9 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: John Bowin (University of California, Santa Cruz)
  1. John Bowin, Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2008.07.47.
    In a nutshell: this volume lives up to the impressive standards of the OSAP series. Throughout the eleven articles and two reviews, the clarity and rigor of argument are of a very high quality. Given the intensity and complexity of the articles, the primary audience will be graduate students and professors. In this issue "ancient philosophy" means Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The first four articles are on Socrates and Plato; the last seven discuss various topics in Aristotelian studies. This is (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. John Bowin (2012). Aristotle on 'First Transitions' in De Anima II 5. Apeiron 45 (3):262-282.
    At De Anima II 5, 417b17, Aristotle says, ‘The first transition (πρώτη μεταβολή) in that which can perceive is brought about by the parent, and when it is born it already has [the faculty of] sense-perception in the same way as it has knowledge. Actual sense-perception is so spoken of in the same way as contemplation.’ The purpose of this paper is to determine the nature of first transitions.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. John Bowin (2012). De Anima Ii 5 on the Activation of The Senses. Ancient Philosophy 32 (1):87-104.
    This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s identification, in De Anima 2.5, of αἴσθησις with an ἀλλοίωσίς τις that is not ‘a kind of destruction of something by its contrary’. Drawing on a passage from Metaphysics Iota 5, it argues that when so described, what is referred to as an ἀλλοίωσίς τις is not a uniquely perceptual alteration.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. John Bowin (2011). Aristotle on Various Types of Alteration in De Anima II 5. Phronesis 56 (2):138-161.
    In De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes a number of distinctions between types of transitions, affections, and alterations. The objective of this paper is to sort out the relationships between these distinctions by means of determining which of the distinguished types of change can be coextensive and which cannot, and which can overlap and which cannot. From the results of this analysis, an interpretation of 417a21-b16 is then constructed that differs from previous interpretations in certain important respects, chief among (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. John Bowin (2010). Aristotle on the Unity of Change: Five Reductio Arguments in Physics Viii. Ancient Philosophy 30 (2):319-345.
  6. John Bowin (2009). Aristotle on the Order and Direction of Time. Apeiron 42 (1):49-78.
    This paper defends Aristotle’s project of deriving the order of time from the order of change in Physics 4.11, against the objection that it contains a vicious circularity arising from the assumption that we cannot specify the direction of a change without invoking the temporal relations of its stages. It considers and rejects a solution to this objection proposed by Ursula Coope, and proposes an alternative solution. It also considers the related problem of how the temporal orders and directions derived (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. John Bowin (2008). Aristotle on Identity and Persistence. Apeiron 41 (1):63-88.
    In Physics 4.11, Aristotle discusses a sophistical puzzle in which "being Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum is different from being Coriscus-in-the-market-place." I take this puzzle to threaten the persistence of changing entities. Aristotle's answer to the puzzle is that the changing thing "is the same in respect of that, by (means of) being which at any time it is (what it is), S but in definition it is different." That is, Coriscus may be described as either a persisting substrate or as one or more (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. John Bowin (2007). Aristotelian Infinity. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 32:233-250.
    Bowin begins with an apparent paradox about Aristotelian infinity: Aristotle clearly says that infinity exists only potentially and not actually. However, Aristotle appears to say two different things about the nature of that potential existence. On the one hand, he seems to say that the potentiality is like that of a process that might occur but isn't right now. Aristotle uses the Olympics as an example: they might be occurring, but they aren't just now. On the other hand, Aristotle says (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. John Bowin (2003). Chrysippus' Puzzle About Identity. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24:239-251.
    In 'Chrysippus' Puzzle about Identity', John Bowin (thereafter JB) cogently strengthens David Sedley's reading of the puzzle of Chrysippus as a reductio ad absurdum of the Growing Argument. For Sedley, Chrysippus reduces to absurdity the assumption that matter is the sole principle of identity by refuting its presupposition that the two protagonists of the puzzle, namely Theon and Dion, are related as part to the whole. According to Plutarch's Comm. not. 1083 a8-c1, however, the Growing Argument concludes by posing that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation