19 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Jing Zhu [18]Jingsan Zhu [1]
See also:
Profile: Jing Zhu (Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China)
  1. Paul Thagard & Jing Zhu, Acupuncture, Incommensurability, and Conceptual Change.
    This paper is an investigation of the degree of incommensurability between Western scientific medicine and traditional Chinese medicine, focusing on the practice and theory of acupuncture. We describe the structure of traditional Chinese medicine, oriented around such concepts as yin, yang, qi, and xing, and discuss how the conceptual and explanatory differences between Western medicine and traditional Chinese medicine generate impediments to their comparison and evaluation. We argue that the linguistic, conceptual, ontological, and explanatory impediments can to a large extent (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jing Zhu (2010). On the Principle of Intention Agglomeration. Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.
    In this article, I first elaborate and refine the Principle of Intention Agglomeration (PIA), which was introduced by Michael Bratman as “a natural constraint on intention”. According to the PIA, the intentions of a rational agent should be agglomerative. The proposed refinement of the PIA is not only in accordance with the spirit of Bratman’s planning theory of intention as well as consistency constraints for intentions rooted in the theory, but also reveals some deep rationales of practical rationality regarding resource-limited (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu (2009). The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action. The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action 3 (26):1 - 16.
    The mentalistic orthodoxy about reason-explanations of action in the philosophy of mind has recently come under renewed attack. Julia Tanney is among those who have critiqued mentalism. The alternative account of the folk practice of giving reason-explanations of actions she has provided affords features of an agent�s external environment a privileged role in explaining the intentional behaviour of agents. The authors defend the mentalistic orthodoxy from Tanney�s criticisms, arguing that Tanney fails to provide a philosophically satisfying or psychologically realistic account (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. R. Tamara Konetzka, Jingsan Zhu, Julie Sochalski & Kevin G. Volpp (2008). Managed Care and Hospital Cost Containment. Inquiry 45 (1):98-111.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jing Zhu (2007). Mental Action and Causalism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):89.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Jing Zhu (2006). In Defence of Functionalism. Philosophia 34 (1):95-99.
  7. Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Intentions Are Mental States. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.
    Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jing Zhu (2005). Explaining Synchronic Self-Control. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):475-492.
  9. Jing Zhu (2005). How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions, by Berent Enç. Disputatio.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu (2004). Causalisms Reconsidered. Dialogue 43 (01):147-.
    We reply to Andrew Sneddon’s recent criticism of the causal theory of action (CTA) and critically examine Sneddon’s preferred alternative, minimal causalism. We show that Sneddon’s criticism of CTA is problematic in several respects, and therefore his conclusion that “the prospects for CTA look poor” is unjustified. Moreover, we show that the minimal causalism that Sneddon advocates looks rather unpromising and its merits that Sneddon mentions are untenable.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jing Zhu (2004). How to Make an Effort: A Reply to E. J. Coffman. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):23-33.
    Abstract In ?On Making an Effort? E. J. Coffman develops what he takes to be a fairly serious problem for Robert Kane's positive theory of free choice, where the concept of efforts of will is pivotal.1 Coffman argues that the plausibility of Kane's libertarian account of free choice ?is inversely proportional to the plausibility of a certain principle of agency? (p. 12). And since the latter is quite plausible, the former is therefore ?at best fairly implausible? (p. 12). In what (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jing Zhu (2004). Intention and Volition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):175 - 193.
  13. Jing Zhu (2004). Is Conscious Will an Illusion? Disputatio 16:59 - 70.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jing Zhu (2004). Locating Volition. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):302-322.
    In this paper, it is examined how neuroscience can help to understand the nature of volition by addressing the question whether volitions can be localized in the brain. Volitions, as acts of the will, are special mental events or activities by which an agent consciously and actively exercises her agency to voluntarily direct her thoughts and actions. If we can pinpoint when and where volitional events or activities occur in the brain and find out their neural underpinnings, this can substantively (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jing Zhu (2004). Passive Action and Causalism. Philosophical Studies 119 (3):295-314.
    The first half of this paper is an attemptto conceptualize and understand the paradoxicalnotion of ``passive action''''. The strategy is toconstrue passive action in the context ofemotional behavior, with the purpose toestablish it as a conceivable and conceptuallycoherent category. In the second half of thispaper, the implications of passive action forcausal theories of action are examined. I arguethat Alfred Mele''s defense of causalism isunsuccessful and that causalism may lack theresource to account for passive action.Following Harry Frankfurt, I suggest analternative way (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jing Zhu (2004). Understanding Volition. Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):247-274.
    The concept of volition has a long history in Western thought, but is looked upon unfavorably in contemporary philosophy and psychology. This paper proposes and elaborates a unifying conception of volition, which views volition as a mediating executive mental process that bridges the gaps between an agent's deliberation, decision and voluntary bodily action. Then the paper critically examines three major skeptical arguments against volition: volition is a mystery, volition is an illusion, and volition is a fundamentally flawed conception that leads (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. David A. Gallo, John G. Seamon, L. Andrew Coward, Ron Sun, Jing Zhu, John F. Kihlstrom, Steven M. Platek, Jaime W. Thomson, Gordon G. Gallup Jr & Jeroen G. W. Raaijmakers (2003). Kielan Yarrow, Patrick Haggard, and John C. Rothwell. Action, Arousal, and Subjective Time. Consciousness and Cognition 12:783.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jing Zhu (2003). Reclaiming Volition: An Alternative Interpretation of Libet's Experiment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):61-77.
  19. Jing Zhu & Paul Thagard (2002). Emotion and Action. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):19 – 36.
    The role of emotion in human action has long been neglected in the philosophy of action. Some prevalent misconceptions of the nature of emotion are responsible for this neglect: emotions are irrational; emotions are passive; and emotions have only an insignificant impact on actions. In this paper we argue that these assumptions about the nature of emotion are problematic and that the neglect of emotion's place in theories of action is untenable. More positively, we argue on the basis of recent (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation