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Joel Smith [28]Joel M. Smith [4]Joel R. Smith [3]
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Profile: Joel Smith (University of Manchester)
  1. Joel Smith, Perceptual Recognition, Emotion, and Value.
    I outline an account of perceptual knowledge and assess the extent to which it can be employed in a defence of perceptual accounts of emotion and value recognition. I argue that considerations ruling out lucky knowledge give us some reason to doubt its prospects in the case of value recognition. I also discuss recent empirical work on cultural and contextual influences on emotional expression, arguing that a perceptual account value recognition is consistent with current evidence.
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  2. Joel Smith, Vision and the Ontology of Emotion and Expression.
    I offer an account of the ontology of emotions and their expressions, drawing some morals for the view that we can see others' emotions in virtue of seeing their expressions.
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  3. Joel Smith (2014). Are Emotions Embodied Evaluative Attitudes? [REVIEW] Disputatio 6 (38):93-106.
    Deonna and Teroni’s The Emotions is both an excellent introduction to philosophical work on emotions and a novel defence of their own Attitudinal Theory. After summarising their discussion of the literature I describe and evaluate their positive view. I challenge their theory on three fronts: their claim that emotions are a form of bodily awareness, their account of what makes an emotion correct, and their account of what justifies an emotion.
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  4. Joel Smith (2014). Egocentric Space. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (3):409-433.
    I discuss the relation between egocentric spatial representation and the capacity for bodily activity, with specific reference to Merleau-Ponty.
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  5. Joel Smith (2013). The Phenomenology of Face‐to‐Face Mindreading. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2).
    I defend a perceptual account of face-to-face mindreading. I begin by proposing a phenomenological constraint on our visual awareness of others' emotional expressions. I argue that to meet this constraint we require a distinction between the basic and non-basic ways people, and other things, look. I offer and defend just such an account.
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  6. Joel Smith (2012). Review of JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (Eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    The authors in this collection pursue a number of questions concerning self-consciousness, self and consciousness. Although the essays range rather broadly, there is a good deal of unity. In her introduction Liu organises the chapters under three headings: the Humean denial of self-awareness, the issue of self-knowledge, and the nature of persons or selves. This is helpful although it is worth bearing in mind that some chapters fall under more than one heading (for example, Shoemaker) and some don't fall neatly (...)
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  7. Joel Smith (2011). Can Transcendental Intersubjectivity Be Naturalised? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):91-111.
    I discuss Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. I focus on the problem of perceived similarity. I argue that recent work in developmental psychology and neuroscience, concerning intermodal representation and the mirror neuron system, fails to constitute a naturalistic solution to the problem. This can be seen via a comparison between the Husserlian project on the one hand and Molyneux’s Question on the other.
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  8. Joel Smith (2011). Review of Radu Bogdan, Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
    Our Own Minds presents an account of the nature and development of self-consciousness. Bogdan describes the mind of the infant as outward looking, turning in on itself only at a relatively late stage of development. This it does as a response to the increasingly sophisticated sociocultural pressures it faces throughout infancy and early childhood. The book is difficult to follow (about which, more later) but the main line of argument is this: to begin with, infants are attuned to their physical (...)
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  9. Joel Smith (2011). 1. Strawson's Argument. In Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (eds.), Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford University Press. 184.
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  10. Joel Smith (2011). Strawson on Other Minds. In Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (eds.), Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. OUP.
    I critically discuss Strawson's transcendental argument against other minds scepticism, and look at the prospects for a naturalised version of it.
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  11. Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (eds.) (2011). Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford University Press.
    Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism assesses the present state and contemporary relevance of this tradition.
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  12. Joel Smith (2010). Seeing Other People. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):731-748.
    I present a perceptual account of other minds that combines a Husserlian insight about perceptual experience with a functionalist account of mental properties.
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  13. Joel Smith (2010). The Conceptual Problem of Other Bodies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):201-217.
    The, so called, ‘conceptual problem of other minds’ has been articulated in a number of different ways. I discuss two, drawing out some constraints on an adequate account of the grasp of concepts of mental states. Distinguishing between behaviour-based and identity-based approaches to the problem, I argue that the former, exemplified by Brewer and Pickard, are incomplete as they presuppose, but do not provide an answer to, what I shall call the conceptual problem of other bodies. I end with some (...)
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  14. Joel Smith, Phenomenology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In its central use “phenomenology” names a movement in twentieth century philosophy. A second use of “phenomenology” common in contemporary philosophy names a property of some mental states, the property they have if and only if there is something it is like to be in them. Thus, it is sometimes said that emotional states have a phenomenology while belief states do not. For example, while there is something it is like to be angry, there is nothing it is like to (...)
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  15. Joel Smith (2007). Review of Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy 82 (1):196-200.
    The stated aim of Shaun Gallagher’s book is to provide, “an account of embodiment that is sufficiently detailed, and that is articulated in a vocabulary that can integrate discussions across the cognitive sciences...to remap the terrain that lies between phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience” (10). With this in mind, the book must be considered a success. The book provides a unified account of embodiment, and its relations to a number of aspects of experience, that is genuinely accessible from the perspectives of (...)
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  16. Joel Smith (2006). Review of Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (Eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1126-9.
    You and I are watching a spider crawl across the carpet. We are both aware of the spider, and aware that both are so aware. We are jointly attending to it. This collection of essays addresses a bewildering array of questions that arise regarding the notion of joint attention. How should joint attention be characterised in adults? In particular, how can we articulate the sense in which it is plausible to say that nothing is hidden from either participant in cases (...)
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  17. Joel Smith (2006). Bodily Awareness, Imagination, and the Self. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):49-68.
    Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in way in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), (...)
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  18. Joel Smith (2006). Which Immunity to Error? Philosophical Studies 130 (2):273-83.
    A self-ascription is a thought or sentence in which a predicate is self-consciously ascribed to oneself. Self-ascriptions are best expressed using the first-person pronoun. Mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of mental predicates (predicates that designate mental properties), non-mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of non-mental predicates (predicates that designate non-mental properties). It is often claimed that there is a range of self-ascriptions that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM for short). What this means, (...)
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  19. Richard Scheines, Gaea Leinhardt, Joel Smith & Kwangsu Cho, Replacing Lecture with Web-Based Course Materials.
    In a series of 5 experiments in 2000 and 2001, several hundred students at two different universities with three different professors and six different teaching assistants took a semester long course on causal and statistical reasoning in either traditional lecture/recitation or online/recitation format. In this paper we compare the pre-post test gains of these students, we identify features of the online experience that were helpful and features that were not, and we identify student learning strategies that were effective and those (...)
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  20. Joel Smith (2005). Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenological Reduction. Inquiry 48 (6):553-571.
    _reduction in favour of his existentialist account of être au monde. I show that whilst Merleau-Ponty _ _rejected, what he saw as, the transcendental idealist context in which Husserl presents the _ _reduction, he nevertheless accepts the heart of it, the epoché, as a methodological principle. _ _Contrary to a number of Merleau-Ponty scholars, être au monde is perfectly compatible with the _ _epoché and Merleau-Ponty endorses both. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that Merleau-_ _Ponty’s (...)
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  21. Joel Smith (2005). Review of M. R. Bennett & P. M. S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Mind 114 (454):391-394.
    In this long and detailed book Bennett and Hacker set themselves two ambitious tasks. The first is to offer a philosophical critique of, what they argue are, philosophical confusions within contemporary cognitive neuroscience. The second is to present a ‘conceptual reference work for cognitive neuroscientists who wish to check the contour lines of the psychological concept relevant to their investigation’ (p.7). In the process they cover an astonishing amount of material. The first two chapters present a critical history of neuroscience (...)
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  22. Joel Smith (2004). On Knowing Which Thing I Am. Philosophy 79 (310):591-608.
    Russell's Principle states that in order to think about an object I must know which thing it is, in the sense of being able to distinguish it from all other things. I show that, contra Strawson, Evans and Cassam, Russell's Principle cannot be applied to first-person thought so as to yield necessary conditions of self-consciousness. Footnotes1 Thanks to Naomi Eilan, Keith Hossack, Lucy O'Brien and Ann Whittle for helpful comments.
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  23. Joel Smith (2003). Review of Naomi Eilan & Johannes Roessler (Eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. [REVIEW] The Human Nature Review 3:346-8.
    On hearing a sound behind me I may turn my head in order to see what is happening. This piece of behaviour is a deliberate action, one which feels to be under my own control. If asked what I am doing, I will be able to provide an immediate and knowledgeable answer, viz. 'turning my head' or maybe 'looking to see what is going on'. Not only do I know that an action is taking place, I know which action is (...)
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  24. Joel Smith (2003). Review of F. Nietzsche, Writings From the Late Notebooks. Edited by R. Bittner and Translated by K. Sturge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Writings 22:69-71.
    As so often with his published texts, the experience of reading Nietzsche’s notebooks is at once mesmerising and infuriating. One is in the presence of a thinker who, on the one hand, meditates deeply on fundamental issues in philosophy and psychology but who, on the other, refuses to be pinned down. The fact that Nietzsche’s style is so elusive can account for the enormously disparate interpretations of his work and it is no surprise that his notebooks have been read in (...)
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  25. Joel Smith (2003). Self-Consciousness and Embodied Experience. Dissertation, UCL
    The Body Claim states that a transcendental condition of self-consciousness is that one experience oneself as embodied. The contention of this thesis is that popular arguments in support of the Body Claim are unconvincing. Understanding the Body Claim requires us to have a clear understanding of both self-consciousness and embodied experience. In the first chapter I lay out two different conceptions of self-consciousness, arguing that the proponent of the Body Claim should think of self-consciousness as first-person thought. I point out (...)
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  26. Richard Scheines, Gaea Leinhardt, Joel Smith & Kwangsu Cho, Teaching and Learning with Online Courses.
    Richard Scheines, Gaea Leinhardt, Joel Smith, and Kwangsu Cho. Teaching and Learning with Online Courses.
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  27. Sita Anantha Raman, Robert Nichols Richard, Joshua Searle-White, Heather T. Frazer, Timothy Lubin, Robin Rinehart, Joel R. Smith, Andrea Pinkney, David Gordon White, John Powers, Phyllis Herman, Lawrence A. Babb, Carl Olson, June McDaniel, Knut A. Jacobsen, John E. Cort, Gregory P. Fields & Jeffrey J. Kripal (2000). Book Reviews and Notices. [REVIEW] International Journal of Hindu Studies 4 (2):185-216.
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  28. Joel Smith (1999). Edward Steichen: The Early Years. Princeton University Press.
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  29. Joel R. Smith (1996). Human Insufficiency in Shinran and Kierkegaard. Asian Philosophy 6 (2):117 – 127.
    Abstract Shinran (1173?1263), the founder of the J?doshinsh? of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism, and S?ren Kierkegaard (1813?1855), the Danish father of Christian existentialism, belong to very different eras, cultures, and religious traditions. Yet there are striking similarities between their religious philosophies, especially in how both offer theistic views emphasising faith and grace that see the person as radically insufficient to attain complete self?transformation. Both claim that the human person is so radically insufficient that no one can attain Buddhist enlightenment or (...)
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  30. Joel R. Smith (1994). Nishitani and Nietzsche on the Selfless Self. Asian Philosophy 4 (2):165 – 172.
  31. Bas C. Van Fraassen & Joel M. Smith (1993). Laws and Symmetry. Philosophy of Science 60 (4):659.
     
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  32. Joel M. Smith (1993). Book Review:Laws and Symmetry Bas C. Van Fraassen. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 60 (4):661-.
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  33. Joel M. Smith (1989). John Losee, Philosophy of Science and Historical Enquiry Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 9 (2):58-60.
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  34. Joel Smith (1988). Inconsistency and Scientific Reasoning. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 19 (4):429-445.
    This is a philosophical and historical investigation of the role of inconsistent representations of the same scientific phenomenon. The logical difficulties associated with the simultaneous application of inconsistent models are discussed. Internally inconsistent scientific proposals are characterized as structures whose application is necessarily tied to the confirming evidence that each of its components enjoys and to a vision of the general form of the theory that will resolve the inconsistency. Einstein's derivation of the black body radiation law is used as (...)
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  35. Joel M. Smith (1988). Scientific Reasoning or Damage Control: Alternative Proposals for Reasoning with Inconsistent Representations of the World. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:241 - 248.
    Inconsistent representations of the world have in fact played and should play a role in scientific inquiry. However, it would seem that logical analysis of such representations is blocked by the explosive nature of deductive inference from inconsistent premisses. "Paraconsistent logics" have been suggested as the proper way to remove this impediment and to make explication of the logic of inconsistent scientific theories possible. I argue that installing paraconsistent logic as the underlying logic for scientific inquiry is neither a necessary (...)
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