Search results for 'Jnr Richard G. Heck' (try it on Scholar)

107 found
Sort by:
  1. Richard G. Heck (2012). Reading Frege's Grundgesetze. Oup Oxford.score: 1732.5
    Richard G. Heck presents a new account of Gottlob Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, or Basic Laws of Arithmetic, which establishes it as a neglected masterpiece at the center of Frege's philosophy. He explores Frege's philosophy of logic, and argues that Frege knew that his proofs could be reconstructed so as to avoid Russell's Paradox.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Richard G. Heck (2014). Intuition and the Substitution Argument. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):1-30.score: 855.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Richard G. Heck (2014). In Defense of Formal Relationism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):243-250.score: 855.0
    In his paper “Flaws of Formal Relationism”, Mahrad Almotahari argues against the sort of response to Frege's Puzzle I have defended elsewhere, which he dubs ‘Formal Relationism’. Almotahari argues that, because of its specifically formal character, this view is vulnerable to objections that cannot be raised against the otherwise similar Semantic Relationism due to Kit Fine. I argue in response that Formal Relationism has neither of the flaws Almotahari claims to identify.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Heck, Jr & G. Richard (1992). On The Consistency of Second-Order Contextual Definitions. Noûs 26 (4):491 - 494.score: 855.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Richard G. Heck (2014). Predicative Frege Arithmetic and 'Everyday' Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):279-307.score: 855.0
    The primary purpose of this note is to demonstrate that predicative Frege arithmetic naturally interprets certain weak but non-trivial arithmetical theories. It will take almost as long to explain what this means and why it matters as it will to prove the results.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. George Boolos & Richard G. Heck (2003). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 82-3. In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Clarendon Press.score: 855.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Richard G. Heck, (2010). Frege on Identity and Identity-Statements. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):83-102.score: 855.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Heck, Jr & G. Richard (1993). Michael Dummett's “Frege'. Philosophical Quarterly 43:223--232.score: 855.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Richard Heck (ed.) (1997). Language, Truth, and Logic. Oxford University Press.score: 480.0
    A Festschrift for Michael Dummett. Includes papers by Christopher Peacocke, Alexander George, Sanford Shieh, John McDowell, Jason Stanley, John Campbell, Barry Taylor, Crispin Wright, George Boolos, Charles Parsons, and Richard Heck.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Richard Heck (1993). A Note on the Logic of (Higher-Order) Vagueness. Analysis 53 (4):201-208.score: 450.0
    A discussion of Crispin Wright's 'paradox of higher-order vagueness', I suggest that the paradox may be resolved by careful attention to the logical principles used in its formulation. In particular, I focus attention on the rule of inference that allows for the inference from A to 'Definitely A', and argue that this rule, though valid, may not be used in subordinate deductions, e.g., in the course of a conditional proof. Wright's paradox uses the rule (or its equivalent) in this way.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. R. T. Cook (2012). RICHARD G. HECK, Jr. Frege's Theorem. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011. ISBN 978-0-19-969564-5. Pp. Xiv + 307. Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):346-359.score: 438.8
  12. John P. Burgess (2012). Richard G. Heck, Jr.: Frege’s Theorem. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 109 (12):728-733.score: 438.8
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Manuel Bremer (2012). Richard G. Heck, Jr. , Frege's Theorem . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 32 (4):319-325.score: 438.8
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. M. Dummett (2007). Reply to Richard G. Heck, Jr. In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court. 558--565.score: 438.8
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Raymond Woller (2000). Heck, Richard G. Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Review of Metaphysics 53 (3):701-703.score: 427.5
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Richard Heck (2002). Do Demonstratives Have Senses? Philosophers' Imprint 2 (2):1-33.score: 300.0
    Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Richard Heck (2000). Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons&Quot;. Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.score: 240.0
    In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Richard Heck (2007). Are There Different Kinds of Content? In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 117–38.score: 240.0
    In an earlier paper, "Non-conceptual Content and the 'Space of Reasons'", I distinguished two forms of the view that perceptual content is non-conceptual, which I called the 'state view' and the 'content view'. On the latter, but not the former, perceptual states have a different kind of content than do cognitive states. Many have found it puzzling why anyone would want to make this claim and, indeed, what it might mean. This paper attempts to address these questions.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Richard Heck (1997). Tarski, Truth, and Semantics. Philosophical Review 106 (4):533-554.score: 240.0
    John Etchemendy has argued that it is but "a fortuitous accident" that Tarski's work on truth has any signifance at all for semantics. I argue, in response, that Etchemendy and others, such as Scott Soames and Hilary Putnam, have been misled by Tarski's emphasis on definitions of truth rather than theories of truth and that, once we appreciate how Tarski understood the relation between these, we can answer Etchemendy's implicit and explicit criticisms of neo-Davidsonian semantics.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Richard Heck & Robert May (2011). The Composition of Thoughts. Noûs 45 (1):126-166.score: 240.0
    Are Fregean thoughts compositionally complex and composed of senses? We argue that, in Begriffsschrift, Frege took 'conceptual contents' to be unstructured, but that he quickly moved away from this position, holding just two years later that conceptual contents divide of themselves into 'function' and 'argument'. This second position is shown to be unstable, however, by Frege's famous substitution puzzle. For Frege, the crucial question the puzzle raises is why "The Morning Star is a planet" and "The Evening Star is a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Richard Heck & Robert May (2006). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    An investigation of Frege's various contributions to the study of language, focusing on three of his most famous doctrines: that concepts are unsaturated, that sentences refer to truth-values, and that sense must be distinguished from reference.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Richard Heck (2007). Meaning and Truth-Conditions. In D. Greimann & G. Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 349--76.score: 240.0
    Defends the view that understanding can be identified with knowledge of T-sentences against the classical criticisms of Foster and Soames.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Richard Heck & Robert May (forthcoming). Truth in Frege. In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    A general survey of Frege's views on truth, the paper explores the problems in response to which Frege's distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. It also discusses his view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth. Finally, we consider, very briefly, the question whether Frege was a deflationist.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Richard Heck (2006). Idiolects. In J. J. Thomson & A. Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    Defends the view that the study of language should concern itself, primarily, with idiolects. The main objections considered are forms of the normativity objection.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Richard Heck (2005). Truth and Disquotation. Synthese 142 (3):317--352.score: 240.0
    Hartry Field has suggested that we should adopt at least a methodological deflationism: [W]e should assume full-fledged deflationism as a working hypothesis. That way, if full-fledged deflationism should turn out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we now have of just where it is that inflationist assumptions ... are needed. I argue here that we do not need to be methodological deflationists. More pre-cisely, I argue that we have no need for a disquotational truth-predicate; (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Richard Heck (2006). MacFarlane on Relative Truth. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):88–100.score: 240.0
  27. Richard Heck (2011). Ramified Frege Arithmetic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):715-735.score: 240.0
    Øystein Linnebo has recently shown that the existence of successors cannot be proven in predicative Frege arithmetic, using Frege’s definitions of arithmetical notions. By contrast, it is shown here that the existence of successor can be proven in ramified predicative Frege arithmetic.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Richard Heck (2013). Is Compositionality a Trivial Principle? Frontiers of Philosophy in China 8 (1):140-55.score: 240.0
    Primarily a response to Paul Horwich's "Composition of Meanings", the paper attempts to refute his claim that compositionality—roughly, the idea that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts and how they are there combined—imposes no substantial constraints on semantic theory or on our conception of the meanings of words or sentences. Show Abstract.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Richard Heck (2007). Self-Reference and the Languages of Arithmetic. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (1):1-29.score: 240.0
    I here investigate the sense in which diagonalization allows one to construct sentences that are self-referential. Truly self-referential sentences cannot be constructed in the standard language of arithmetic: There is a simple theory of truth that is intuitively inconsistent but is consistent with Peano arithmetic, as standardly formulated. True self-reference is possible only if we expand the language to include function-symbols for all primitive recursive functions. This language is therefore the natural setting for investigations of self-reference.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Richard Heck (2012). A Liar Paradox. Thought 1 (1):36-40.score: 240.0
    The purpose of this note is to present a strong form of the liar paradox. It is strong because the logical resources needed to generate the paradox are weak, in each of two senses. First, few expressive resources required: conjunction, negation, and identity. In particular, this form of the liar does not need to make any use of the conditional. Second, few inferential resources are required. These are: (i) conjunction introduction; (ii) substitution of identicals; and (iii) the inference: From ¬(p (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Richard Heck (1995). The Sense of Communication. Mind 104 (413):79 - 106.score: 240.0
    Many philosophers nowadays believe Frege was right about belief, but wrong about language: The contents of beliefs need to be individuated more finely than in terms of Russellian propositions, but the contents of utterances do not. I argue that this 'hybrid view' cannot offer no reasonable account of how communication transfers knowledge from one speaker to another and that, to do so, we must insist that understanding depends upon more than just getting the references of terms right.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Richard Heck (2007). Use and Meaning. In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court. 531--57.score: 240.0
    Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea that meaning is, in some way or other, determined by use—chief among them, perhaps, Michael Dummett. But John McDowell has argued that Dummett, and anyone else who would seek to draw serious philosophical conclusions from this claim, must face a dilemma: Either the use of a sentence is characterized in terms of what it can be used to say, in which case profound philosophical consequences can hardly follow, or it will be impossible (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Richard Heck (2011). The Existence (and Non-Existence) of Abstract Objects. In Frege's Theorem. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    This paper is concerned with neo-Fregean accounts of reference to abstract objects. It develops an objection to the most familiar such accounts, due to Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, based upon what I call the 'proliferation problem': Hale and Wright's account makes reference to abstract objects seem too easy, as is shown by the fact that any equivalence relation seems as good as any other. The paper then develops a response to this objection, and offers an account of what it (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Richard Heck (2006). Reason and Language. In C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald (eds.), McDowell and His Critics. Blackwell Pub.. 22--45.score: 240.0
    John McDowell has often emphasized the fact that the use of langauge is a rational enterprise. In this paper, I explore the sense in which this is so, arguing that our use of language depends upon our consciously knowing what our words mean. I call this a 'cognitive conception of semantic competence'. The paper also contains a close analysis of the phenomenon of implicature and some suggestions about how it should and should not be understood.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Richard Heck (ed.) (1997). Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    In this exciting new collection, a distinguished international group of philosophers contribute new essays on central issues in philosophy of language and logic, in honor of Michael Dummett, one of the most influential philosophers of the late twentieth century. The essays are focused on areas particularly associated with Professor Dummett. Five are contributions to the philosophy of language, addressing in particular the nature of truth and meaning and the relation between language and thought. Two contributors discuss time, in particular the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Richard Heck (1996). The Consistency of Predicative Fragments of Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. History and Philosophy of Logic 17 (1):209-220.score: 240.0
    As is well-known, the formal system in which Frege works in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent, Russell?s Paradox being derivable in it.This system is, except for minor differences, full second-order logic, augmented by a single non-logical axiom, Frege?s Axiom V. It has been known for some time now that the first-order fragment of the theory is consistent. The present paper establishes that both the simple and the ramified predicative second-order fragments are consistent, and that Robinson arithmetic, Q, is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Richard Heck, What Is a Singular Term?score: 240.0
    This paper discusses the question whether it is possible to explain the notion of a singular term without invoking the notion of an object or other ontological notions. The framework here is that of Michael Dummett's discussion in Frege: Philosophy of Language. I offer an emended version of Dummett's conditions, accepting but modifying some suggestions made by Bob Hale, and defend the emended conditions against some objections due to Crispin Wright. This paper dates from about 1989. It originally formed part (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Richard Heck (1998). That There Might Be Vague Objects (So Far as Concerns Logic). The Monist 81 (1):277-99.score: 240.0
    Gareth Evans has argued that the existence of vague objects is logically precluded: The assumption that it is indeterminate whether some object a is identical to some object b leads to contradiction. I argue in reply that, although this is true—I thus defend Evans's argument, as he presents it—the existence of vague objects is not thereby precluded. An 'Indefinitist' need only hold that it is not logically required that every identity statement must have a determinate truth-value, not that some such (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Richard Heck (2007). Frege and Semantics. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):27-63.score: 240.0
    In recent work on Frege, one of the most salient issues has been whether he was prepared to make serious use of semantical notions such as reference and truth. I argue here Frege did make very serious use of semantical concepts. I argue, first, that Frege had reason to be interested in the question how the axioms and rules of his formal theory might be justified and, second, that he explicitly commits himself to offering a justification that appeals to the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Richard Heck (2003). Semantic Accounts of Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps. OUP.score: 240.0
    Read as a comment on Crispin Wright's \"Vagueness: A Fifth Column Approach\", this paper defends a form of supervaluationism against Wright's criticisms. Along the way, however, it takes up the question what is really wrong with Epistemicism, how the appeal of the Sorities ought properly to be understood, and why Contextualist accounts of vagueness won't do.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Richard Heck & George Boolos (1998). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik §§82-83. In M. Schirn (ed.), Philosophy of Mathematics Today. OUP.score: 240.0
    This paper contains a close analysis of Frege's proofs of the axioms of arithmetic §§70-83 of Die Grundlagen, with special attention to the proof of the existence of successors in §§82-83. Reluctantly and hesitantly, we come to the conclusion that Frege was at least somewhat confused in those two sections and that he cannot be said to have outlined, or even to have intended, any correct proof there. The proof he sketches is in many ways similar to that given in (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Richard Heck (2003). Frege on Identity and Identity-Statements: A Reply to Thau and Caplan. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):83-102.score: 240.0
    The paper argues, as against Thau and Caplan, that the traditional interpretation that Frege abandoned his earlier views about identity and identity--statements is correct.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Richard Heck (2005). Julius Caesar and Basic Law V. Dialectica 59 (2):161–178.score: 240.0
    This paper dates from about 1994: I rediscovered it on my hard drive in the spring of 2002. It represents an early attempt to explore the connections between the Julius Caesar problem and Frege's attitude towards Basic Law V. Most of the issues discussed here are ones treated rather differently in my more recent papers "The Julius Caesar Objection" and "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I 10". But the treatment here is more accessible, in many ways, providing more context and a better (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Richard Heck (2012). More on 'A Liar Paradox'. Thought 1 (4):270-280.score: 240.0
    A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox".
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Richard Heck (1999). Frege's Theorem: An Introduction. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 7 (1):56-73.score: 240.0
    A brief, non-technical introduction to technical and philosophical aspects of Frege's philosophy of arithmetic. The exposition focuses on Frege's Theorem, which states that the axioms of arithmetic are provable, in second-order logic, from a single non-logical axiom, "Hume's Principle", which itself is: The number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs if, and only if, the Fs and Gs are in one-one correspondence.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Richard Heck, Is Indeterminate Identity Incoherent?score: 240.0
    In "Counting and Indeterminate Identity", N. Ángel Pinillos develops an argument that there can be no cases of `Split Indeterminate Identity'. Such a case would be one in which it was indeterminate whether a=b and indeterminate whether a=c, but determinately true that b≠c. The interest of the argument lies, in part, in the fact that it appears to appeal to none of the controversial claims to which similar arguments due to Gareth Evans and Nathan Salmon appeal. I argue for two (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Richard Heck & Jason Stanley (1993). Reply to Hintikka and Sandu: Frege and Second-Order Logic. Journal of Philosophy 90 (8):416 - 424.score: 240.0
    Hintikka and Sandu had argued that 'Frege's failure to grasp the idea of the standard interpretation of higher-order logic turns his entire foundational project into a hopeless daydream' and that he is 'inextricably committed to a non-standard interpretation' of higher-order logic. We disagree.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Richard Heck (2011). A Logic for Frege's Theorem. In Frege's Theorem. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    It has been known for a few years that no more than Pi-1-1 comprehension is needed for the proof of "Frege's Theorem". One can at least imagine a view that would regard Pi-1-1 comprehension axioms as logical truths but deny that status to any that are more complex—a view that would, in particular, deny that full second-order logic deserves the name. Such a view would serve the purposes of neo-logicists. It is, in fact, no part of my view that, say, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Richard Heck (2002). Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.score: 240.0
    In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself styles 'a literal, rather (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 107