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John A. Humphrey [5]John Arthur Humphrey [1]
  1.  67
    John A. Humphrey (1996). Kripke's Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language: The Same Old Story? Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):197-207.
    A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW), if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics (a failure that is justified, in part, by Kripke’s text) to recognize and (...)
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  2.  35
    John A. Humphrey (1999). Quine, Kripke's Wittgenstein, Simplicity and Sceptical Solutions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):43-55.
  3.  11
    John A. Humphrey (2010). Kripke's Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:197-207.
    A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein , if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics to recognize and understand his distinction between a “physically isolated” individual and an (...)
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  4.  7
    John A. Humphrey (1993). Some Objections to Putnam's “Consistency Objection”. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:127-141.
    This paper is a critical analysis of Putnam’s “consistency objection,” an objection made against a particular reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics (“up-to-us-ism”). I show that Putnam’s objection presupposes a rather unlikely version of Wittgenstein’s “up-to-us-ism” and is unable to undermine a more likely anti-Platonist version. I also show that a companion argument, (the “something more” argument) is unable to overturn this more sophisticated anti-Platonist version of Wittgenstein’s up-to-us-ism. Along the way I try to clarify Wittgenstein’s anti-Plalonist account of mathematics, (...)
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  5.  6
    John A. Humphrey (1991). Some Objections to Garavaso's Wittgenstein. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):303-327.
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