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  1. John Barresi, Black and White Like Me.
    John Griffi n’s classic on racism, Black Like Me (1960), provides an interesting text with which to investigate the development of a dialogical self. Griffi n becomes a black man for only a short period of time, but during that time he develops a black social identity and sense of personal identity, that contrasts radically with his former white identity. When he looks into a mirror on several occasions he engages in a dialogue with himself, as both a black and (...)
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  2. John Barresi, The Origins of Autism: Commentary on “Autism as a Downstream Effect of Primary Difficulties in Intersubjectivity Going with Abnormal Development of Brain Connectivity” by Filippo Muratori and Sandra Maestro.
    International Journal for Dialogical Science, 2007, 2, 119-124.
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  3. John Barresi, The Rise and Fall of the Conscious Self: A History of Western Concepts of Self and Personal Identity.
    I will trace the history of western conceptions of soul and self from the ancient Greeks to the present. The story line that I will present is based mainly on material covered in two books by Ray Martin and myself: _The Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the_.
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  4. John Barresi, Giving Meaning to Movement: A Developmental Study.
    Recently, researchers have been investigating the effects of kinematic stimulus properties on pattern perception and recognition, However, the stimulus properties that are used to discriminate animate from inanimate objects have received relatively little attention. Earlier research has indicated that the external movement of artificially generated objects is perceived as animate by observers of all ages. In this investigation, children in Grades 1, 4, and 7 and university adults were asked to describe what they saw after viewing computer-generated displays of two (...)
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  5. John Barresi, Intentional Relations and Divergent Perspectives in Social Understanding.
    selves than we care about others, so we are more likely to attend to and interpret our own activities than we are likely to attend to and interpret the activities of others. Yet, it is also a common notion that a person has the least knowledge of his or her own biases or prejudices, and that it is often a naive observer, who can better interpret the meaning of someone's actions when such biases are involved.
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  6. John Barresi, On Seeing Our Selves and Others as Persons.
    Human beings may be the only organisms capable of thinking of self and other in equivalent ways – as selves and persons. Most organisms think about their own activities differently than they do the activities of others. A few large-brained organisms like chimps and dolphins sometimes think of the activities of self and other in the same way. But, only humans think quite generally in this manner. In this paper I give a description of our commonsense notions of self and (...)
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  7. John Barresi & Raymond Martin (2011). History as Prologue: Western Theories of the Self. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oup Oxford.
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  8. Cindy Hamon-Hill & John Barresi (2010). Does Motor Mimicry Contribute to Emotion Recognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):447-448.
    We focus on the role that motor mimicry plays in the SIMS model when interpreting whether a facial emotional expression is appropriate to an eliciting context. Based on our research, we find general support for the SIMS model in these situations, but with some qualifications on how disruption of motor mimicry as a process relates to speed and accuracy in judgments.
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  9. John Barresi (2008). Some Boundary Conditions on Embodied Agents Sharing a Common World. In Ipke Wachsmuth, Manuela Lenzen & Günther Knoblich (eds.), Embodied Communication in Humans and Machines. Oup Oxford. 29.
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  10. John Barresi (2008). The Neuroscience of Social Understanding. The Shared Mind 1:39–66.
    In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha and E. Itkonen (Eds.) The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, in press.
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  11. John Barresi (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.
    My goal is to try to understand the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. My basic methodological assumption is that embodied agents, through their sensory-motor, affective, and cognitive activities directed at objects, engage in intentional relations with these objects. Furthermore, I assume that intentional relations can be viewed from a first- and a third-person perspective. What is called primary consciousness is the first-person perspective of the agent engaged in a current intentional relation. While primary consciousness posits an implicit.
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  12. John Barresi (2006). On Earth As It Is in Heaven: Trinitarian Influences on Locke's Account of Personal Identity. The Pluralist 1 (1):110 - 128.
    Locke’s concepts of person and self as they first appeared in the 1694 essay were not original to him but had already appeared in the Trinitarian controversy in England in the early 1690s. In particular, William Sherlock, who in 1690 argued that the Trinity might be understood as composed of three distinct self-conscious minds or persons in one God, previously used not only concepts but also phrases that Locke used in his definition of person. Both Sherlock and Locke defined person (...)
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  13. Joshua Knobe, Dingmar Van Eck, Susan Blackmore, Henk Bij De Weg, John Barresi, Roblin Meeks, Julian Kiverstein & Drew Rendall (2005). Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):785 – 817.
  14. John Barresi (2004). Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentional Relations: From Constitutive Phenomenology to Cognitive Science. In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 79--93.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
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  15. John Barresi & Chris Moore (2004). Even an “Epistemic Triangle” has Three Sides. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):98-99.
    By focusing primarily on communication between adult and child and on adult-set criteria for appropriate action, Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) account of the development of social understanding in the epistemic triangle tends toward an enculturation view, while diminishing the role of individuals. What their proposed mechanism fails to acknowledge is that the two agents in the epistemic triangle necessarily have independent perspectives of the object and of each other.
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  16. R. Martin & John Barresi (2004). Naturalizing the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century. Routledge.
    It fills an important gap in intellectual history by being the first book to emphasize the enormous intellectual transformation in the eighteenth century, when...
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  17. Sven Arvidson, John Barresi, Tim Bayne, Pierre Bovet, Andrew Brook, Andy Clark, Lester Embree, William Friedman, Peter Goldie & David Hunter (2003). Acknowledgement of External Reviewers for 2002. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (95).
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  18. John Barresi & Raymond Martin (2003). Self-Concern From Priestley to Hazlitt. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (3):499 – 507.
    himself or a proper object of his egoistic self-concern. Hazlitt concluded that belief in personal identity must be an acquired imaginary conception and that since in reality each of us is no more related to his or her future self than to the future self of any other person none of us is 2 ‘.
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  19. Raymond Martin & John Barresi (eds.) (2003). Personal Identity. Blackwell.
    These are the very scholars that were involved in initiating the revolution in personal identity theory.
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  20. Elisabeth Bacon, Clive G. Ballard, William P. Banks, James J. Barrell, John Barresi, Melissa R. Beck, Derek Besner, Uri Bibi, Niels Birbaumer & Mark Bishop (2002). Ansorge, Ulrich, 528 Arnel Trevena, Judy, 162, 308. Consciousness and Cognition 11:689-690.
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  21. John Barresi & John R. Christie (2002). Consciousness and Information Processing: A Reply to Durgin. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):372-374.
    Durgin's (2002) commentary on our article provides us with an opportunity to look more closely at the relationship between information processing and consciousness. In our article we contrasted the information processing approach to interpreting our data, with our own 'scientific' approach to consciousness. However, we should point out that, on our view, information processing as a methodology is not by itself in conflict with the scientific study of consciousness - indeed, we have adopted this very methodology in our experiments, which (...)
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  22. John Barresi & John R. Christie (2002). Using Illusory Line Motion to Differentiate Misrepresentation (Stalinesque) and Misremembering (Orwellian) Accounts of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):347-365.
    It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten; whereas, by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A (...)
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  23. John R. Christie & John Barresi (2002). Consciousness and Information Processing: A Reply to Durgin. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):372-374.
    Durgin's (2002) commentary on our article provides us with an opportunity to look more closely at the relationship between information processing and consciousness. In our article we contrasted the information processing approach to interpreting our data, with our own 'scientific' approach to consciousness. However, we should point out that, on our view, information processing as a methodology is not by itself in conflict with the scientific study of consciousness - indeed, we have adopted this very methodology in our experiments, which (...)
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  24. J. Allan Hobson, John Christie, John Barresi, Judy Arnel Trevena, Jeff Miller, S. Pockett & Gilberto Gomes (2002). P. Andrew Leynes, Richard L. Marsh, Jason L. Hicks, Joseph D. Allen, and Christopher B. May. Consciousness and Cognition 11:139.
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  25. John Barresi (2001). Extending Self-Consciousness Into the Future. In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. 141-161.
    As adults we have little difficulty thinking of ourselves as mental beings extended in time. Even though our conscious thoughts and experiences are constantly changing, we think of ourselves as the same self throughout these variations in mental content. Indeed, it is so natural for adults to think this way that it was not until the 18th century—at least in Western thought—that the issue of how we come to acquire such a concept of an identical but constantly changing self was (...)
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  26. John Barresi (1999). On Becoming a Person. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.
    How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through (...)
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  27. Raymond Martin, John Barresi & Alessandro Giovannelli (1998). Fission Examples in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Personal Identity Debate. History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (3):323 - 348.
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  28. John Barresi (1996). Group Selection and “the Pious Gene”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4):777.
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  29. John Barresi & Chris Moore (1996). Intentional Relations and Social Understanding. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107.
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  30. John Barresi & Chris Moore (1996). Understanding Self and Other. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142.
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  31. John Barresi (1995). You Can Cheat People, but Not Nature! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):544-545.
    The psychological mechanisms implicated in psychopathy do not limit their activity to those behaviors that support a cheater strategy in social games. They result in a number of other clearly maladaptive behaviors that do not directly involve other individuals. Thus, any gains that might arise from the use of a cheater strategy in social situations are probably lost elsewhere.
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  32. Raymond Martin & John Barresi (1995). Hazlitt on the Future of the Self. Journal of the History of Ideas 56 (468):61-100.
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  33. John Barresi & Chris Moore (1993). Sharing a Perspective Precedes the Understanding of That Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):513.
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  34. Tim J. Juckes & John Barresi (1993). The Subjective-Objective Dimension in the Individual-Society Connection: A Duality Perspective. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (2):197–216.
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  35. Chris Moore & John Barresi (1993). Knowledge of the Psychological States of Self and Others is Not Only Theory-Laden but Also Data-Driven. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
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  36. John Barresi (1987). Prospects for the Cyberiad: Certain Limits on Human Self-Knowledge in the Cybernetic Age. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (March):19-46.