46 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
John Bickle [45]John W. Bickle [1]
See also:
Profile: John Bickle (Mississippi State University)
  1. John Bickle, Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.
  2. Kari Theurer & John Bickle (2013). What's Old Is New Again: Kemeny-Oppenheim Reduction at Work in Current Molecular Neuroscience. Philosophia Scientiae 17 (2):89-113.
    We introduce a new model of reduction inspired by Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model [Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956] and argue that this model is operative in a “ruthlessly reductive” part of current neuroscience. Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model was quickly rejected in mid-20th-century philosophy of science and replaced by models developed by Ernest Nagel and Kenneth Schaffner [Nagel 1961], [Schaffner 1967]. We think that Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model was correctly rejected, given what a “theory of reduction” was supposed to account for at (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. John Bickle (2012). A Brief History of Neuroscience's Actual Influences on Mind-Brain Reductionism. In Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. 88.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. John Bickle (2010). Has the Last Decade of Challenges to the Multiple Realization Argument Provided Aid and Comfort to Psychoneural Reductionists? Synthese 177 (2):247 - 260.
    The previous decade has seen renewed critical interest in the multiple realization argument. These criticisms constitute a "second wave" of challenges to this central argument in late-20th century philosophy of mind. Unlike the first wave, which challenged the premise that multiple realization is inconsistent with reduction or type identity, this second wave challenges the truth of the multiple realization premise itself. Since psychoneural reductionism was prominent among the explicit targets of the multiple realization argument, one might think that this second (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Richard C. Taylor, Geoffrey Berg, John Bickle, Tracy Bowell, Michael Boylan, Robert B. Brandom, David Brax & J. Budziszewski (2010). Agamben, Giorgio. 2009. What Is an Apparatus? And Other Essays. Crossing Aesthetics. Translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ix+ 56 Pp. Alford, C. Fred. 2009. After the Holocaust: The Book of Job, Primo Levi, and the Path to Affliction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Xi+ 172 Pp. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 119 (2).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. John Bickle (ed.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience is a state-of-the-art collection of interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy (of science, mind, and ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. A. J. Silva & John Bickle (2009). Science of Research and the Search for the Molecular Mechanisms of Cognitive Functions. In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. John Bickle (2008). Anna Alexandrova is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Missouri St. Louis. Her Research Focuses on the Use of Formal Models for Explanation and Policy Making in Economics and Also on the Measurement of Happiness and Well-Being. Her Recent Papers Are Appearing in Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Psychology, and the Journal. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 24:545-547.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. John Bickle, Multiple Realizability. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. John Bickle (2008). Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience : Metascience, Not Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!). In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
  11. John W. Bickle (2008). Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. A Bradford Book.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Anthony Landreth & John Bickle (2008). Neuroeconomics, Neurophysiology and the Common Currency Hypothesis. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):419-429.
    We briefly describe ways in which neuroeconomics has made contributions to its contributing disciplines, especially neuroscience, and a specific way in which it could make future contributions to both. The contributions of a scientific research programme can be categorized in terms of (1) description and classification of phenomena, (2) the discovery of causal relationships among those phenomena, and (3) the development of tools to facilitate (1) and (2). We consider ways in which neuroeconomics has advanced neuroscience and economics along each (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. John Bickle (2007). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):262–264.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. John Bickle (2006). Editor's Introduction. Synthese 153 (3):1-6.
    No categories
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. John Bickle (2006). Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Synthese 151 (3):411-434.
    As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. John Bickle, Pete Mandik & Anthony Landreth, The Philosophy of Neuroscience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown increasingly “local.” Concerns have switched from general features of scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within the humanities, including the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, and normativity. Empirical discoveries about brain structure and function suggest (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. John Bickle (2005). Molecular Neuroscience to My Rescue (Again): Reply to Looren de Jong and Schouten. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):487-494.
    In their review essay (published in this issue), Looren de Jong and Schouten take my 2003 book to task for (among other things) neglecting to keep up with the latest developments in my favorite scientific case study (memory consolidation). They claim that these developments have been guided by psychological theorizing and have replaced neurobiology's traditional 'static' view of consolidation with a 'dynamic' alternative. This shows that my 'essential but entirely heuristic' treatment of higher-level cognitive theorizing is a mistaken view of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. John Bickle (2005). Phenomenology and Cortical Microstimulation. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 140.
  19. John Bickle (2005). Precis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):231-238.
    This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. John Bickle (2005). Replies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):285-296.
    I reply to challenges raised by contributors to this book symposium. Key challenges include (but are not limited to): distancing my new account of reductionism-in-practice from my previous “new wave” account; clarifying my claimed “heuristic” status for higher-level investigations (including cognitive-neuroscientific ones); defending the “reorientation of philosophical desires” I claim to be required by my project; and addressing consideration about normativity.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. John Bickle (2004). Editor's Introduction. Synthese 141 (2):1-6.
    No categories
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. John Bickle (2003). Empirical Evidence for a Narrative Concept of Self. In Gary D. Fireman, T. E. McVay & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  23. John Bickle (2002). Concepts Structured Through Reduction: A Structuralist Resource Illuminates the Consolidation – Long-Term Potentiation (Ltp) Link. Synthese 130 (1):123 - 133.
    The structuralist program has developed a useful metascientific resource: ontological reductive links (ORLs) between the constituents of the potential models of reduced and reducing theories. This resource was developed initially to overcome an objection to structuralist ``global'' accounts of the intertheoretic reduction relation. But it also illuminates the way that concepts at a higher level of scientific investigation (e.g., cognitive psychology) become ``structured through reduction'' to lower-level investigations (e.g., cellular/molecular neuroscience). After (briefly) explaining this structuralist background, I demonstrate how this (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. John Bickle (2002). Editor's Note: State of the Science Article. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 3 (3):381-381.
  25. John Bickle (2002). Philosophy of Mind and the Sciences. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. John Bickle (2001). Book Symposium on John Horgan's the Undiscovered Mind: How the Human Brain Denies Replication, Medication and Explanation. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 2 (2):213-213.
  27. John Bickle (2001). New Wave Metascience: Replies to Beckermann, Maloney, and Stephan. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:285-293.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. John Bickle (2001). Precis of Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:249-255.
  29. John Bickle (2001). Understanding Neural Complexity: A Role for Reduction. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 11 (4):467-481.
    Psychoneural reduction is under attack again, only this time from a former ally: cognitive neuroscience. It has become popular to think of the brain as a complex system whose theoretically important properties emerge from dynamic, non-linear interactions between its component parts. ``Emergence'' is supposed to replace reduction: the latter is thought to be incapable of explaining the brain qua complex system. Rather than engage this issue at the level of theories of reduction versus theories of emergence, I here emphasize a (...)
    Direct download (16 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Laurent Auclair, Jodie A. Baird, Kati Balog, Iris R. Bell, Marcia Bernstein, John Bickle, Steven Ravett Brown, Peter Cariani, Wallace Chafe & Ziya V. Dikman (2000). Alkire, MT, 370. Consciousness and Cognition 9:639.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Marica Bernstein, Samantha Stiehl & John Bickle (2000). The Effect of Motivation on the Stream of Consciousness: Generalizing From a Neurocomputational Model of Cingulo-Frontal Circuits Controlling Saccadic Eye Movements. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins. 133-160.
  32. Marica Bernstein, Sara Stiehl & John Bickle (2000). Limbic Connectivities with Parietofrontal Circuits Controlling Saccadic Eye Movements: A Neurobiological Model for the Role of Affect in the Stream of Consciousness. In Ralph D. Ellis (ed.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. John Bickle (2000). Editor's Note. Brain and Mind 1 (1):305-.
  34. John Bickle, Gillian Einstein & Valerie Hardcastle (2000). Editors' Introduction. Brain and Mind 1 (1):1-6.
  35. John Bickle (1997). From Sensory Neuroscience to Neurophilosophy: Reflections on Llinas and Churchland's Mind-Brain Continuum. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):523-530.
    Philosophers and psychologists seeking an accessible introduction to current neuroscience will find much value in this volume. Befitting the neuroscientific focus on sensory processes, many essays address explicitly the binding problem. Theoretical and experimental work pertaining to the “temporal synchronicity” solution is prominent. But there are also some surprising implications for current philosophical concerns, such as the intemalism/extemalism debate about representational content, epistemological realism, a “bottom-up” approach to naturalizing intentionality, Humean concerns about the self, and implications from phantom-limb phenomena. Higher-level (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. John Bickle (1997). Psychoneural Reductionism: The New Wave. MIT Press.
  37. John Bickle (1996). New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):57-78.
  38. John Bickle (1995). Connectionism, Reduction, and Multiple Realizability. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39.
    I sketch a theory of cognitive representation from recent "connectionist" cognitive science. I then argue that (i) this theory is reducible to neuroscientific theories, yet (ii) its kinds are multiply realized at a neurobiological level. This argument demonstrates that multiple realizability alone is no barrier to the reducibility of psychological theories. I conclude that the multiple realizability argument, the most influential argument against psychophysical reductionism, should be abandoned.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. John Bickle (1995). Psychoneural Reduction of the Genuinely Cognitive: Some Accomplished Facts. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):265-85.
    The need for representations and computations over their contents in psychological explanations is often cited as both the mark of the genuinely cognitive and a source of skepticism about the reducibility of cognitive theories to neuroscience. A generic version of this anti-reductionist argument is rejected in this paper as unsound, since (i) current thinking about associative learning emphasizes the need for cognitivist resources in theories adequate to explain even the simplest form of this phenomena (Pavlovian conditioning), and yet (ii) the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. John Bickle (1993). Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Semantic View of Theories. Erkenntnis 39 (3):359-382.
    Recently some philosophers have urged that connectionist artificial intelligence is (potentially) eliminative for the propositional attitudes of folk psychology. At the same time, however, these philosophers have also insisted that since philosophy of science has failed to provide criteria distinguishing ontologically retentive from eliminative theory changes, the resulting eliminativism is not principled. Application of some resources developed within the semantic view of scientific theories, particularly recent formal work on the theory reduction relation, reveals these philosophers to be wrong in this (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. John Bickle (1993). Philosophy Neuralized: A Critical Notice of PM Churchland's Neurocomputational Perspective. Behavior and Philosophy 20:75-88.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. John Bickle (1993). Review: Philosophy Neuralized. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 20:75 - 88.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. John Bickle (1992). Introduction. Topoi 11 (1):1-4.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. John Bickle (1992). Mental Anomaly and the New Mind-Brain Reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30.
    Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that new reductionists (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. John Bickle (1992). Multiple Realizability and Psychophysical Reduction. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):47-58.
    The argument from multiple realizability is that, because quite diverse physical systems are capable of giving rise to identical psychological phenomena, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states. This influential argument depends upon a theory of reduction that has been defunct in the philosophy of science for at least fifteen years. Better theories are now available.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. John Bickle (1992). Revisionary Physicalism. Biology and Philosophy 7 (4):411-30.
    The focus of much recent debate between realists and eliminativists about the propositional attitudes obscures the fact that a spectrum of positions lies between these celebrated extremes. Appealing to an influential theoretical development in cognitive neurobiology, I argue that there is reason to expect such an “intermediate” outcome. The ontology that emerges is a revisionary physicalism. The argument draws lessons about revisionistic reductions from an important historical example, the reduction of equilibrium thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and applies them to the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation