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Profile: Joëlle Proust (Institut Jean Nicod)
  1. Joëlle Proust (forthcoming). Mental Acts as Natural Kinds. In Till Vierkant, Julian Kieverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the will. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have pre-specified goal contents. For example, one cannot prespecify the content of a judgment or of a deliberation. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental actions. Given these three constraints, mental and bodily actions appear (...)
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  2. Joëlle Proust (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness. Oup Oxford.
    Does metacognition--the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance--derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations, and is essentially related to mental agency.
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  3. Michael J. Beran, Johannes L. Brandl, Josef Perner & Joélle Proust (2012). On the Nature, Evolution, Development, and Epistemology of Metacognition: Introductory Thoughts. In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press.
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  4. Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.) (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press.
    Bringing together researchers from across the cognitive sciences, the book is valuable for philosophers of mind, developmental and comparative psychologists, and neuroscientists.
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  5. Zoltán Dienes, Michael Beran, Johannes L. Brandl, Josef Perner & Joelle Proust (2012). Is Hypnotic Responding the Strategic Relinquishment of Metacognition? In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press.
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  6. Joëlle Proust (2012). Metacognition and Mindreading: One or Two Functions? In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The foundations of metacognition. Oxford University Press. 234.
    Given disagreements about the architecture of the mind, the nature of self-knowledge, and its epistemology, the question of how to understand the function and scope of metacognition – the control of one's cognition - is still a matter of hot debate. A dominant view, the self-ascriptive view (or one-function view), has been that metacognition necessarily requires representing one's own mental states as mental states, and, therefore, necessarily involves an ability to read one's own mind. The self-evaluative view (or two-function view), (...)
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  7. Joëlle Proust (2012). The Norms of Acceptance. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.
    An area in the theory of action that has received little attention is how mental agency and world-directed agency interact. The purpose of the present contribution is to clarify the rational conditions of such interaction, through an analysis of the central case of acceptance. There are several problems with the literature about acceptance. First, it remains unclear how a context of acceptance is to be construed. Second, the possibility of conjoining, in acceptance, an epistemic component, which is essentially mind-to-world, and (...)
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  8. Anna Loussouarn, Damien Gabriel & Joëlle Proust (2011). Exploring the Informational Sources of Metaperception: The Case of Change Blindness Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1489-1501.
  9. Joëlle Proust (2011). Epistemic Normativity From the Reasoner's Viewpoint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):265-265.
    Elqayam & Evans (E&E) are focused on the normative judgments used by theorists to characterize subjects' performances (e.g. in terms of logic or probability theory). They ignore the fact, however, that subjects themselves have an independent ability to evaluate their own reasoning performance, and that this ability plays a major role in controlling their first-order reasoning tasks.
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  10. Joëlle Proust (2010). Metacognition. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):989-998.
  11. Joelle Proust (2009). Is There a Sense of Agency for Thought? In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
  12. Joëlle Proust (2009). Overlooking Metacognitive Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):158-159.
    Peter Carruthers correctly claims that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important functional differences.
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  13. Joëlle Proust (2009). The Representational Basis of Brute Metacognition: A Proposal. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 165--183.
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  14. Joëlle Proust (2008). Conversational Metacognition. In Ipke Wachsmuth, Manuela Lenzen & Günther Knoblich (eds.), Embodied Communication in Humans and Machines. Oup Oxford. 329.
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  15. Joëlle Proust (2008). Presentation. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:5-6.
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  16. Joëlle Proust (2008). Précis de La Nature de la Volonté et Disputatio. Philosophiques:0-00.
    Cet article résume l'ouvrage paru en 2005 et répond aux objections de Stéphane Chauvier, Daniel Laurier et Pierre Livet dans le cadre d'une disputatio organisée par la revue Philosophiques.
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  17. Joëlle Proust (2008). Précis de La Nature de la Volonté. Philosophiques 35 (1):109.
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  18. Joëlle Proust (2008). Réponses à Mes Critiques. Philosophiques 35 (1):139-159.
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  19. Joëlle Proust (2008). Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.
    Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brain in the lab' thought experiment suggests that (...)
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  20. Joëlle Proust (2007). Le Langage Forme-T-Il Une Condition Nécessaire de la Rationalité? Dialogue 46 (1):165-172.
    A propos de 'Evolution et Rationalité' de Ronald de Sousa (2004).
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  21. Joëlle Proust (2007). Metacognition and Metarepresentation: Is a Self-Directed Theory of Mind a Precondition for Metacognition? [REVIEW] Synthese 159 (2):271 - 295.
    Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive (...)
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  22. Joëlle Proust (2006). Why Evolution Has to Matter to Cognitive Psychology and to Philosophy of Mind. Biological Theory 1 (4):346-348.
    Growing suspicions were raised however that an exclusively language-oriented view of the mind, focussing on the characterization of anhistorical, static mental states through their propositional contents, was hardly compatible with what is currently known of brain architecture and did not fare well when confronted with results from many behavioral studies of mental functions. My aim in what follows is to show that these forms of dissatisfaction stem from the fact that brain evolution and development were either entirely ignored, or insufficiently (...)
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  23. Joelle Proust (2006). Metacognition and Animal Rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
     
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  24. Joëlle Proust (2006). Rationality and Metacognition in Non-Human Animals. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press. 247--274.
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  25. Joëlle Proust (2005). Réponse à Édouard Machery. Pour Une Pensée Évolutionniste Des Répresentations: Le Cas de L'Objectivité. Dialogue 44 (1):161-166.
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  26. Joëlle Proust (2005). Réponse à Édouard Machery. Pour une pensée évolutionniste des répresentations. Dialogue 44 (1):161-166.
    Dans son compte-rendu de mon livre, Les Animaux Pensent-ils?, Machery objecte que l'évolution n'étant ni hiérarchique ni linéaire, il n'et pas justifié de proposer une analyse hiérarchique des représentations. Je réponds à cette objection, en montrant qu'on peut en effet distinguer des types de représentation par leurs propriétés sémantiques et computationnelles. On peut reconnaître le caractère anagénétique du développement de la cognition sans pour autant légitimer une conception hiérarchique et continuiste de l'évolution des espèces.
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  27. Joëlle Proust (2003). Does Metacognition Necessarily Involve Metarepresentation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):352-352.
    Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need involve neither metarepresentation nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind.
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  28. Joelle Proust (2003). Perceiving Intentions. In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press.
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  29. Joelle Proust (2003). Review of John Searle, Consciousness and Language. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (5).
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  30. Joelle Proust (2003). Thinking of Oneself as the Same. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509.
    What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own (...)
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  31. Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.) (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.
    CHAPTER Simulation theory and mental concepts Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Folk psychology and the TT-ST debate The study of folk psychology, ...
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  32. Joëlle Proust (2002). A Critical Review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's When Self-Consciousness Breaks. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):543 – 550.
    This book deals with the experience of externality, i.e. an experience, common in schizophrenia, present both in verbal hallucination and in thought insertion. The view defended is that thought insertion is a case of failed agency, experienced by the agent at the personal level as an intelligible thought with which she cannot identify. Such a case in which sense of agency and sense of subjectivity come apart reveals the existence of two dimensions in self-consciousness. Several difficulties of the solution offered (...)
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  33. Joëlle Proust (2002). Criticial Review Of: When Self-Consciousness Breaks, by G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):543-550.
    The book under review offers two important contributions. One is a valuable discussion of the various ways of addressing the paradoxical experience of externality. The other is an emphasis on a distinction between the experience of subjectivity and the experience of agency. This review tries to show that this distinction is indeed a crucial feature in any solution to the question of externality, but that it is associated with a view of thinking as acting that is questionable.
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  34. Joëlle Proust (2002). Can 'Radical' Simulation Theories Explain Psychological Concept Acquisition? In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.
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  35. Joëlle Proust (2001). A Plea for Mental Acts. Synthese 129 (1):105-128.
    A prominent but poorly understood domain of human agency is mental action, i.e., thecapacity for reaching specific desirable mental statesthrough an appropriate monitoring of one's own mentalprocesses. The present paper aims to define mentalacts, and to defend their explanatory role againsttwo objections. One is Gilbert Ryle's contention thatpostulating mental acts leads to an infinite regress.The other is a different although related difficulty,here called the access puzzle: How can the mindalready know how to act in order to reach somepredefined result? A (...)
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  36. Joëlle Proust (2001). Cnrs, Crea. Synthese 129:105-128.
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  37. Joelle Proust (2000). Awareness of Agency: Three Levels of Analysis. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 307--24.
    This paper discusses the content of agency awareness. It contrast three elements in content: what the goal is, how it is to be reached, and who is having the goal/performing the action ? Marc Jeannerod's claim that goal representations are self-other neutral is discussed. If goal representations are essentially sharable, then we do not understand other people by projecting a piece of internal knowledge on to them, as often assumed. The problem which our brain has to solve is the converse (...)
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  38. Joëlle Proust (2000). Les conditions de la connaissance de soi. Philosophiques 27 (1):161-186.
    La connaissance de soi suppose que l'on puisse former des pensées vraies de la forme 'je Y que P', où 'Y' fait référence à une attitude propositionnelle, 'P' à son contenu, et 'je' au penseur de cette pensée. La question qui se pose est de savoir, ce qui, dans le contenu mental occurrent [P], justifie l'auto-attribution de cette pensée. Ce problème dit de la transition soulève trois difficultés ; celle de la préservation du contenu intentionnel entre la pensée de premier (...)
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  39. Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust (1999). Cognitive Theories of Mental Illness. The Monist 82 (4).
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  40. Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds & Joëlle Proust (1999). Attributing Mental Concepts to Nonlinguistic Animals Poses Wellknown Problems to Ethologists and Philosophers. It is All Too Easy to Interpret a Piece of Animal Social Behavior (Ie a Behavior Performed Inside a Group on the Basis of Information Being Displayed by Behaviors From Other Members of the Group) as Involving Representations of Other Individual's Beliefs And. Philosophical Topics 27 (1):203-232.
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  41. Jean-Noël Missa, Claude Debru, Joëlle Proust, Pierre Karli, Robert M. French, Patrick Anselme, Axel Cleeremans & John-Dylan Haynes (1999). Comptes Rendus Pierre Daled, Spiritualisme Et Matérialisme au Xixe Siècle (Yves Lepers) 449 J.-C. DuPont, Histoire de la Neurotransmission (Rodolphe Vàn-Wunendaele) 450. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 53:265.
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  42. Joelle Proust (1999). Bolzano's Theory of Representation/La Théorie de la Représentation Chez Bolzano. Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3):363-384.
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  43. Joëlle Proust (1999). Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds? Philosophical Topics 27 (1):203-232.
    Granted that a given species is able to entertain beliefs and desires, i.e. to have (epistemic and motivational) internal states with semantically evaluable contents, one can raise the question of whether the species under investigation is, in addition, able to represent properties and events that are not only perceptual or physical, but mental, and use the latter to guide their actions, not only as reliable cues for achieving some output, but as mental cues (that is: whether it can 'read minds'). (...)
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  44. Joëlle Proust (1999). Intentionality, Consciousness and the System's Perspective. In. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. 51--72.
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  45. Joëlle Proust (1999). Indexes for Action. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1999 (3):321-345.
    This articles examines three ways in which the connection between semantic and pragmatic representations of a single action can be tightened up in order to remedy the puzzle of deviant causation. A first move consists in making the feedback process, i.e. the dynamics of the relationship between both representational components, a central element in the definition of an action. A second step brings in the action-effect principle, emphasizing the teleological relation of each pragmatic representation type with its external effects. A (...)
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  46. Joëlle Proust (1999). Mind, Space and Objectivity in Non-Human Animals. Erkenntnis 51 (1):545-562.
    This article is a summary of two chapters of a book published in French in 1997, entitled Comment L'esprit vient aux Bêtes, Paris, Gallimard. The core idea is that the crucial distinction between internal and external states, often used uncritically by theorists of intentionality, needs to be made on a non-circular basis. The proposal is that objectivity - the capacity to reidentify individuals as the same across places and times depends on the capacity to extract spatial crossmodal invariants, which in (...)
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  47. E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery & Marc Jeannerod (1997). Looking for the Agent: An Investigation Into Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness in Schizophrenic Patients. Cognition 65 (1):71-86.
    The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty normal (...)
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  48. Joëlle Proust (1995). Raisonnement, Argumentation Et Rationalité Chez le Psychotique. Hermes 16:113.
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  49. Joëlle Proust (1994). Essais sur le langage et l'intentionalité Daniel Laurier et François Lepage, directeurs de la publication Collection «Analytiques», vol. 4 Montréal, Bellarmin; Paris, Vrin, 1992, 368 p. [REVIEW] Dialogue 33 (03):559-.
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  50. Joelle Proust (1994). Time and Conscious Experience. In C.C. Gould (ed.), Artifacts, Representations, and Social Practice. Kluwer.
     
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