The agronomist who wants to study the nutrient and water uptake of roots needs a quantitative three-dimensional dynamic model of the structure of root systems.The model presented takes into account current knowledge about the morphogenesis of root systems. It describes the root system as a set of root axes, characterised by their orders. The morphogenetic properties of root axes differ according to their order. The axes of order 1 are directly inserted on the stem, the axes of order 2 are (...) inserted on axes of order 1, and so on. They tend to be more plagiotropec and to have less vascular bundles as the order increases. (shrink)
Animal production, especially pork production, is facing growing international criticism. The greatest concerns relate to the environment, the animals’ living conditions, and the occupational diseases. But human and animal conditions are rarely considered together. Yet the living conditions at work and the emotional bond that inevitably forms bring the farm workers and the animals to live very close, which leads to shared suffering. Suffering does spread from animals to human beings and can cause workers physical, mental, and also moral suffering, (...) which is all the more harmful due to the fact that it is concealed. The conceptual tools used to conceal suffering ( animal welfare, stress, pain) suggest that the industrial system can be improved, whereas for farmers it is by definition incompatible with animal husbandry. (shrink)
This article was written jointly by a philosopher and a mathematician. It has two aims: to acquaint mathematicians with some of the philosophical questions at the foundations of their subject and to familiarize philosophers with some of the answers to these questions which have recently been obtained by mathematicians. In particular, we argue that, if these recent findings are borne in mind, four different basic philosophical positions, logicism, formalism, platonism and intuitionism, if stated with some moderation, are in fact reconcilable, (...) although with some reservations in the case of logicism, provided one adopts a nominalistic interpretation of Plato's ideal objects. This eclectic view has been asserted by Lambek and Scott (LS 1986) on fairly technical grounds, but the present argument is meant to be accessible to a wider audience and to provide some new insights. (shrink)
Souvent, Wittgenstein est lu comme un critique de la subjectivité. Et en effet, on trouve dans sa pensée une attaque très forte contre Villusion métaphysique de la subjectivité (comme sphère ontologique spécifique). Mais, une fois qu'on a dit cela, reste à prendre en compte la contribution positive de Wittgenstein à ce qu'on pourrait appeler une phénoménologie concrète de la subjectivité, c'est-à-dire du sujet tel qu'il se manifeste dans le langage. Wittgenstein's work is often read as a criticism of subjectivity. A (...) very strong attack is indeed to be found in his thought against the metaphysical illusion of subjectivity (construed as a specific ontological sphere). This still leaves room for accounting for Wittgenstein's positive contribution to what may be called a concrete phenomenology of subjectivity, that is, of the subject as it manifests itself within language. (shrink)
One of the striking features of Logical Investigations is its metaphysical neutrality. What are the implications of this neutrality? Should it be counted among the many virtues of the work, or rather mourned as a fateful shortcoming? In an article published in the beginning of the nineties, I answered this question rather unequivocally.1 At that time I considered the neutrality in question to be highly problematic. In the meantime, however, I have had the pleasure of reading Jocelyn Benoist’s recent work (...) Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie, where he argues for the opposite conclusion, criticizing my own interpretation in the process. In the light of this criticism, I would like to use this occasion to reconsider the question anew. (shrink)
It seems reasonable to say that the basic problem of Husserl’s phenomenology is the possibility for the mind to get related to the world. In Brentano’s view, intentionality was a universal characterization of the mental. In Husserl’s, it becomes as well the framework of the possible contact of the mind with the world. As Hilary Putnam observes: “‘Brentano’s thesis’ was meant by him to serve as a way of showing the autonomy of mentalistic psychology (‘act-psychology’) by showing that the mental (...) was separate from the real (external) world. Brentano himself, to my knowledge, never used the word ‘intentionality’, nor did he use the terms ‘intentional inexistence’ and ‘intentional existence’ to refer to the relation between mind and the real world, as philosophers have come to use the word ‘intentionality’ after Husserl.”1 * I owe my understanding of what Wittgenstein says on ‘intentionality’ to Bouveresse 1987, p.279-302. My further criticism of ‘intentional objects’, and my present conception of intentionality, was also deeply influenced by Vincent Descombes’s realist strand of intentionalism. See Descombes 1995 and 1996. John McDowell (see “Intentionality and interiority in Wittgenstein”, reprinted in McDowell 1998a, 297-321, among other papers) gave me the decisive clue as to the problem of the basic ‘harmony’ between thought and reality in Wittgenstein, and illuminating discussions with Jean-Philippe Narboux, in particular on the occasion of a lecture in which he presented a sharp criticism of Husserl’s conception of indexicality, helped me to measure up all the difficulty of a comparison with Husserl. See Narboux 2008. As to my awareness of the trouble one may have ‘meaning’ and sticking to a use, I owe it to Stanley Cavell’s radical reading of Wittgenstein that shows that realism makes room for scepticism, far from extinguishing it, and Sandra Laugier’s sensitive research in the field of moral philosophy, following in the footsteps of Cora Diamond, drew my attention to the role some experiences play in overcoming such difficulty (as the lack of such experiences can make it a dead-end).. (shrink)
The characteristic feature of phenomenology is the phenomenological constraint it exerts on its concepts: they should be embodied in concrete cases. Now, one might take that that possible match between concepts and the given would require some ontological foundation: as if the general determination provided by the concept should correspond to a particular piece of given to be found in the object itself as an abstract ‘moment’. Phenomenology would then call for an ontology of abstract particulars. Against such view, the (...) author advocates that such ontological foundation is flawed in principle, and that phenomenology as such does not call for any particular ontology: phenomenology rather introduces some kind of phenomenological constraint on the very way of ontological analysis. In order to determine what one can say to be in particular circumstances, one has to consider what one usually says to be in that kind of circumstances: on this alternative view, ontology rests on examples, as paradigmatic applications of concepts. The phenomenological move consists in disclosing how the very content of concepts depends on the ways they are applied, rather than what would be supposed to ‘correspond’ to them would depend on their alleged content—as if the latter was independent of any previous connection with the given. (shrink)
Phillips & Silverstein (P&S, 2003) propose that NMDA-receptor dysfunction may be the fundamental neurobiological mechanism underlying and associating impaired holistic perception and cognitive coordination with schizophrenic psychopathology. We discuss how the P&S hypothesis shares different aspects of the weak central coherence account of autism from both theoretical and experimental perspectives. Specifically, we believe that neither those persons with autism nor those with schizophrenia integrate visuo-perceptual information efficiently, resulting in incongruous internal representations of their external world. However, although NMDA-hypofunction may be (...) responsible for perceptual impairments in schizophrenia and possibly autism, we suggest that it is highly unlikely that NMDA-hypofunction is specifically responsible for the autistic behavioral symptomology, as described by P&S in their target article. (shrink)
Dans les Recherches Logiques, Husserl a recours à un concept d'analyticité qui s'écarte des définitions kantiennes. En fait, pour le comprendre, il faut se plonger dans la tradition d'analyse logique autrichienne qui remonte à Bolzano. L'analyticité est ici une propriété formelle, qui s'illustre par la possibilité de la mise en variables de propositions, leur vérité étant maintenue. Husserl ne laisse toutefois pas la question dans l'état dans lequel Bolzano l'avait laissée : surgit la question propre aux Recherches Logiques, qui est (...) celle du sens et du statut du logique comme tel. In his Logical Investigations, Husserl uses a concept of « analyticity » that seems quite different from the Kantian one. Analyticity is defined as formal and by the possibility of regular variations, so as in mathematical equations which determine relations between variables. In that matter, Husserl is influenced by Bolzano and is much deeply connected with the Austrian tradition of logical studies than with the transcendental tradition of the German Idealism. But he deals also with the problem that Bolzano left unsolved : if analyticity in the « strict » sense means the logical rule, what does « logical » mean? (shrink)
A number of phenomena have lent a new complexity to the long-standing challenge of constructing a legitimate and stable political order. I contend that both legitimacy and integration under contemporary conditions ultimately hinge upon a form of public practical reasoning that departs considerably from the ones proposed by John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and several deliberative democrats. I argue that the generalizability test that constitutes the cornerstone of most contemporary neo-Kantian theories of public reason should be abandoned as a rule of (...) public argumentation and be replaced by a norm of civic responsiveness towards minority claims. I not only suggest that a wider variety of reasons, motives and genres of speech needs to be admitted within the purview of public reason, but more fundamentally that generalizability cannot cogently be seen as anything more (or less) than a civic virtue. The underlying point of this article is that neo-Kantian theories of public reason work with a problematic conception of practical reason. I conclude by providing reasons, against some radical and agonistic democrats, why the language of public reasoning needs to be retained and renovated. Key Words: acknowledgement • agonistic democracy • deliberative democracy • generalizability • Habermas • pluralism • practical reason • public reason • Rawls • social integration. (shrink)
« Les pensées sans intuition sont vides ; les intuitions sans concepts sont aveugles. » Tout le « kantisme analytique » tourne autour de cette formule kantienne et de l'interprétation qu'il essaie d'en donner. Sellars soutient que l'intuition ne peut être une connaissance à elle toute seule. McDowell pense même que l'intuition en tant que telle ne joue aucun rôle dans la pensée – c'est-à-dire qu'il croit que le contenu de l'intuition est encore conceptuel. Nous examinerons ces théories dans leur (...) rapport à Kant, qu'elles discutent et critiquent, et nous essaierons de comprendre pourquoi il y a une « tentation kantienne » en philosophie analytique, en la faisant remonter à l'œuvre fondatrice de Frege. (shrink)
The case of Dr. Nancy Olivieri, the Hospital for Sick Children, the University of Toronto, and Apotex Inc. vividly illustrates many of the issues central to contemporary health research and the safety of research participants. First, it exemplifies the financial and health stakes in such research. Second, it shows deficits in the ways in which research is governed. Finally, it was and remains relevant not only in Toronto but in communities across Canada and well beyond its borders because, absent appropriate (...) policies, what happened in Toronto could have happened (and could well still happen) elsewhere. In Part One of this paper, we review the facts of the Olivieri case relevant to the issues we wish to highlight: first, the right of participants in a clinical trial to be informed of a risk that an investigator had identified during the course of the trial and the obligation of the investigator to inform participants (both her own and those of other investigators); and second, the obligation of institutions to protect and promote the well-being of research participants as well as academic freedom and research integrity, the obligations of research sponsors to inform participants, research regulators, and others about unforeseen risks, and the obligations of research regulators to ensure that participants are informed of unforeseen risks and to otherwise protect and promote research integrity. In Part Two, we relate these facts and issues to New Zealand and Australia. We also make detailed recommendations for changes to the various instruments used for the governance of research involving humans in Australasia. (shrink)
Golden parachutes are often viewed as a form of excessive compensation because they provide senior management with substantial payouts following an acquisition while other stakeholders are subjected to layoffs, disrupted business relationships and other negative externalities. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms, an economic and ethical justification for this type of contract is given. Golden parachutes ensure effective corporate governance that, in turn, preserve the firm's value for all stakeholders. Boards of directors enter into parachute agreements to protect recently (...) hired CEOs' human capital during periods of financial uncertainty and, thus, potential takeover activity. From an ethics viewpoint, golden parachutes are valuable to all stakeholders because they encourage merger or acquisition in lieu of bankruptcy. (shrink)
Phillips & Silverstein (P&S, 2003) have proposed that NMDA-receptor hypofunction is the central reason for impaired cognitive coordination and abnormal gestalt-like perceptual processing in schizophrenia. We suggest that this model may also be applicable to non-pathological (or normal) aging given the compelling evidence of NMDA-receptor involvement during the aging process that results in age-related change in higher-level perceptual performance. Given that such deficits are present in other neurological disorders such as autism, an argument for a systematic assessment of perceptual functioning (...) in these conditions may be posited. (shrink)
To date, ethics discussions about stem cell research overwhelmingly have centered on the morality and acceptability of using human embryonic stem cells. Governments in many jurisdictions have now answered these “first-level questions” and many have now begun to address ethical issues related to the donation of cells, gametes, or embryos for research. In this commentary, we move beyond these ethical concerns to discuss new themes that scientists on the forefront of NRM development anticipate, providing a preliminary framework for further discussion (...) between scientists and ethicists. Fostering strong partnerships between neuroscientists and ethicists that operate and collaborate within this evolving framework will maximize the translation of NRM discoveries on the brain into cures that are safe and address the needs of science and society. (shrink)
With increasing use of ethics resources by health care teams, the number of patients transferred from one care setting to another who may have had ethics consultations is rising rapidly. There has been virtually no discussion in the ethics literature and no experience in our community addressing questions concerning the continuity of ethics care and the transfer of ethics information. Our ethics committee faced the following questions during a recent consultation. Should there be continuity of ethics care between institutions? If (...) so, what should be the nature of the communication? How is continuity best accomplished? Do ethics consultants or committees incur additional liability following the transfer of care? Where should the boundaries of confidentiality be drawn? How can existing health care ethics networks facilitate continuity of ethics care?We address these ethical and logistical questions and hope to encourage others to report their views on these issues. (shrink)
L'auteur cherche d'abord à éclairer le concept de structure en mettant en évidence son origine - origine double du reste - dans le concept phénoménologique de priori (analytique et synthétique), tel qu'il est repris par certaines ontologies analytiques contemporaines. Puis, il discute la nature de cette a prioricité de la structure : est-elle normative ou ontologique ? Il tient pour nécessaire une approche purement ontologique et théorique des structures.
S'attachant au Traité de la nature humaine de Hume, l'auteur essaie de montrer comment le concept moderne de naturalisme est un concept ambigu. D'un côté, Hume a ouvert la possibilité d'une science de la nature humaine, qui traite le sujet connaissant comme lui-même objet possible de connaissance. De l'autre côté, prenant en compte cette constitution du sujet connaissant comme pur fait et la réincorporant dans le flux de la vie (comme réalité et comme expérience), il a mis cette science aux (...) prises avec le risque du scepticisme, comme son envers. Dès lors, le naturalisme ne peut jamais être du seul ordre de la science. Focusing on Hume's Treatise of the Human Nature, the author tries to show how the modern concept of naturalism, according to its origin, is a very ambiguous one. On the one side, Hume has opened the possibility of a science of the human nature that deals with the knowing subject as itself a possible object of knowledge. On the other side, taking into account this constitution of the knowing subject as a mere fact and embodying it in the stream of life (as reality and as experience), he has confronted this science with the risk of skepticism, as its own back side. Thus naturalism can never be just science. (shrink)
L 'Elementarlehre de la Wissenschaftslehre de Bolzano peut être lue comme une sorte de réécriture de l'Elementarlehre de la Critique de la raison pure. Bien sûr, on pourrait avoir l'impression que toute Esthétique Transcendantale fait ici défaut.Des déterminations qui sont supposées intuitives chez Kant sont réinterprétées par Bolzano comme purement conceptuelles. Pourtant, en fait, développant sa propre Esthétique Transcendantale du point de vue d'une sémantique objective, Bolzano invente une nouvelle sorte d'à priori pour la sensibilité - précisément un a priori (...) purement conceptuel. The Elementarlehre of Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre can be read as some kind of rewriting of the Elementarlehre from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Of course it could seem that any Transcendental Aesthetics is here missing. Determinations which are supposed to be intuitive in Kant's Critique are reinterpreted by Bolzano as mere conceptual ones. However, in fact, developing his own Transcendental Aesthetics from the point of view of an objective semantics, Bolzano invents some new kind of a priori for the sensibility - precisely a mere conceptual one. (shrink)
In this paper I distinguish moral “ought”-judgments, meaning “ought”- judgments that qualify as moral judgments, from “morally ought”-judgments, meaning “ought”-judgments whose “ought” is either prefaced (or followed) by the word “morally” or construable as so prefaced. Specifically, I argue that the former class of judgments is wider than the second. (As I show in section 3, this is not to argue for the already familiar distinction, or putative distinction, between a broad and a narrow sense of “moral.”) I also speculate (...) as to why the distinction exists, and, more important, show that it has important consequences. For instance, it undermines a tempting argument for moral subjectivism. (shrink)
L'auteur met en évidence l'ambiguïté de la théorie phénoménologique de la négation telle qu'elle est soutenue par Husserl. Husserl hésite entre une conception de la négation comme acte et l'incorporation de la négation au sens lui-même : entre une conception illocutionnaire et une conception propositionnelle de la négation. En définitive, il choisit la seconde conception, mais en l'étendant au niveau infrapropositionnel (à la perception). L'auteur traite ce problème comme révélateur de l'ambiguïté de la philosophie phénoménologique, suspendue entre acte et sens, (...) langage et perception. The author shows the ambiguity of the phenomenological theory of negation, such as it is held by Husserl. Husserl hesitates between a conception of negation as an act and of negation belonging to the meaning itself : that is, between an illocutionary and a propositional view of negation. Eventually, he chooses the later, but by extending it to the subpropositional level (i.e. to perception). The author takes this problem to be revealing of the ambiguity of phenomenological philosophy, standing between act and meaning, and between language and perception. (shrink)
