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  1. John A. Foster (2004). Reply to Armstrong. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):27-28.
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  2. John A. Foster (2001). A Brief Defense of the Cartesian View. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
     
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  3. John A. Foster (2000). Theos, Anthropos, Christos: A Compendium of Modern Philosophical Theology. New York: Lang.
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  4. John A. Foster (2000). The Case for Dualism. In Theos, Anthropos, Christos: A Compendium of Modern Philosophical Theology. New York: Lang.
     
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  5. John A. Foster (2000). The Nature of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press.
    John Foster addresses the question: what is it to perceive a physical object? He rejects the view that we perceive such objects directly, and argues for a new version of the traditional empiricist account, which locates the immediate objects of perception in the mind. But this account seems to imply that we do not perceive physical objects at all. Foster offers a surprising solution, which involves embracing an idealist view of the physical world.
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  6. John A. Foster (1994). The Token-Identity Thesis. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
     
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  7. John A. Foster (1993). Dennett's Rejection of Dualism. Inquiry 36 (1-2):17-31.
    In Consciousness Explained, Dennett elaborates and defends a materialist?functionalist account of the human mind, and of consciousness in particular. This defence depends crucially on his prior rejection of dualism. Dennett rejects this dualist alternative on three grounds: first, that its version of mind?to?body causation is in conflict with what we know, or have good reason to believe, from the findings of physical science; second, that the very notion of dualistic psychophysical causation is incoherent; and third, that dualism puts the mind (...)
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  8. John A. Foster (1991). Lockwood's Hypothesis. In , The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge.
     
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  9. John A. Foster (1991). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge.
    The Immaterial Self examines and defends this thesis, and in particular argues for its Cartesian version, which assigns the non-physical ingredients of the ...
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  10. John A. Foster (1989). A Defense of Dualism. In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.
     
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  11. John A. Foster (1982). The Case for Idealism. Routledge.
     
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  12. John A. Foster (1968). Psychophysical Causal Relations. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (January):64-70.
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