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Profile: John Bengson
  1. Marc A. Moffett, Jennifer Cole Wright & John Bengson, The Folk on Know-How: Why Radical Intellectualism Does Not Over-Intellectualize.
    Philosophical discussion of the nature of know-how has focused on the relation between know-how and ability. Broadly speaking, neo-Ryleans attempt to identify know-how with a certain type of ability,1 while, traditionally, intellectualists attempt to reduce it to some form of propositional knowledge. For our purposes, however, this characterization of the debate is too crude. Instead, we prefer the following more explicit taxonomy. Anti-intellectualists, as we will use the term, maintain that knowing how to ? entails the ability to ?. Dispositionalists (...)
     
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  2. John Bengson (forthcoming). Grasping the Third Realm. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
    Some things we can know just by thinking about them: for example, that identity is transitive, that Gettier’s Smith does not know that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pockets, that the ratio between two and six holds also between one and three, that it is wrong to wantonly torture innocent sentient beings, and various other things that simply strikeus, intuitively, as true when we consider them. The question is how : how can we (...)
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  3. John Bengson (forthcoming). How Philosophers Use Intuition and 'Intuition'. Philosophical Studies.
    Herman Cappelen’s Philosophy Without Intuitions (hereafter ‘PWI’) is a novel study in philosophical sociology—or, as Cappelen at one point suggests, “intellectual anthropology” (96). Its target is the thesis that intuition is central, in the descriptive sense that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions for evidence— or, more generally, positive epistemic status. Cappelen labels the target thesis Centrality.
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  4. John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
  5. John Bengson (2013). Knowledge How Vs. Knowledge That. In B. Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia for Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage.
    An overview of philosophical work on the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that, focusing on what it means to say that they are 'distinct', and on what is at stake in the debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about knowledge how.
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  6. John Bengson (2013). Presentation and Content A Critical Study of Susanna Siegel. The Contents of Visual Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Noûs 47 (4):795-807.
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  7. John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman (2011). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.
    Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative (...)
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  8. John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.) (2011). Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This is the book on knowing how-an invaluable resource for philosophers, linguists, psychologists, and others concerned with knowledge, mind, and action.
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  9. John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2011). Nonpropositional Intellectualism. In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. 161.
  10. John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2011). Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowledge How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence. In John Bengson & Marc Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. 3.
     
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  11. John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright (2009). The Folk on Knowing How. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.
    It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. (...)
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  12. Jennifer Cole Wright & John Bengson (2009). Asymmetries in Judgments of Responsibility and Intentional Action. Mind and Language 24 (1):24-50.
    Abstract: Recent experimental research on the 'Knobe effect' suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that there is a bi-directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative considerations. We defend a novel account of this phenomenon that exploits two factors: (i) an intuitive asymmetry in judgments of responsibility (e.g. praise/blame) and (ii) the fact that intentionality commonly connects the evaluative status of actions to the responsibility of actors. We present the results of several new studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this (...)
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  13. John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2007). Know-How and Concept Possession. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
    We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can (...)
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