39 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Jessica Brown (University of St. Andrews)
  1. Jessica Brown, Proof.
    Davies and Wright have recently diagnosed the felt inadequacy of Moore’s response to the sceptic in terms of a failure of transmission of warrant. They argue that warrant fails to transmit across the following key inference: I have hands, if I have hands then I am not a BIV, so I am not a BIV, on the grounds that this inference cannot be used to rationally overcome doubt about its conclusion, and cannot strengthen one’s epistemic position with respect to the (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.) (forthcoming). New Essays On Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jessica Brown (2014). Shifty Talk: Knowledge and Causation. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):183-199.
    In this paper, I criticise one main strategy for supporting anti-intellectualism, the view that whether a subject knows may depend on the stakes. This strategy appeals to difficulties with developing contextualist and pragmatic treatments of the shiftiness of our talk about knowledge to motivate anti-intellectualism. I criticise this strategy by drawing an analogy between debates about causation and knowledge. In each case, talk about a phenomenon is shifty and contextualist and pragmatic explanations of the shifty talk face the same objections. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jessica Brown (2013). Cognitive Diversity and Epistemic Norms. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):326-342.
  5. Jessica Brown (2013). Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.
    I will ask the conditional question: if folk attributions of "know" are not sensitive to the stakes and/or the salience of error, does this cast doubt on contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI)? I argue that if it should turn out that folk attributions of knowledge are insensitive to such factors, then this undermines contextualism, but not SSI. That is not to say that SSI is invulnerable to empirical work of any kind. Rather, I defend the more modest claim that leading (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Jessica Brown (2013). Intuitions, Evidence and Hopefulness. Synthese 190 (12):2021-2046.
    Experimental philosophers have recently conducted surveys of folk judgements about a range of phenomena of interest to philosophy including knowledge, reference, and free will. Some experimental philosophers take these results to undermine the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence. I consider several different replies to the suggestion that these results undermine philosophical appeal to intuition, both piecemeal replies which raise concerns about particular surveys, and more general replies. The general replies include the suggestions that the surveys consider the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jessica Brown (2013). Infallibilism, Evidence and Pragmatics. Analysis 73 (4):626-635.
    According to one contemporary formulation of infallibilism, probability 1 infallibilism, if a subject knows that p, then the probability of p on her evidence is 1. To avoid an implausible scepticism about knowledge, probability 1 infallibilism needs to allow that, in a wide range of cases, a proposition can be evidence for itself. However, such infallibilism needs to explain why it is typically infelicitous to cite p as evidence for p itself. I argue that probability 1 infallibilism has no explanation (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jessica Brown (2013). Immediate Justification, Evidence, and Pragmatics. In C. Tucker (ed.), Seemings and justification. OUP.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Jessica Brown (2013). Immediate Justification, Perception, and Intuition. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. 71.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jessica Brown (2013). Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem. Noûs 47 (1):179-192.
    I consider but reject one broad strategy for answering the threshold problem for fallibilist accounts of knowledge, namely what fixes the degree of probability required for one to know? According to the impurist strategy to be considered, the required degree of probability is fixed by one's practical reasoning situation. I distinguish two different ways to implement the suggested impurist strategy. According to the Relevance Approach, the threshold for a subject to know a proposition at a time is determined by the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jessica Brown (2013). Knowing-How: Linguistics and Cognitive Science. Analysis 73 (2):220-227.
    Stanley and Williamson have defended the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a subspecies of knowing-that by appeal to the syntax and semantics of ascriptions of knowing-how. Critics have objected that this way of defending intellectualism places undue weight on linguistic considerations and fails to give sufficient attention to empirical considerations from the scientific study of the mind. In this paper, I examine and reject Stanley's recent attempt to answer the critics.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jessica Brown (2012). Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jessica Brown (2012). Practial Reasoning, Decision Theory and Anti-Intellectualism. Episteme 9 (1):1-20.
    In this paper, I focus on the most important form of argument for anti-intellectualism, one that exploits alleged connections between knowledge and practical reasoning. I first focus on a form of this argument which exploits a universal principle, Sufficiency, connecting knowledge and practical reasoning. In the face of putative counterexamples to Sufficiency, a number of authors have attempted to reformulate the argument with a weaker principle. However, I argue that the weaker principles suggested are also problematic. I conclude that, so (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jessica Brown (2012). Words, Concepts and Epistemology. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. 31.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.) (2012). Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
    As a result, knowledge ascriptions are a central topic of research in both philosophy and science. In this collection of new essays on knowledge ascriptions, world class philosophers offer novel approaches to this long standing topic.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jessica Brown (2011). Fallibilism and the Knowledge Norm for Assertion and Practical Reasoning. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oup Oxford.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Jessica Brown (2011). Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence. Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
    What is the nature of the evidence provided by thought experiments in philosophy? For instance, what evidence is provided by the Gettier thought experiment against the JTB theory of knowledge? According to one view, it provides as evidence only a certain psychological proposition, e.g. that it seems to one that the subject in the Gettier case lacks knowledge. On an alternative, nonpsychological view, the Gettier thought experiment provides as evidence the nonpsychological proposition that the subject in the Gettier case lacks (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (2011). Assertion: An Introduction and Overview. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 1-17.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.) (2011). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Assertion is a fundamental feature of language. This volume will be the place to look for anyone interested in current work on the topic.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Jessica Brown (2010). Knowledge and Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jessica Brown (2009). Review: Sosa on Scepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397 - 405.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Jessica Brown (2009). Sosa on Scepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397--405.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Jessica Brown (2008). Knowledge and Practical Reason. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.
    It has become recently popular to suggest that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning and that this provides an important constraint on the correct account of knowledge, one which favours subject-sensitive invariantism over contextualism and classic invariantism. I argue that there are putative counterexamples to both directions of the knowledge norm. Even if the knowledge norm can be defended against these counterexamples, I argue that it is a delicate issue whether it is true, one which relies on fine (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Jessica Brown (2008). Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning. Noûs 42 (2):167-189.
  25. Jessica Brown (2008). The Knowledge Norm for Assertion. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):89-103.
  26. Jessica Brown (2007). Externalism in Mind and Epistemology. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 13--34.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Jessica Brown (2006). Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
    Contextualists such as Cohen and DeRose claim that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary contextually, in particular that the strength of epistemic position required for one to be truly ascribed knowledge depends on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists support their view by appeal to our intuitions about when it's correct (or incorrect) to ascribe knowledge. Someone might argue that some of these intuitions merely reflect when it is conversationally appropriate to ascribe knowledge, not when knowledge is truly ascribed, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Jessica Brown (2005). Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism? Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263–285.
    Contextualists support their view by appeal to cases which show that whether an attribution of knowledge seems correct depends on attributor factors. Contextualists conclude that the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. Invariantists respond that these cases show only that the warranted assertability-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. I examine DeRose's recent argument against the possibility of such an invariantist response, an argument which appeals to the knowledge account of assertion and the context-sensitivity of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jessica Brown (2005). Comparing Contextualism and Invariantism on the Correctness of Contextualist Intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):71-100.
    Contextualism is motivated by cases in which the intuitive correctness of a range of phenomena, including knowledge attributions, assertions and reasoning, depends on the attributor's context. Contextualists offer a charitable understanding of these intuitions, interpreting them as reflecting the truth value of the knowledge attributions and the appropriateness of the relevant assertions and reasoning. Here, I investigate a range of different invariantist accounts and examine the extent to which they too can offer a charitable account of the contextualist data.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Jessica Brown (2005). Doubt, Circularity and the Moorean Response to the Sceptic. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):1–14.
  31. Jessica Brown (2005). Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):319–327.
    According to contextualism, the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists take their view to be supported by cases in which the intuitive correctness of knowledge attributions depends on the attributor's context. Williamson offers a complex invariantist account of such cases which appeals to two elements, psychological bias and a failure of luminosity. He provides independent reasons for thinking that contextualist cases are characterized by psychological bias and a failure of luminosity, and argues that some (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Jessica Brown (2004). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. MIT Press.
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Jessica Brown (2004). Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity. Analysis 64 (4):339–348.
    Bergmann argues that we should accept epistemically circular reasoning since, he claims, it is a consequence of the plausible assumption that some justification is noninferential (Bergmann, M. "Epistemic Circularity, Malignant and Benign", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research forthcoming). I show that epistemically circular reasoning does not follow merely from the assumption that some justification is noninferential, but only from that view combined with the assumption of basic justification or knowledge. Thus, we have reason to endorse epistemically circular reasoning only to the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Jessica Brown (2004). Wright on Transmission Failure. Analysis 64 (1):57–67.
  35. Jessica Brown (2003). Externalism and the Fregean Tradition. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 431--458.
  36. Jessica Brown (2001). Book Review. Knowing Our Own Minds Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia MacDonald. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):586-588.
  37. Jessica Brown (2000). Against Temporal Externalism. Analysis 60 (2):178-188.
  38. Jessica Brown (1999). Boghossian on Externalism and Privileged Access. Analysis 59 (1):52-59.
    Boghossian has argued that Putnam's externalism is incompatible with privileged access, i.e., the claim that a subject can have nonempirical knowledge of her thought contents ('What the externalist can know a priori', PAS 1997). Boghossian's argument assumes that Oscar can know a priori that (1) 'water' aims to name a natural kind; and (2) 'water' expresses an atomic concept. However, I show that if Burge's externalism is correct, then these assumptions may well be false. This leaves Boghossian with two options: (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation