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  1. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2014). You're an Animal, Plain and Simple. Think 13 (36):61-70.
    In this essay, I argue that we are merely biological organisms. This view (animalism) explains everyday practices like watching ourselves in the mirror. The claim that we are psychological in nature cannot explain something as trivial as watching ourselves in the mirror. Thus, we should accept animalism.
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  2. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2013). On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-Weight View. [REVIEW] Philosophia 41 (3):809-823.
    There is a controversy, within social epistemology, over how to handle disagreement among epistemic peers. Call this the problem of peer disagreement. There is a solution, i.e. the equal-weight view, which says that disagreement among epistemic peers is a reason for each peer to lower the credence they place in their respective positions. However, this solution is susceptible to a serious challenge. Call it the merely modal peers challenge. Throughout parts of modal space, which resemble the actual world almost completely, (...)
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  3. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2013). Properly Functioning Brains and Personal Identity: An Argument for Neural Animalism. SATS 14 (1):63-69.
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  4. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2012). Still No Suicide for Presentists: Why Hales’ Response Fails. Logos and Episteme (1):149-155.
    In this paper, I defend my original objection to Hales’ suicide machine argument against Hales’ response. I argue Hales’ criticisms are either misplaced or underestimate the strength of my objection; if the constraints of the original objection are respected, my original objection blocks Hales’ reply. To be thorough, I restate an improved version of the objection to the suicide machine argument. I conclude that Hales fails to motivate a reasonable worry as to the supposed suicidal nature of presentist time travel.
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  5. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2012). Another Argument for Animalism: The Argument From Causal Powers. Prolegomena: Časopis Za Filozofiju 11 (2):169-180.
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  6. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2012). Sceptical Thoughts on Philosophical Expertise. Logos and Episteme 3 (3):449-458.
    My topic is two-fold: a reductive account of expertise as an epistemic phenomenon, and applying the reductive account to the question of whether or not philosophers enjoy expertise. I conclude, on the basis of the reductive account, that even though philosophers enjoy something akin to second-order expertise (i.e. they are often experts on the positions of other philosophers, current trends in the philosophical literature, the history of philosophy, conceptual analysis and so on), they nevertheless lack first-order philosophical expertise (i.e. expertise (...)
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  7. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2012). The Immorality of Procreation. THINK 11 (32):85-91.
    In this paper, I argue the practice of procreation is immoral regardless of the consequences of human presence such as climate change and overpopulation; the lack of consent, interests and moral desert on the part of nonexistent individuals means someone could potentially suffer in the absence of moral justification. Procreation is only morally justified if there is some method for acquiring informed consent from a non-existent person; but that is impossible; therefore, procreation is immoral.
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  8. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2011). No Suicide for Presentists. Logos and Episteme 2 (3):455-464.
    Steven Hales constructs a novel argument against the possibility of presentist time travel called the suicide machine argument. Hales argues that if presentism were true, then time travel would result in the annihilation of the time traveler. But such a consequence is not time travel, therefore presentism cannot allow for the possibility of time travel. This paper argues that in order for the suicide machine argument to succeed, it must make (at least) one of two assumptions, each of which beg (...)
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