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  1. Joan Weiner (2008). How Tarskian is Frege? Mind 117 (466):427-450.
    I argued that Frege does not have a metatheory in the following sense: the justifications he offers for his basic laws and rules of inference neither employ nor require a truth-predicate or metalinguistic variables. In ‘Does Frege Use a Truth-predicate in his "Justification" of the Laws of Logic?’, Dirk Greimann disputes this. As Greimann interprets Frege, (i) Frege's remarks commit him to giving a metatheoretic justification of the basic laws and rules of his logic, and (ii) Frege actually gives such (...)
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  2. Joan Weiner (2007). Science and Semantics: The Case of Vagueness and Supervaluation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):355–374.
    It is widely assumed that the methods and results of science have no place among the data to which our semantics of vague predicates must answer. This despite the fact that it is well known that such prototypical vague predicates as ‘is bald’ play a central role in scientific research (e.g. the research that established Rogaine as a treatment for baldness). I argue here that the assumption is false and costly: in particular, I argue one cannot accept either supervaluationist semantics, (...)
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  3. Joan Weiner (2007). What's in a Numeral? Frege's Answer. Mind 116 (463):677 - 716.
    Frege wanted to define the number 1 and the concept of number. What is required of a satisfactory definition? A truly arbitrary definition will not do: to stipulate that the number one is Julius Caesar is to change the subject. One might expect Frege to define the number 1 by giving a description that picks out the object that the numeral '1' already names; to define the concept of number by giving a description that picks out precisely those objects that (...)
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  4. Joan Weiner (2005). Semantic Descent. Mind 114 (454):321-354.
    Does Frege have a metatheory for his logic? There is an obvious and uncontroversial sense in which he does. Frege introduces and discusses his new logic in natural language; he argues, in response to criticisms of Begriffsschrift, that his logic is superior to Boole's by discussing formal features of both systems. In so far as the enterprise of using natural language to introduce, discuss, and argue about features of a formal system is metatheoretic, there can be no doubt: Frege has (...)
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  5. Joan Weiner (2004). Frege Explained: From Arithmetic to Analytic Philosophy. Open Court.
    Frege's life and character -- The project -- Frege's new logic -- Defining the numbers -- The reconception of the logic, I-"Function and concept" -- The reconception of the logic, II- "On sense and meaning" and "on concept and object" -- Basic laws, the great contradiction, and its aftermath -- On the foundations of geometry -- Logical investigations -- Frege's influence on recent philosophy.
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  6. Joan Weiner (2004). What Was Frege Trying to Prove? A Response to Jeshion. Mind 113 (449):115-129.
    Why did Frege look for the foundations of arithmetic in logic? Robin Jeshion has argued against several proposed answers, mine among them, and offered one of her own. In response, I argue that (i) Jeshion's own interpretation does not work: it is unsupported by the text and fails to answer the question; (ii) while it is not my view that Frege is motivated solely by philosophical concerns, his motivation cannot be divorced from his belief that foundations for science must show (...)
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  7. Joan Weiner (1999). Frege. Oxford University Press.
    What is the number one? How do we know that 2+2=4? These apparently simple questions are in fact notoriously difficult to answer, and in one form or other have occupied philosophers from ancient times to the present. Gottlob Frege's conviction that the truths of arithmetic, and mathematics more generally, are derived from self-evident logical truths formed the basis of a systematic project which revolutionized logic, and founded modern analytic philosophy. In this accessible and stimulating introduction, Joan Weiner traces the development (...)
     
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  8. Joan Weiner (1997). Frege and the Linguistic Turn. Philosophical Topics 25 (2):265-288.
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  9. Elizabeth B. Davis, Joan Weiner, Neil J. Farber, Earl J. Robinson & E. Gil Boyer (1995). The Biotechnology “Wheel of Fortune”: Who Gives, Who Gets, Who Profits? [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 16 (1):23-38.
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  10. Elizabeth B. Davis, Joan Weiner, Neil J. Farber, Earl J. Robinson & E. Gil Boyer (1995). The Biotechnology “Wheel of Fortune”: Who Gives, Who Gets, Who Profits? Journal of Medical Humanities 16 (1):23-38.
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  11. Joan Weiner (1995). Burge's Literal Interpretation of Frege. Mind 104 (415):585-597.
  12. Joan Weiner (1995). Realismbei Frege: Reply to Burge. Synthese 102 (3):363 - 382.
    Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and arch-realist. He is renowned for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and independent of us, our judgments and our thoughts; that there is a third realm containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. Until recently, there were few attempts to explicate these renowned claims, for most philosophers thought the clarity of Frege's prose rendered explication unnecessary. But the last ten years have seen the publication of several revisionist interpretations of Frege's writings (...)
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  13. Joan Weiner (1994). Review: Andrea Nye, Words of Power. A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (2):678-681.
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  14. Joan Weiner (1989). On Concepts, Hints, and Horses. History of Philosophy Quarterly 6 (1):115 - 130.
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  15. Joan Weiner (1984). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (1):90-94.
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  16. Joan Weiner (1984). The Philosopher Behind the Last Logicist. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):242-264.
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  17. Joan Weiner (1979). Counterfactual Conundrum. Noûs 13 (4):499-509.