12 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Joe Lau [9]Joe Y. F. Lau [4]
See also:
Profile: Yen Fong Lau (University of Hong Kong)
  1. Joe Lau, Book Review Anthropology and Philosophy Vol III Issue 2, 1999. [REVIEW]
    Michael Tye’s book is a powerful defense of the controversial theory that the phenomenal properties of our conscious mental states are representational in character. The theory is introduced and defended through discussing ten philosophical problems about consciousness. The book is clearly written and arguments are illustrated with interesting thought-experiments and empirical findings. It is one of those delightful occasions where a book is of interest both to professional philosophers and students.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Joe Lau, Belief Reports and Interpreted-Logical Forms.
    One major obstacle in providing a compositional semantics for natural languages is that it is not clear how we should deal with propositional attitude contexts. In this paper I will discuss the Interpreted Logical Form proposal , focusing on the case of belief. This proposal has been developed in different ways by authors such as Harman (1972), Higginbotham (1986,1991), Segal (1989) and Larson and Ludlow (1993). On this approach, the that-clause of a belief report is treated as a singular term, (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Joe Lau, Some Critical Issues in Cognitive Science.
    Cognitive science aims to provide scientific explanations of various mental phenomena. Attempts to study the mind, however, go back thousands of years, and what is distinctive about cognitive science is not its aim but the use of computations and representations in psychological explanations. We shall discuss whether the computational approach comes under challenge from dynamics, and look at some of the main themes in recent developments in cognitive science. In the final part of this paper we shall look at two (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Joe Lau, Three Motivations for Narrow Content.
    In everyday life, we typically explain what people do by attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires. Such mental states belong to a class of mental states that are _intentional_, mental states that have content. Hoping that Johnny will win, and believing that Johnny will win are of course rather different mental states that can lead to very different behaviour. But they are similar in that they both have the same content : what is being hoped for and believed (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Joe Lau, The Nature of Emotions Comments on Martha Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
    Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions draws heavily on the Stoic account. In her theory, emotions are a kind of value judgment or thought. This is in stark contrast to the well-known proposal from William James, who took emotions to be bodily feelings. There are various motivations for taking emotions as judgments. One main reason is that emotions are intentional mental states. They are always about something, directed at particular objects or state of affairs. For example, fear seems to involve the (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Joe Y. F. Lau (2011). Anti-Externalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):174-177.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Joe Y. F. Lau (2011). An Introduction to Critical Thinking and Creativity: Think More, Think Better. Wiley.
    "This book is about the basic principles that underlie critical thinking and creativity.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Joe Lau, Externalism About Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Joe Y. F. Lau (1999). A More Substantive Neuron Doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):843-844.
    (1) It is not clear from Gold and Stoljar’s definition of biological neuroscience whether it includes computational and representational concepts. If so, then their evaluation of Kandel’s theory is problematic. If not, then a more direct refutation of the radical neuron doctrine is available. (2) Objections to the psychological sciences might derive not just from the conflation of the radical and the trivial neuron doctrine. There might also be the implicit belief that for many mental phenomena, adequate theories must invoke (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Joe Lau (1997). Logica Yearbook.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Joe Lau (1997). Possible Worlds Semantics for Belief Sentences. In Logica Yearbook.
    This paper is about possible worlds semantics for propositional attitude sentences. In particular I shall focus on belief reports in English such as "Lusina believes that tofu is nutritious." It is well-known that possible worlds semantics for such reports suffers from the so-called _problem of equivalence_ . In this paper I shall examine some attempts to deal with this problem and argue that they are unsatisfactory.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Joe Lau (1995). Pietroski on Possible Worlds Semantics for Belief Sentences. Analysis 55 (4):295 - 298.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation