Works by Joel I. Friedman ( view other items matching `Joel I. Friedman`, view all matches )

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  1. Joel I. Friedman (2005). Modal Platonism: An Easy Way to Avoid Ontological Commitment to Abstract Entities. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (3):227 - 273.
    Modal Platonism utilizes “weak” logical possibility, such that it is logically possible there are abstract entities, and logically possible there are none. Modal Platonism also utilizes a non-indexical actuality operator. Modal Platonism is the EASY WAY, neither reductionist nor eliminativist, but embracing the Platonistic language of abstract entities while eliminating ontological commitment to them.
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  2. Joel I. Friedman (1995). Towards an Adequate Definition of Distribution for First-Order Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (2):161 - 192.
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  3. Joel I. Friedman (1986). The Natural God: A God Even an Atheist Can Believe In. Zygon 21 (3):369-388.
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  4. Joel I. Friedman (1983). Spinoza's Problem of “Other Minds”. Synthese 57 (1):99 - 126.
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  5. Joel I. Friedman (1982). Plato'seuthyphro and Leibniz' Law. Philosophia 12 (1-2):1-20.
  6. Joel I. Friedman (1982). Was Spinoza Fooled by the Ontological Argument? Philosophia 11 (3-4):307-344.
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  7. Joel I. Friedman (1980). Necessity and the Ontological Argument. Erkenntnis 15 (3):301 - 331.
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  8. Joel I. Friedman (1978). An Overview of Spinoza'sehics. Synthese 37 (1):67 - 106.
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  9. Joel I. Friedman (1971). The Generalized Continuum Hypothesis is Equivalent to the Generalized Maximization Principle. Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (1):39-54.
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