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Profile: Johannes Roessler (University of Warwick)
  1. Johannes Roessler (2013). The Epistemic Role of Intentions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1):41-56.
    According to David Velleman, it is part of the ‘commonsense psychology’ of intentional agency that an agent can know what she will do without relying on evidence, in virtue of intending to do it. My question is how this claim is to be interpreted and defended. I argue that the answer turns on the commonsense conception of calculative practical reasoning, and the link between such reasoning and warranted claims to knowledge. I also consider the implications of this argument for Velleman’s (...)
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  2. Johannes Roessler, Thought Insertion, Self-Awareness, and Rationality.
    This chapter argues that recent attempts to make sense of the delusion of thought insertion in terms of a distinction between two notions of thought ownership have been unsuccessful. It also proposes an alternative account, on which the delusion is to be interpreted in the light of its prehistory.
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  3. Johannes Roessler (2013). The Silence of Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):1-17.
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  4. Wei Ji Ma, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, Karl J. Friston, Motomu Katsurakawa, Katsuyuki Sakai, Nathalie Tzourio-Mazoyer, Laure Zago, Martin M. Monti & Lawrence M. Parsons (2012). Forum: Science & Society 489 Brain Network: Social Media and the Cognitive Scientist. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16:404-406.
     
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  5. Johannes Roessler (2011). Counterfactuals, and Special Causal Concepts. In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. 75.
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  6. Johannes Roessler (2011). Causation in Commonsense Realism. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    Leading philosophers & psychologists offer an assessment of the commonsense view that perceptual experience is an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects. They examine the nature of perception, its role in the acquisition of knowledge, the role of causation in perception, & how perceptual understanding develops in humans.
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  7. Johannes Roessler (2011). Introduction. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oup Oxford.
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  8. Johannes Roessler (2011). Perceptual Attention and the Space of Reasons. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. 274.
  9. Johannes Roessler, Perceptual Causality, Counterfactuals, and Special Causal Concepts.
    How are causal judgements such as 'The ice on the road caused the traffic accident' connected with counterfactual judgements such as 'If there had not been any ice on the road, the traffic accident would not have happened'? This volume throws new light on this question by uniting, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches to causation and counterfactuals. Traditionally, philosophers have primarily been interested in connections between causal and counterfactual claims on the level of meaning or truth-conditions. More (...)
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  10. Johannes Roessler (2011). 1 Strawson's Rationale for the Causal Theory of Perception. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press. 103.
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  11. Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.) (2011). Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual experience, that paradigm of subjectivity, constitutes our most immediate and fundamental access to the objective world. At least, this would seem to be so if commonsense realism is correct — if perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Commonsense realism raises many questions. First, can we be more precise about its commitments? Does it entail any particular conception of the nature of perceptual experience (...)
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  12. Josef Perner & Johannes Roessler, Teleology and Causal Understanding in Children's Theory of Mind.
    The causal theory of action (CTA) is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency--the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources while (...)
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  13. Johannes Roessler, Agents' Knowledge.
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  14. Johannes Roessler (2009). Critical Notice of Lucy O'Brien, Self-Knowing Agents. Philosophical Books 50 (4):227-234.
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  15. Johannes Roessler (2009). Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Knowledge. Mind 118 (472):1013-1041.
    Commonsense epistemology regards perceptual experience as a distinctive source of knowledge of the world around us, unavailable in ‘blindsight’. This is often interpreted in terms of the idea that perceptual experience, through its representational content, provides us with justifying reasons for beliefs about the world around us. I argue that this analysis distorts the explanatory link between perceptual experience and knowledge, as we ordinarily conceive it. I propose an alternative analysis, on which representational content plays no explanatory role: we make (...)
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  16. Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.) (2005). Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention (...)
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  17. Johannes Roessler (2005). Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It argues (...)
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  18. Johannes Roessler (2004). Consciousness and the World. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):163-173.
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  19. Naomi M. Eilan & Johannes Roessler (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  20. Naomi Eilan & Johannes Roessler (2003). Introduction. In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press.
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  21. Johannes Roessler (2003). Intentional Action and Self-Awareness. In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press.
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  22. Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.) (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.
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  23. Johannes Roessler (2002). Action, Emotion, and the Development of Self-Awareness. European Review of Philosophy 5:33-52.
  24. Johannes Roessler (2001). Understanding Delusions of Alien Control. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):177-187.
    According to Jaspers, claims to the effect that one's thoughts, impulses, or actions are controlled by others belong to those schizophrenic symptoms that are not susceptible to any psychological explanation. In opposition to Jaspers, it has recently been suggested that such claims can be made intelligible by distinguishing two ingredients in our common sense notion of ownership of a thought: It is one thing for a thought to occur in my stream of consciousness; it is another for it to be (...)
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  25. Johannes Roessler (2000). Attention and the Self: An Appreciation of C.O. Evans' The Subject of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):76-81.
    _The Sub ject of Con scious ness_ is a rich, strik ingly orig i nal and ambi tious work. It makes an impor tant and timely con tri bu tion to cur rent debates on a num ber of issues which over the last few years have been tak ing cen tre stage in the phi los o phy of mind: for exam ple, self-consciousness, selec tive atten tion and the nature of bodily aware ness. What makes this achieve ment (...)
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  26. Johannes Roessler (1999). Perception, Introspection and Attention. European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47-64.
  27. Johannes Roessler, Review of The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays, by Shoemaker, S. [REVIEW]
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