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Profile: Jessica Pfeifer (University of Maryland, Baltimore County)
  1. Jessica Pfeifer (2012). Mill and Lewis on Laws, Experimentation, and Systematization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):172-181.
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  2. Jessica Pfeifer (2010). Nominalism and Inductive Generalizations. In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  3. Jessica Pfeifer (2009). Review of Elliott Sober, Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).
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  4. Jessica Pfeifer (2006). The Use of Information Theory in Biology: Lessons From Social Insects. Biological Theory 1 (3):317-330.
  5. Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.) (2006). The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
    The philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that examines the profound philosophical questions that arise from scientific research and theories. A sub-discipline of philosophy that emerged in the twentieth century, the philosophy of science is largely a product of the British and Austrian schools of thought and traditions. The first in-depth reference in the field that combines scientific knowledge with philosophical inquiry, The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia is a two-volume set that brings together an international team of (...)
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  6. Jessica Pfeifer (2005). Why Selection and Drift Might Be Distinct. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1135-1145.
    In this paper, it is argued that selection and drift might be distinct. This contradicts recent arguments by Brandon (forthcoming) and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that such a distinction “violates sound probabilistic thinking” (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 62). While their arguments might be valid under certain assumptions, they overlook a possible way to make sense of the distinction. Whether this distinction makes sense, I argue, depends on the source of probabilities in natural selection. In particular, if the probabilities used in (...)
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