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Profile: Joel Krueger (University of Exeter)
  1. Joel Krueger & Amanda Taylor Aiken (forthcoming). Losing Social Space: Phenomenological Disruptions of Spatiality and Embodiment in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia. In Jack Reynolds & Ricky Sebold (eds.), Phenomenology and Science. Palgracve Macmillan
    We argue that a phenomenological approach to social space, as well as its relation to <span class='Hi'>embodiment</span> and affectivity, is crucial for understanding how the social world shows up as social in the first place—that is, as affording different forms of sharing, connection, and relatedness. We explore this idea by considering two cases where social space is experientially disrupted: Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We show how this altered <span class='Hi'>sense</span> of social space emerges from subtle disruptions of <span class='Hi'>embodiment</span> and (...)
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  2.  67
    Joel Krueger (forthcoming). The Extended Mind and Religious Cognition. In Niki Clements (ed.), MacMillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks on Religion - Mental Religion: The Brain, Cognition, and Culture. MacMillan
    The extended mind thesis claims that mental states need not be confined to the brain or even the biological borders of the subject. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have in recent years debated the plausibility of this thesis, growing an immense body of literature. Yet despite its many supporters, there have been relatively few attempts to apply the thesis to religious studies, particularly studies of religious cognition. In this essay, I indicate how various dimensions of religious cognition might be (...)
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  3. Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
    Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view (...)
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  4. Joel Krueger & Søren Overgaard (2012). Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds. ProtoSociology (47):239-262.
    The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational (...)
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  5.  42
    Joel Krueger (2014). Emotions and the Social Niche. In Christian von Scheve & Mikko Salmela (eds.), Collective Emotions. Oxford University Press 156-171.
  6.  42
    Joel Krueger (2015). The Affective 'We': Self-Regulation and Shared Emotions. In Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Sociality: Discovering the 'We'. Routledge 263-277.
    What does it mean to say that an emotion can be shared? I consider this question, focusing on the relation between the phenomenology of emotion experience and (...)
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  7.  20
    Joel Krueger (forthcoming). Intentionality. In G. Stanghellini, M. Broome, A. Fernandez, P. Fusar Poli, Raballo A. & R. Rosfort (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford University Press
  8. Joel Krueger (2011). Extended Cognition and the Space of Social Interaction. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):643-657.
    The extended mind thesis (EM) asserts that some cognitive processes are (partially) composed of actions consisting of the manipulation and exploitation of environmental structures. Might some processes at the root of social cognition have a similarly extended structure? In this paper, I argue that social cognition is fundamentally an interactive form of space management—the negotiation and management of ‘‘we-space”—and that some of the expressive actions involved in the negotiation and management of we-space (gesture, touch, facial and whole-body expressions) (...)
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  9.  27
    Simon Hoffding & Joel Krueger (2016). The First-Person Perspective and Beyond: Commentary on Almaas. Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2):158-178.
    In this commentary, we engage with Almaas’s contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a ‘minimal self’. We attempt to clarify Almaas’s claims about ‘phenomenological givens’ and ‘non-dual’, ‘pure consciousness’, and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.
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  10.  20
    Joel Krueger (2015). At Home in and Beyond Our Skin: Posthuman Embodiment in Film and Television. In Hauskeller Michael, Carbonell Curtis D. & Philbeck Thomas D. (eds.), Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television. Palgrave Macmillan 172-181.
    Film and television portrayals of posthuman cyborgs melding biology and technology, simultaneously “animal and machine” abound. Most of us immediately think of iconic characters like Arnold Schwarzenegger’s relentless cyborg assassin in the Terminator series or Peter Weller’s crime-fighting cyborg police officer in Robocop (1987). Or perhaps we recall the many cyborgs populating the Dr. Who, Star Trek, and Star Wars television series and films—including Darth Vader, surely the most famous cinematic cyborg of all time. But lesser-known explorations of cybernetic embodiment (...)
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  11.  34
    Joel Krueger (2013). The Space Between Us: Embodiment and Intersubjectivity in Watsuji and Levinas. In Leah Kalmanson, Frank Garrett & Sarah Mattice (eds.), Levinas and Asian Thought. Duquesne University Press 53-78.
    This essay brings Emmanuel Levinas and Watsuji Tetsurō into constructive philosophical engagement. Rather than focusing primarily on interpretation — admittedly an important dimension of comparative philosophical inquiry — my intention is to put their respective views to work, in tandem, and address the problem of the embodied social self.1 Both Watsuji and Levinas share important commonalities with respect to the embodied nature of intersubjectivity —commonalities that, moreover, put both thinkers in step with some of the concerns driving current treatments of (...)
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  12.  23
    Angela Woods, Nev Jones, Marco Bernini, Felicity Callard, Ben Alderson-Day, Johanna Badcock, Vaughn Bell, Chris Cook, Thomas Csordas, Clara Humpston, Joel Krueger, Frank Laroi, Simon McCarthy-Jones, Peter Moseley, Hilary Powell & Andrea Raballo (2014). Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Phenomenology of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. Schizophrenia Bulletin 40:S246-S254.
    Despite the recent proliferation of scientific, clinical, and narrative accounts of auditory verbal hallucinations, the phenomenology of voice hearing remains opaque and undertheorized. In this article, we outline an interdisciplinary approach to understanding hallucinatory experiences which seeks to demonstrate the value of the humanities and social sciences to advancing knowledge in clinical research and practice. We argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH utilizes rigorous and context-appropriate methodologies to analyze a wider range of first-person accounts of AVH (...)
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  13.  96
    Giovanna Colombetti & Joel Krueger (2015). Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind. Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1157-1176.
    In this paper we adopt Sterelny's framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines, and develop phenomenological (...)
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  14.  15
    Joel Krueger (2015). Musicing, Materiality, and the Emotional Niche. Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education 14 (3):43-62.
    Building on Elliot and SilvermanÕs (2015) embodied and enactive approach to musicing, I argue for an extended approach: namely, the idea that music can function as an environmental scaffolding supporting the development of various experiences and embodied practices that would otherwise remain inaccessible. I focus especially on the materiality of music. I argue that one of the central ways we use music, as a material resource, is to manipulate social spaceÑand in so doing, manipulate our emotions. Acts of musicing, thought (...)
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  15.  33
    Joel Krueger (2013). Merleau-Ponty on Shared Emotions and the Joint Ownership Thesis. Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):509-531.
    In “The Child’s Relations with Others,” Merleau-Ponty argues that certain early experiences are jointly owned in that they are numerically single experiences that are nevertheless given to more than one subject (e.g., the infant and caregiver). Call this the “joint ownership thesis” (JT). Drawing upon both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis, as well as studies of exogenous attention and mutual affect regulation in developmental psychology, I motivate the plausibility of JT. I argue that the phenomenological structure of some early infant–caregiver dyadic exchanges (...)
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  16.  14
    Joel Krueger (2014). Musical Manipulations and the Emotionally Extended Mind. Empirical Musicology Review 9 (3-4):208-212.
    I respond to Kersten’s criticism in his article “Music and Cognitive Extension” of my approach to the musically extended emotional mind in Krueger (2014). I specify how we manipulate—and in so doing, integrate with—music when, as active listeners, we become part of a musically extended cognitive system. I also indicate how Kersten’s account might be enriched by paying closer attention to the way that music functions as an environmental artifact for emotion regulation.
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  17. Joel Krueger (2011). Enacting Musical Content. In Riccardo Manzotti (ed.), Situated Aesthetics: Art Beyond the Skin. Imprint Academic 63-85.
    This chapter offers the beginning of an enactive account of auditory experience—particularly the experience of listening sensitively to music. It investigates how sensorimotor regularities grant perceptual access to music qua music. Two specific claims are defended: (1) music manifests experientially as having complex spatial content; (2) sensorimotor regularities constrain this content. Musical content is thus brought to phenomenal presence by bodily exploring structural features of music. We enact musical content.
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  18.  12
    Joel Krueger (2015). Empathy Beyond the Head: Comment on "Music, Empathy, and Cultural Understanding". Physics of Life Reviews 15:92-93.
  19. Joel Krueger (2009). Enacting Musical Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):98-123.
    I argue for an enactive account of musical experience — that is, the experience of listening ‘deeply’(i.e., sensitively and understandingly) to a piece of music. The guiding question is: what do we do when we listen ‘deeply’to music? I argue that these music listening episodes are, in fact, doings. They are instances of active perceiving, robust sensorimotor engagements with and manipulations of sonic structures within musical pieces. Music is thus experiential art, and in Nietzsche’s words, ‘we listen to music with (...)
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  20. Joel Krueger (2011). Doing Things with Music. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):1-22.
    This paper is an exploration of how we do things with music—that is, the way that we use music as an esthetic technology to enact micro-practices of emotion regulation, communicative expression, identity construction, and interpersonal coordination that drive core aspects of our emotional and social existence. The main thesis is: from birth, music is directly perceived as an affordance-laden structure. Music, I argue, affords a sonic world, an exploratory space or nested acoustic environment that further affords possibilities for, among other (...)
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  21.  33
    Joel Krueger (2014). Varieties of Extended Emotions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):533-555.
    I offer a preliminary defense of the hypothesis of extended emotions (HEE). After discussing some taxonomic considerations, I specify two ways of parsing HEE: the hypothesis of bodily extended emotions (HEBE), and the hypothesis of environmentally extended emotions (HEEE). I argue that, while both HEBE and HEEE are empirically plausible, only HEEE covers instances of genuinely extended emotions. After introducing some further distinctions, I support one form of HEEE by appealing to different streams of empirical research—particularly work on music and (...)
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  22. Joel Krueger (2014). Emotions and Other Minds. In Julia Weber & Rüdiger Campe (eds.), Rethinking Emotion: Interiority and Exteriority in Premodern, Modern, and Contemporary Thought. De Gruyter 324-350.
  23.  11
    Joel Krueger & Mads Gram Henriksen (forthcoming). Embodiment and Affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Analysis. In J. Aaron Simmons & James Hackett (eds.), Phenomenology for the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan
    In this comparative study, we examine experiential disruptions of embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions, and that such an understanding may have significant therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis can shed light on the importance of embodiment and affectivity for the constitution of a sense of self and interpersonal relatedness (...)
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  24.  10
    John Michael, Kathleen Bogart, Kristian Tylen, Joel Krueger, Morten Bech, John R. Ostergaard & Riccardo Fusaroli (2015). Training in Compensatory Strategies Enhances Rapport in Interactions Involving People with Möebius Syndrome. Frontiers in Neurology 6 (213):1-11.
    In the exploratory study reported here, we tested the efficacy of an intervention designed to train teenagers with Möbius syndrome (MS) to increase the use of alternative communication strategies (e.g., gestures) to compensate for their lack of facial expressivity. Specifically, we expected the intervention to increase the level of rapport experienced in social interactions by our participants. In addition, we aimed to identify the mechanisms responsible for any such increase in rapport. In the study, five teenagers with MS interacted with (...)
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  25.  9
    Joel Krueger (2014). Affordances and the Musically Extended Mind. Frontiers in Psychology 4 (1003):1-12.
    I defend a model of the musically extended mind. I consider how acts of “musicking” grant access to novel emotional experiences otherwise inaccessible. First, I discuss the idea of “musical affordances” and specify both what musical affordances are and how they invite different forms of entrainment. Next, I argue that musical affordances – via soliciting different forms of entrainment – enhance the functionality of various endogenous, emotiongranting regulative processes, drawing novel experiences out of us with an expanded complexity and phenomenal (...)
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  26.  9
    John Michael, Kathleen Bogart, Kristian Tylen, Joel Krueger, Morten Bech, John R. Ostergaard & Riccardo Fusaroli (2014). Control and Flexibility of Interactive Alignment: Mobius Syndrome as a Case Study. Cognitive Processing 15 (1):S125-126.
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  27. Dorothée Legrand & Joel Krueger (2009). The Open Body. In Antonella Carassa, Francesca Morganti & Guiseppa Riva (eds.), Enacting Intersubjectivity: Paving the Way for a Dialogue Between Cognitive Science, Social Cognition, and Neuroscience. Universita Della Svizzera Italiana 109-128.
    In this paper we characterize the body as constitutively open. We fi rst consider the notion of bodily openness at the basic level of its organic constitution. This will provide us a framework relevant for the understanding of the body open to its intersubjective world. We argue that the notion of “bodily openness” captures a constitutive dimension of intersubjectivity. Generally speaking, there are two families of theories intending to characterize the constitutive relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity: either the self (...)
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  28.  15
    Joel Krueger (2013). Empathy. In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage
  29.  30
    Somogy Varga & Joel Krueger (2013). Background Emotions, Proximity and Distributed Emotion Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):271-292.
    In this paper, we draw on developmental findings to provide a nuanced understanding of background emotions, particularly those in depression. We demonstrate how they reflect our basic proximity (feeling of interpersonal connectedness) to others and defend both a phenomenological and a functional claim. First, we substantiate a conjecture by Fonagy & Target (International Journal of Psychoanalysis 88(4):917–937, 2007) that an important phenomenological aspect of depression is the experiential recreation of the infantile loss of proximity to significant others. Second, we argue (...)
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  30.  7
    Joel Krueger (2014). Dewey's Rejection of the Emotion/Expression Distinction. In Tibor Solymosi & John Shook (eds.), Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism: Understanding Brains at Work in the World. Palgrave Macmillan 140-161.
  31.  7
    Joel Krueger (forthcoming). James on Pure Experience. In David Evans (ed.), Understanding James, Understanding Modernism. Bloomsbury
  32.  36
    Joel Krueger, Marco Bernini & Sam Wilkinson (2014). Introspection, Isolation, and Construction: Mentality as Activity. Commentary on Hurlburt, Heavey & Kelsey, “Toward a Phenomenology of Inner Speaking”. Consciousness and Cognition 25 (1):9-10.
  33. Joel Krueger (2009). Empathy and the Extended Mind. Zygon 44 (3):675-698.
    I draw upon the conceptual resources of the extended mind thesis to analyze empathy and interpersonal understanding. Against the dominant mentalistic paradigm, I argue that empathy is fundamentally an extended bodily activity and that much of our social understanding happens outside of the head. First, I look at how the two dominant models of interpersonal understanding, theory theory and simulation theory, portray the cognitive link between folk psychology and empathy. Next, I challenge their internalist orthodoxy and offer an alternative "extended" (...)
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  34. Joel Krueger (2010). Radical Enactivism and Inter-Corporeal Affectivity. In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Heningnsen (eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders. Schattauer
  35.  11
    Joel Krueger (2012). Gestural Coupling and Social Cognition: Moebius Syndrome as a Case Study. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6 (81).
    Social cognition researchers have become increasingly interested in the ways that behavioral, physiological, and neural coupling facilitate social interaction and interpersonal understanding. We distinguish two ways of conceptualizing the role of such coupling processes in social cognition: strong and moderate interactionism. According to strong interactionism (SI), low-level coupling processes are alternatives to higher-level individual cognitive processes; the former at least sometimes render the latter superfluous. Moderate interactionism (MI) on the other hand, is an integrative approach. Its guiding assumption is that (...)
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  36.  30
    Joel Krueger (2006). Concrete Consciousness: A Sartrean Critique of Functionalist Accounts of Mind. Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60.
    In this essay, I argue that Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. First, I look at some of the basic claims motivating functionalist accounts of mind. Next, I look at Sartre's (...)
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  37. Joel Krueger (2013). Watsuji's Phenomenology of Embodiment and Social Space. Philosophy East and West 63 (2):127-152.
    The aim of this essay is to situate the thought of Tetsurō Watsuji within contemporary approaches to social cognition. I argue for Watsuji’s current relevance, suggesting that his analysis of embodiment and social space puts him in step with some of the concerns driving ongoing treatments of social cognition in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Yet, as I will show, Watsuji can potentially offer a fruitful contribution to this discussion by lending a phenomenologically informed critical perspective. This is because (...)
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  38. Joel Krueger (2011). The Who and the How of Experience. In Dan Zahavi, Evan Thompson & Mark Siderits (eds.), Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press 27-55.
  39. Joel Krueger (2006). James on Experience and the Extended Mind. Contemporary Pragmatism 3 (1):165-176.
    William James’s characterization of consciousness as a selecting agency can be used to develop and defend an externalist view of mind. The mind – including the content of phenomenal consciousness – is in an important sense distributed beyond the skin and skull of the subject, out into the world of people and things. Moreover, conscious experience is an action, and not simply something that happens to us. Consciousness, perception, and experience are activities – in other words, things that we do.
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  40. Joel Krueger (2010). James Austin's Selfless Insight: Zen and the Meditative Transformations of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):240-244.
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  41.  7
    Joel Krueger (2008). A Daoist Critique of Searle on Mind and Action. In Bo Mou (ed.), Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. Brill Academic Publishers 97-123.
  42.  7
    Joel Krueger (2013). Ontogenesis of the Socially Extended Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 25:40-46.
    I consider the developmental origins of the socially extended mind. First, I argue that, from birth, the physical interventions caregivers use to regulate infant attention and emotion (gestures, facial expressions, direction of gaze, body orientation, patterns of touch and vocalization, etc.) are part of the infant’s socially extended mind; they are external mechanisms that enable the infant to do things she could not otherwise do, cognitively speaking. Second, I argue that these physical interventions encode the norms, values, and patterned practices (...)
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  43. Joel Krueger (2007). Stream of Consciousness. In John Lachs & Robert Talisse (eds.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge
  44.  33
    Joel Krueger (2014). The Phenomenology of Person Perception. In Mark Bruhn & Donald Wehrs (eds.), Neuroscience, Literature, and History. Routledge 153-173.
  45.  5
    Joel Krueger (2013). Phenomenology and the Visibility of the Mental. Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan 29:13-25.
  46.  4
    Simon McCarthy-Jones, Joel Krueger, Matthew Broome & Charles Fernyhough (2013). Stop, Look, Listen: The Need for Philosophical Phenomenological Perspectives on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7 (127):1-9.
    One of the leading cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) proposes such experiences result from a disturbance in the process by which inner speech is attributed to the self. Research in this area has, however, proceeded in the absence of thorough cognitive and phenomenological investigations of the nature of inner speech, against which AVHs are implicitly or explicitly defined. In this paper we begin by introducing philosophical phenomenology and highlighting its relevance to AVHs, before briefly examining the evolving literature (...)
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  47.  4
    Andrea Raballo & Joel Krueger (2011). Phenomenology of the Social Self in the Prodrome of Psychosis: From Perceived Negative Attitude of Others to Heightened Interpersonal Sensitivity. European Psychiatry 26 (8):532-533.
  48. Joel Krueger (2008). Nishida, Agency, and the 'Self-Contradictory' Body. Asian Philosophy 18 (3):213 – 229.
    In this essay, I investigate Kitarō Nishida's characterization of what he refers to as the 'self-contradictory' body. First, I clarify the conceptual relation between the self-contradictory body and Nishida's notion of 'acting-intuition'. I next look at Nishida's analysis of acting-intuition and the self-contradictory body as it pertains to our personal, sensorimotor engagement with the world and things in it, as well as to our bodily immersion within the intersubjective and social world. Along the way, I argue that Nishida develops a (...)
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  49.  54
    Søren Overgaard & Joel Krueger (2013). Social Perception and “Spectator Theories” of Other Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):434 - 435.
    We resist Schilbach et al.’s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second person approach from the social perception view.
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  50.  28
    Joel Krueger (2009). Knowing Through the Body: The Daodejing and Dewey. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36 (1):31-52.
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