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Jessica Moss [12]Jessica Dawn Moss [1]
  1. Jessica Moss (2012). Soul-Leading: The Unity of the Phaedrus, Again. In Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 43--1.
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  2. Jessica Dawn Moss (2012). Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire. Oxford University Press.
    Pt. I. The apparent good. Evaluative cognition -- Perceiving the good -- Phantasia and the apparent good -- pt. II. The apparent good and non-rational motivation. Passions and the apparent good -- Akrasia and the apparent good -- pt. III. The apparent good and rational motivation. Phantasia and deliberation -- Happiness, virtue, and the apparent good -- Practical induction -- Conclusion : Aristotle's practical empiricism.
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  3. Jessica Moss (2011). >Virtue Makes the Goal Right: Virtue and Phronesis in Aristotles Ethics. Phronesis 56 (3):204-261.
    Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue “makes the goal right“, while Phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the contents of our goals. Furthermore, there are no good textual (...)
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  4. Jessica Moss (2010). Aristotle's Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View That Everyone Always Desires Things Under the Guise of the Good. In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press. 65.
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  5. Jessica Moss (2009). Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 91 (2):119-156.
    de Anima III.10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia (“imagination”) on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis , I use this parallel to illuminate the difficult discussion (...)
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  6. Jessica Moss (2009). No Title Provided. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):119-156.
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  7. Jessica Moss (2009). Philosophy (D.) Cairns, (F.) Hermann and (T.) Penner Eds Pursuing the Good: Ethics and Metaphysics in Plato's Republic. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. Pp. 327. £75. 9780748628117. [REVIEW] Journal of Hellenic Studies 129:232-.
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  8. Jessica Moss (2008). Appearances and Calculations: Plato's Division of the Soul. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34:35-68.
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  9. Jessica Moss (2008). The Doctor and the Pastry Chef. Ancient Philosophy 27 (2):229 - 249.
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  10. Jessica Moss (2007). The Doctor and the Pastry Chef: Pleasure and Persuasion in Plato's Gorgias. Ancient Philosophy 27 (2):229-249.
  11. Jessica Moss (2006). Review of Devin Stauffer, The Unity of Plato's Gorgias: Rhetoric, Justice, and the Philosophic Life. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (11).
  12. Jessica Moss (2006). Pleasure and Illusion in Plato. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):503 - 535.
    Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but (...)
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  13. Jessica Moss (2005). Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29:137-170.