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  1. John A. Winnie (2000). Information and Structure in Molecular Biology: Comments on Maynard Smith. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):517-526.
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  2. John A. Winnie (1996). Deterministic Chaos and the Nature of Chance. In J. Earman & J. Norton (eds.), The Cosmos of Science: Essays of Exploration. University of Pitsburgh Press. 299--324.
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  3. John A. Winnie (1992). Computable Chaos. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):263-275.
    Some irrational numbers are "random" in a sense which implies that no algorithm can compute their decimal expansions to an arbitrarily high degree of accuracy. This feature of (most) irrational numbers has been claimed to be at the heart of the deterministic, but chaotic, behavior exhibited by many nonlinear dynamical systems. In this paper, a number of now classical chaotic systems are shown to remain chaotic when their domains are restricted to the computable real numbers, providing counterexamples to the above (...)
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  4. John A. Winnie (1986). 1. The Problem of Structure. In Robert G. Colodny (ed.), From Quarks to Quasars: Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics. University of Pittsburgh Press. 71.
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  5. John A. Winnie (1977). Introduction. Noûs 11 (3):207-209.
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  6. John A. Winnie (1977). The Causal Theory of Space-Time. In John Earman, Clark Glymour & John Stachel (eds.), Foundations of Space-Time Theories. University of Minnesota Press.
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  7. John A. Winnie (1970). The Completeness of Copi's System of Natural Deduction. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 11 (3):379-382.
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  8. John A. Winnie (1970). Special Relativity Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions: Part I. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):81-99.
    The Reichenbach-Grunbaum thesis of the conventionality of simultaneity is clarified and defended by developing the consequences of the Special Theory when assumptions are not made concerning the one-way speed of light. It is first shown that the conventionality of simultaneity leads immediately to the conventionality of all relative speeds. From this result, the general-length-contraction and time-dilation relations are then derived. Next, the place of time-dilation and length-contraction effects within the Special Theory is examined in the light of the conventionality thesis. (...)
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  9. John A. Winnie (1970). Special Relativity Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions: Part II. Philosophy of Science 37 (2):223-238.
    The Reichenbach-Grunbaum thesis of the conventionality of simultaneity is clarified and defended by developing the consequences of the Special Theory when assumptions are not made concerning the one-way speed of light. It is first shown that the conventionality of simultaneity leads immediately to the conventionality of all relative speeds. From this result, the general-length-contraction and time-dilation relations are then derived. Next, the place of time-dilation and length-contraction effects within the Special Theory is examined in the light of the conventionality thesis. (...)
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  10. John A. Winnie (1970). Theoretical Analyticity. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970:289 - 305.
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  11. John A. Winnie (1967). The Implicit Definition of Theoretical Terms. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (3):223-229.
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  12. John A. Winnie (1965). Theoretical Terms and Partial Definitions. Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):324-328.
    The problem of the interpretation of theoretical terms is outlined, and some difficulties connected with the distinction between partial definitions and empirical postulates are discussed. A reconstruction is sketched which is intended to explicate the 'definitional' character of partial definitions. Finally, some implications for the methodology of theory construction are indicated.
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