley-Blackwell.
    An anthology of essays by a diverse range of thinkers and musicians analyzes how the blues genre reflects universal cultural and emotional issues that render its messages relatable to people on all social levels. Original.
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  4. Jesse R. Steinberg, Christopher M. Layne & Alan M. Steinberg (2012). Ceteris Paribus Causal Generalizations and Scientific Inquiry in Empirical Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):180-190.
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  5. Fritz Allhoff, Patrick Lin & Jesse Steinberg (2011). Ethics of Human Enhancement: An Executive Summary. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (2):201-212.
  6. Jesse R. Steinberg (2010). Dispositions and Subjunctives. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):323 - 341.
    It is generally agreed that dispositions cannot be analyzed in terms of simple subjunctive conditionals (because of what are called “masked dispositions” and “finkish dispositions”). I here defend a qualified subjunctive account of dispositions according to which an object is disposed to Φ when conditions C obtain if and only if, if conditions C were to obtain, then the object would Φ ceteris paribus . I argue that this account does not fall prey to the objections that have been raised (...)
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  7. Jesse Steinberg (2009). Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):1-24.
  8. Jesse R. Steinberg (2008). Review of Savas L. Tsohatzidis (Ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6).
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  9. Jesse Ramon Steinberg (2008). God and the Possibility of Random Creation. Sophia 47 (2):193-199.
    In this paper I discuss a number of problems associated with the suggestion that it is possible for God to randomly select a possible world for actualization.
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  10. Jesse R. Steinberg (2007). Concerning the Preservation of God's Omnipotence. Sophia 46 (1):1-5.
    Numerous examples have been offered that purportedly show that God cannot be omnipotent. I argue that a common response to such examples (i.e., that failure to do the impossible does not indicate a lack of power) does not preserve God’s omnipotence in the face of some of these examples. I consider another possible strategy for preserving God’s omnipotence in the face of these examples and find it wanting.
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  11. Jesse R. Steinberg (2007). Leibniz, Creation and the Best of All Possible Worlds. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 62 (3):123 - 133.
    Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction, could not refrain from creating in such a situation. I conclude that either this is the best possible world or God is not our creator.
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  12. Jesse R. Steinberg & Alan M. Steinberg (2007). Disembodied Minds and the Problem of Identification and Individuation. Philosophia 35 (1):75-93.
    We consider and reject a variety of attempts to provide a ground for identifying and differentiating disembodied minds. Until such a ground is provided, we must withhold inclusion of disembodied minds from our picture of the world.
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  13. Jesse Steinberg (2005). Reply to Allhoff on Telomeres and the Ethics of Cloning. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (1):27-28.
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  14. Jesse R. Steinberg (2005). Response to Fritz Allhoff, "Telomeres and the Ethics of Human Cloning" (AJOB 4:2). American Journal of Bioethics 5 (1):W27-W28.
    Fritz Allhoff has recently offered an extremely compelling challenge to the morality of human cloning (Allhoff 2004). He argues that a biological phenomenon, that of telomere shortening, undermines the moral permissibility of human cloning. Telomere shortening is caused by cell replication, and appears to be one of the central reasons that cells and organisms age and die. Allhoff considers a thirty-year-old woman who wishes to create a genetic clone. He notes that the DNA from her cell that would be used (...)
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  15. Jesse R. Steinberg (2005). Why an Unsurpassable Being Cannot Create a Surpassable World. Religious Studies 41 (3):323-333.
    Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder suggest that it is possible for an omnipotent being, Jove, to create randomly a world from a continuum of ever more perfect possible worlds. They then go on to argue that Jove could be characterized as morally unsurpassable despite creating a surpassable world. I raise a number of problems for the view that Jove could be characterized as morally unsurpassable when he creates (randomly or not) a surpassable world.
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  16. Jesse Steinberg, Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.
    I argue that there is a continuum of judgments ranging from those that are affectively rich, what might be called passionate judgments, to those that are purely cognitive and nonaffective, what might be called dispassionate judgments. The former are akin to desires and other affective states and so are necessarily motivating. Applying this schema to moral judgments, I maintain that the motivational internalist is wrong in claiming that all moral judgments are necessarily motivating, but right in regard to the subset (...)
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