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Profile: Joe Cruz (Williams College, Williams College)
  1. Joe Cruz, Comments on Fisher's.
    My first plea has to do with the adequacy of this approach for the diverse purposes that philosophers set out for conceptual analysis. It is unclear what to make of concepts that do not lend themselves to obvious analysis in terms of the sorts of benefits that motivate Fisher’s intuitive cases. Some of the central concepts of philosophy — just the ones that where conceptual analysis ought to be most at home — like Knowledge or Person or Just State are (...)
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  2. Joe Cruz, Knowledge and Neuroscience.
    Let me begin with the standard apology and expression of regret for not being able to comment on all of the intriguing and illuminating themes in Professor Churchland’s paper. I should at least note, though, my enthusiasm for his suggestive discussion of the complexity of all concepts, for his detailed portrayal of the resources of neural network models, and for his attempt to deflate our Cartesian pretensions by focusing on the commonality between human and infrahuman cognition. I restrict my developed (...)
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  3. Joe Cruz, Knowing One's Mind.
    In one of the more compelling introductions to philosophy, Bertrand Russell begins with this question: “Is there any knowledge in the world that is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?” (Presumably he means to include women.) “So certain that no reasonable man could doubt it.” And it’s a good question to begin an introduction to philosophy with, because so often, philosophy is in the mode of skepticism, so often it’s in the mode of offering a critical assessment (...)
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  4. Joe Cruz, A Humean Psychological Alternative to Kant and Wittgenstein: Comments on Stueber's Importance of Simulation for Understanding Linguistic and Rational Agency.
    Let me begin by saying that I am sympathetic to the simulation theory, especially where it is conceived of as a crucial and central addition alongside the theory-theory as the explanation of our capacity to attribute mental states, rather than as an exclusive and exhaustive account by itself.1 I part company with Professor Stueber, however, in that I view the recent simulation theory/theory- theory controversy as subject to resolution primarily through empirical findings. Still, it cannot be denied that Stueber has (...)
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  5. Joe Cruz (2013). Knowledge & Reasons. Philosophy Now 96:19-22.
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  6. Safa Zaki & Joe Cruz (2010). Parsimony and the Triple-System Model of Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):230-231.
    Machery's dismissive position on parsimony requires that we examine especially carefully the data he provides as evidence for his complex triple-system account. We use the prototype-exemplar debate as an example of empirical findings which may not, in fact, support a multiple-systems account. We discuss the importance of considering complexity in scientific theory.
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  7. Joe Cruz, Psychological Explanation and Noise in Modeling. Comments on Whit Schonbein's "Cognition and the Power of Continuous Dynamical Systems".
    I find myself ambivalent with respect to the line of argument that Schonbein offers. I certainly want to acknowledge and emphasize at the outset that Schonbein’s discussion has brought to the fore a number of central, compelling and intriguing issues regarding the nature of the dynamical approach to cognition. Though there is much that seems right in this essay, perhaps my view is that the paper invites more questions than it answers. My remarks here then are in the spirit of (...)
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  8. Joe Cruz, On Teleosemantics and Natural Maps (Comments on Work by Rob Cummins Et Al.).
    Let me begin by signaling my enthusiasm both for the specific case offered by Cummins et al. against teleosemantics and for the overall framework from which this work derives. If the first approximation of the idea is that there will be material implicit in a representation that can be exploited by a cognitive agent that later acquires the right abilities to extract this material, and if this material looks a great deal like content, then the teleosemanticist will find accommodating it (...)
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  9. Joe Cruz & John Pollock (2004). The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 125--42.
    Internalism in epistemology is the view that all the factors relevant to the justification of a belief are importantly internal to the believer, while externalism is the view that at least some of those factors are external. This extremely modest first approximation cries out for refinement (which we undertake below), but is enough to orient us in the right direction, namely that the debate between internalism and externalism is bound up with the controversy over the correct account of the distinction (...)
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  10. Joe Cruz & Robert M. Gordon (2003). Simulation Theory. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
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  11. Robert M. Gordon & Joe Cruz (2002). Simulation Theory. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
    What is the simulation theory? Arguments for simulation theory Simulation theory versus theory theory Simulation theory and cognitive science Versions of simulation theory A possible test of the simulation theory.
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  12. Joe Cruz (1997). Simulation and the Psychology of Sociopathy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):525-527.
    Mealey's (1995a) psychological explanation of the sociopath's antisocial activity appeals to an incomplete or nonstandard theory of mind. This is not the only possible mechanism of mental state attribution. The simulation theory of mental state ascription offers a better hope of explaining the diverse elements of sociopathy reported by Mealey.
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