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Profile: Joel Katzav (Eindhoven University of Technology)
  1. Joel Katzav (2014). The Epistemology of Climate Models and Some of its Implications for Climate Science and the Philosophy of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46:228-238.
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  2. Joel Katzav (2013). Dispositions, Causes, Persistence As Is, and General Relativity. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):41 - 57.
    I argue that, on a dispositionalist account of causation and indeed on any other view of causation according to which causation is a real relation, general relativity (GR) does not give causal principles a role in explaining phenomena. In doing so, I bring out a surprisingly substantial constraint on adequate views about the explanations and ontology of GR, namely the requirement that such views show how GR can explain motion that is free of disturbing influences.
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  3. Joel Katzav (2013). Hybrid Models, Climate Models, and Inference to the Best Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):107-129.
    I examine the warrants we have in light of the empirical successes of a kind of model I call ‘hybrid models’, a kind that includes climate models among its members. I argue that these warrants’ strengths depend on inferential virtues that are not just explanatory virtues, contrary to what would be the case if inference to the best explanation (IBE) provided the warrants. I also argue that the warrants in question, unlike those IBE provides, guide inferences only to model implications (...)
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  4. Joel Katzav (2013). Severe Testing of Climate Change Hypotheses. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (4):433-441.
  5. Joel Katzav, Henk A. Dijkstra & A. T. J. de Laat (2012). Assessing Climate Model Projections: State of the Art and Philosophical Reflections. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 43 (4):258-276.
    The present paper draws on climate science and the philosophy of science in order to evaluate climate-model-based approaches to assessing climate projections. We analyze the difficulties that arise in such assessment and outline criteria of adequacy for approaches to it. In addition, we offer a critical overview of the approaches used in the IPCC working group one fourth report, including the confidence building, Bayesian and likelihood approaches. Finally, we consider approaches that do not feature in the IPCC reports, including three (...)
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  6. Joel Katzav (2008). The Second-Order Property View of Existence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):486-496.
    Abstract: In this paper, I examine the current case against the second-order property view of existence through a discussion of Colin McGinn's up to date statement of this case. I conclude that the second-order property view of existence remains viable.
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  7. Joel Katzav (2005). Ellis on the Limitations of Dispositionalism. Analysis 65 (285):92–94.
    FIRST PARAGRAPH I have argued that dispositionalism is incompatible with the Principle of Least Action (PLA) (Katzav 2004). In ‘Katzav on the Limitations of Dispositionalism,’ Brian Ellis responds, arguing that while naïve dispositionalism is incompatible with the PLA, sophisticated dispositionalism is not. Naive dispositionalism, according to Ellis, is the view that the world is ultimately something like a conglomerate of objects and their dispositions, and that, therefore, dispositions are the ultimate ontological units that explain events. Sophisticated dispositionalism, according to Ellis, (...)
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  8. Joel Katzav (2005). On What Powers Cannot Do. Dialectica 59 (3):331–345.
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  9. Joel Katzav (2004). Dispositions and the Principle of Least Action. Analysis 64 (3):206–214.
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  10. Joel Katzav (2004). Horwich on Meaning and Use. Ratio 17 (2):159–175.
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  11. Joel Katzav (2002). Humean Metaphysics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):59-73.
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  12. Joel Katzav (2002). Identity, Nature, and Ground. Philosophical Topics 30 (1):167-187.
  13. Joel Katzav (1998). Riggs on Strong Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):631 – 639.
    In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified beliefs be truth conducive (likely to be true) is not always compatible with the requirement that they be epistemically responsible (arrived at in an epistemically responsible manner)1. He supports this claim by criticising Alvin Goldman's view that if a belief is strongly justified, it is also epistemically responsible. In light of this, Riggs recommends that we develop two independent conceptions of justification, one that insists upon the (...)
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