This commentary speaks to the relationship between Depue & Marrone-Strupinsky's (D&M-S's) concept of trait affiliation and affiliative memory and the formation of human community, especially among peer groups. The target article suggests a model for how and why dynamic communities form in a number of disparate contexts and under a number of circumstances.
Richard Whitley, Jochen Gläser (eds.), The Changing Governance of the Sciences. The Advent of Research Evaluation Systems. Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook Content Type Journal Article Pages 465-468 DOI 10.1007/s11024-009-9132-4 Authors JürgenEnders, University of Twente Enschede The Netherlands Journal Minerva Online ISSN 1573-1871 Print ISSN 0026-4695 Journal Volume Volume 47 Journal Issue Volume 47, Number 4.
Anthony Brueckner argues for a strong connection between the closure and the underdetermination argument for scepticism. Moreover, he claims that both arguments rest on infallibilism: In order to motivate the premises of the arguments, the sceptic has to refer to an infallibility principle. If this were true, fallibilists would be right in not taking the problems posed by these sceptical arguments seriously. As many epistemologists are sympathetic to fallibilism, this would be a very interesting result. However, in this paper I (...) will argue that Brueckner’s claims are wrong: The closure and the underdetermination argument are not as closely related as he assumes and neither rests on infallibilism. Thus even a fallibilist should take these arguments to raise serious problems that must be dealt with somehow. (shrink)
Friendship, as a unique form of social relationship, establishes a particular union among individual human beings which allows them to overcome diverse boundaries between individual subjects. Age, gender or cultural differences do not necessarily constitute an obstacle for establishing friendship and as a social phenomenon, it might even include the potential to exist independently of space and time. This analysis in the interface of social science and phenomenology focuses on the principles of construction and constitution of this specific form of (...) human encounter. In a “parallel action,” the perspective of social science focuses on concrete socio-historical constructions of friendship in different time periods. These findings are confronted with the description of principles of the subjective constitution of the phenomenon of “friendship” from a phenomenological perspective. The point of reference for the study is the real type of the symbolically established and excessively idealized form of friendship intended for eternity which was especially popular in eighteenth century Germany. Analogous to the method of phenomenological reduction, three different levels of protosociological reduction are developed for the exploration of the unique social phenomenon of friendship. (shrink)
This paper focuses on a combination of the antiskeptical strategies offered by semantic externalism and the inference to the best explanation. I argue that the most difficult problems of the two strategies can be solved, if the strategies are combined: The strategy offered by semantic externalism is successful against standard skeptical brain-in-a-vat arguments. But the strategy is ineffective, if the skeptical argument is referring to the recent-envatment scenario. However, by focusing on the scenario of recent envatment the most difficult problems (...) of the antiskeptical strategy posed by the inference to the best explanation can be solved. The most difficult problems with this strategy are: (1) Why is an explanation of our experience offered by the skeptical hypothesis more complex than our standard explanation? (2) Why is the more complex explanation less likely to be true? By focussing on the recent envatment hypothesis both questions can be answered satisfactorily. Therefore, the combination of semantic externalism and the inference to the best explanation yields a powerful antiskeptical argument. (shrink)
In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena which pursues two objectives. First, I aim to clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because despite its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s distinction has to be understood. I reject one common interpretation of the distinction, endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phenomena with patterns in data (...) sets. Furthermore, I point out that other interpretations of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction do not specify the relationship between phenomena and theories in a satisfying manner. In order to avoid this problem I propose a contextual understanding of scientific phenomena according to which phenomena are states of affairs which play specific roles in scientific practice and to which we adopt a special epistemic attitude. Second, I evaluate the epistemological significance of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction with respect to the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists. Contrary to what Bogen and Woodward claim, I argue that the distinction does not provide a convincing argument against constructive empiricism. (shrink)
The four-principle approach to biomedical ethics is used worldwide by practitioners and researchers alike but it is rather unclear what exactly people do when they apply this approach. Ranking, specification, and balancing vary greatly among different people regarding a particular case. Thus, a sound and coherent applicability of principlism seems somewhat mysterious. What are principlists doing? The article examines the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the applicability of this approach. The most important result is that a sound and comprehensible application (...) of the four principles is additionally ensured by making use of the organizing meta-principle of common morality, which is the starting point and constraining framework of moral reasoning. (shrink)
After what has been termed the affective or emotional turn in sociology and many other academic fields, there is still a dearth of methodologies for systematic empirical emotion analysis in sociology. The article addresses this gap and argues that the principles of narrative analysis can be fruitfully extended to the systematic empirical investigation of emotions. A short description of key principles and tools in narrative analysis will serve as the basis for showing how the same concepts can be used to (...) gain access to the emotional side of human experience. To this end the article engages with philosophical debates to develop a specific theoretical notion of emotions—their narrative nature—and discusses the emotional nature of narrative. Specifically, this calls into question any clear-cut distinction between meaning and emotion. Based on this, the text then employs linguistic and some psychological and literary research to demonstrate and systematize key ways in which emotions can be expressed narratively as well as on the level of sentences and words. Together this forms an encompassing methodological framework that can capture the emotionality of human experience in its manifold forms. Specifically, this also addresses the problem of non-conscious emotions. (shrink)
This essay presents a phenomenological analysis of the functioning of symbols as elements of the life-world with the purpose of demonstrating the interrelationship of individual and society. On the basis of Alfred Schutz''s theory of the life-world, signs and symbols are viewed as mechanisms by means of which the individual can overcome the transcendences posed by time, space, the world of the Other, and multiple realities which confront him or her. Accordingly, the individual''s life-world divides itself into the dimensions of (...) time, space, the social world and various reality spheres which form the boundaries or transcendences that the I has to understand and integrate. Signs and symbols are described as appresentational modes which stand for experiences originating in the different spheres of the life-world within the world of everyday life, within which they can be communicated, thereby establishing intersubjectivity. Schutz''s theory of the symbol explains how social entities – such as nations, states or religious groups – are symbolically integrated to become components of the individual''s life-world. The following paper reconstructs Schutz''s concept of the symbol as a crucial component of his theory of the life-world, which is seen as an outstanding phenomenological contribution to the theory of the sign and the symbol in general. (shrink)
Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing. On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning. On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account (...) for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task. We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference. Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes – cognitive structures we call event codes. We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data. Key Words: action planning; binding; common coding; event coding; feature integration; perception; perception-action interface. (shrink)
The papers collected here are the result of an INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM: Data · Phenomena · Theories: What’s the notion of a scientific phenomenon good for? held in Heidelberg in September 2008. The event was organized by the research group Causality, Cognition, and the Constitution of Scientific Phenomena in cooperation with Philosophy Department at the University of Heidelberg (Peter McLaughlin and Andreas Kemmerling) and the IWH Heidelberg. The symposium was supported by the Emmy-Noether-Programm der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft and by Stiftung Universitat Heidelebrg (...) . The workshop was held in honor of Daniela Bailer-Jones, who died on 13 November 2006 at the age of 37 (cf. my 2007 Daniela Bailer-Jones ). Bailer-Jones was an Emmy Noether fellow, and the symposium was arranged and run by those who were working in her research group at the time of her death: Monika Dullstein, Jochen Apel, and Pavel Radchencko. To them goes the credit for the conception, planning, and carrying out of the symposium. (shrink)
Philosophical anthropology is concerned with assumptions about human nature, differential psychology with the empirical investigation of such belief systems. A questionnaire composed of 64 questions concerning brain and consciousness, free will, evolution, meaning of life, belief in God, and theodicy problem was used to gather data from 563 students of psychology at seven universities and from 233 students enrolled in philosophy or the natural sciences. Essential concepts were monism–dualism–complementarity, atheism–agnosticism–deism–theism, attitude toward transcendence–immanence, and self-ratings of religiosity and interest in meaning (...) of life. The response profiles (Menschenbild) of women and men, and of psychology students in the first and midterm of study were very similar. The method of statistical twins indicated a number of differences between students of psychology, philosophy, and the natural sciences. The majority of respondents were convinced that philosophical preconceptions on mind–body and free will have important practical implications for the way in which psychotherapists, physicians, or and judges exercise their professions. (shrink)
Tomasello et al. argue that the “small difference that made a big difference” in the evolution of the human mind was the disposition to share intentions. Chimpanzees are said to understand certain mental states (like intentions), but not share them. We argue that an alternative model is better supported by the data: the capacity to represent mental states (and other unobservable phenomena) is a human specialization that co-evolved with natural language.
Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge (cf. the so-called bootstrapping-problem or the easy-knowledge-problem). For some (...) philosophers, this is a reason to reject reliabilism. Those who try to defend reliabilism have two basic options: (I) accept that reliabilism does not rule out circular reasoning (or bootstrapping), but argue that this kind of reasoning is not as epistemically “bad” as it seems, or (II) hold on to the view that circular reasoning (or bootstrapping) is epistemically “bad”, but deny that reliabilism really allows this kind of reasoning. Option (I) has been spelled out in several ways, all of which have found to be problematic. Option (II) has not been discussed very widely. Vogel (J Philos 97:602–623, 2000) considers and quickly dismisses it on the basis of three reasons. Weisberg (Philos Phenomenol Res 81:525–548, 2010) has shown in detail that one of these reasons is unconvincing. In this paper I argue that the other two reasons are unconvincing as well and that therefore option (II) might in fact be a more promising starting point to defend reliabilism than option (I). (shrink)
Given any field K, there is a function field F/K in one variable containing definable transcendentals over K, i.e., elements in F \ K first-order definable in the language of fields with parameters from K. Hence, the model-theoretic and the field-theoretic relative algebraic closure of K in F do not coincide. E.g., if K is finite, the model-theoretic algebraic closure of K in the rational function field K(t) is K(t). For the proof, diophantine $\emptyset-definability$ of K in F is established (...) for any function field F/K in one variable, provided K is large, or $K^{x}\,/(K^{x})^n$ is finite for some integer n > 1 coprime to char K. (shrink)
This research examines the moderating role of regret aversion in reason-based choice. Earlier research has shown that regret aversion and reason-based choice effects are linked through a common emphasis on decision justification, and that a simple manipulation of regret salience can eliminate the decoy effect, a well-known reason-based choice effect. We show here that the effect of regret salience varies in theory-relevant ways from one reason-based choice effect to another. For effects such as the select/reject and decoy effect, both of (...) which were independently judged to be unreasonable bases for deciding, regret salience eliminated the effect. For the most-important attribute effect that is judged to be normatively acceptable, however, regret salience amplified the effect. Anticipated self-blame regret and perceived decision justifiability consistently predicted preferences and thus offer a parsimonious account of both attenuation and amplification of these reason-based choice effects. (shrink)
Causal inference in the empiricalsciences is based on counterfactuals. The mostcommon approach utilizes a statistical model ofpotential outcomes to estimate causal effectsof treatments. On the other hand, one leadingapproach to the study of causation inphilosophical logic has been the analysis ofcausation in terms of counterfactualconditionals. This paper discusses and connectsboth approaches to counterfactual causationfrom philosophy and statistics. Specifically, Ipresent the counterfactual account of causationin terms of Lewis's possible-world semantics,and reformulate the statistical potentialoutcome framework using counterfactualconditionals. This procedure highlights variousproperties and (...) mechanisms of the statisticalmodel. (shrink)
Regret is often symptomatic of the defective decisions associated with “temporary preference” problems. It may also help overcome these defects. Outcome regret can modify the relative utilities of different payoffs. Process regret can motivate search for better decision processes or trap-evading strategies. Heightened regret may thus be functional for control of these self-defeating choices.
This paper gives a simple method for providing categorial brands of feature-based unification grammars with a model-theoretic semantics. The key idea is to apply the paradigm of fibred semantics (or layered logics, see Gabbay (1990)) in order to combine the two components of a feature-based grammar logic. We demonstrate the method for the augmentation of Lambek categorial grammar with Kasper/Rounds-style feature logic. These are combined by replacing (or annotating) atomic formulas of the first logic, i.e. the basic syntactic types, by (...) formulas of the second. Modelling such a combined logic is less trivial than one might expect. The direct application of the fibred semantics method where a combined atomic formula like np (num: sg & pers: 3rd) denotes those strings which have the indicated property and the categorial operators denote the usual left- and right-residuals of these string sets, does not match the intuitive, unification-based proof theory. Unification implements a global bookkeeping with respect to a proof whereas the direct fibring method restricts its view to the atoms of the grammar logic. The solution is to interpret the (embedded) feature terms as global feature constraints while maintaining the same kind of fibred structures. For this adjusted semantics, the anticipated proof system is sound and complete. (shrink)
Although Nietzsche is a universally recognized author and has had such an extensive impact—on anthropological thought, philosophical discussions of everything from linguistic to moral philosophy, literature and the fine arts, psychological analysis, and cultural criticism—there is no comprehensive commentary on his collected works. The supplementary volumes (Nachberichtsbände) of Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari's Kritische Gesamtausgabe offer only a few references and are intentionally reserved in their commentary, due to their primary function as an instrument within a philological edition. To date (...) there is no scientific, foundational commentary that reviews and makes accessible, in equal measure, the .. (shrink)
Acceptable programming systems have many nice properties like s-m-n-Theorem, Composition and Kleene Recursion Theorem. Those properties are sometimes called control structures, to emphasize that they yield tools to implement programs in programming systems. It has been studied, among others by Riccardi and Royer, how these control structures influence or even characterize the notion of acceptable programming system. The following is an investigation, how these control structures behave in the more general setting of complete numberings as defined by Mal'cev and Eršov.
Commonsense rational choice explanations exploit a form of intentional causation, an idealized version of which underpins the formal rational modelling of modern economic theory. Following John Searle, it is argued that the deliberations and activities of economic actors do not bottom out in intentional states, but in various nonintentional or 'Background' capacities and dispositions. It is shown why the formal version of rational choice theory employed in economics does not have the resources to address such capacities and dispositions, and that (...) the prevailing commitment to this theory thereby reinforces their neglect. Examples are given of the impact of Background phenomena in the economic realm. (shrink)
This is an interdisciplinary collection of new essays by philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and historians on the question: What has determined and what should determine the territory or the boundaries of the discipline named "psychology"? Both the contents - in terms of concepts - and the methods - in terms of instruments - are analyzed. Among the contributors are Mitchell Ash, Paul Baltes, Jochen Brandtstädter, Gerd Gigerenzer, Michael Heidelberger, Gerhard Roth, and Thomas Sturm.
First, we discuss issues raised with respect to the Theory of Event Coding (TEC)'s scope, that is, its limitations and possible extensions. Then, we address the issue of specificity, that is, the widespread concern that TEC is too unspecified and, therefore, too vague in a number of important respects. Finally, we elaborate on our views about TEC's relations to other important frameworks and approaches in the field like stages models, ecological approaches, and the two-visual-pathways model. Footnotes1 We acknowledge the precedence (...) of both Freud¹s Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915) and Neisser¹s Stimulus Information and Its Vicissitudes (a term Neisser borrowed from Freud for his monograph “Cognitive psychology,” 1967). (shrink)
Paul Davidson's critique of O'Driscoll and Rizzo is based on an ?official? philosophical position that turns on an opposition between knowledge and ignorance (in epistemology) and a corresponding opposition between ergodic and nonergodic processes (in ontology). But Davidson's substantive analysis reveals a very different ?unofficial? position, based on ?sensible expectations? and a realist ontology of enduring social structures. While O'Driscoll and Rizzo have the edge on Davidson in terms of their characterization of agents? beliefs, their ontology of event regularities is (...) ultimately the same, and suffers from the same drawbacks, as Davidson's official ontology. The solution to some of these problems may lie in adopting an ontology similar to the one Davidson invokes in his unofficial capacity. (shrink)
Coronary by-pass surgery has been performed in hundreds of thousands of patients in the last 15 years with a high standard of technical and surgical perfection. The indications for this kind of surgery, however, are still controversial because in spite of many retrospective and several prospective studies it cannot be proven convincingly that in a given patient this surgical procedure will prolong life or prevent myocardial infarction. The present attempt to analyze the causes for this controversy shows that the main (...) reasons for this uncertainty lie: (a) in the enigma of the underlying (ischemic heart) disease itself, which is supposed to lend itself to surgical therapy; (b) in the inadequate methods available up until now for characterizing the state of the disease, its probable course, and its pathogenesis; and (c) in the professional group interests which have a momentum of their own. (shrink)
An outline topography of musical accessibility. What is musical accessibility? ; Society, atonality, psychology -- Accessibility discourse in rock, and cultural change. Case study 1 : 'Prog' rock/punk rock : sophistication, directness and shock ; Zeitgeist : accessibility in flux -- A valiant failure? : new art music and the people. Case study 2 : Vaughan Williams' national music in context ; Art music, vernacular music and accessibility -- Accessibility, identity and social action. Case study 3a : Accessibility in action (...) : Bahia, Brazil ; 3b : Samba in Wales : how is adopted music accessible? -- Part five. Themes. Some key concepts. (shrink)
The development of modern programmable pacemaker-systems has led to a series of questions which until now have apparently not existed in the treatment of cardiac rhythm disturbances. These questions touch especially on the problem of whether the relation which usually exists between a diagnostic step and its therapeutic consequence, namely its therapeutic relevance, is abolished or at least changed.
