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Profile: John Broome (Oxford University)
  1.  50
    John Broome (2013). Rationality Through Reasoning. Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Rationality Through Reasoning_ answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us Gives (...)
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  2.  53
    John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This study uses techniques from economics to illuminate fundamental questions in ethics, particularly in the foundations of utilitarianism. Topics considered include the nature of teleological ethics, the foundations of decision theory, the value of equality and the moral significance of a person's continuing identity through time.
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  3. John Broome (1999). Normative Requirements. Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
    Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing (...)
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  4. John Broome (2007). Wide or Narrow Scope? Mind 116 (462):359-370.
    This paper is a response to ‘Why Be Rational?’ by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for ‘requirement’. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of ‘requirement’. Consequently Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived.
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  5.  20
    John Broome (2012). Climate Matters. W. W. Norton.
    Esteemed philosopher John Broome avoids the familiar ideological stances on climate change policy and examines the issue through an invigorating new lens. As he considers the moral dimensions of climate change, he reasons clearly through what universal standards of goodness and justice require of us, both as citizens and as governments. His conclusions—some as demanding as they are logical—will challenge and enlighten. Eco-conscious readers may be surprised to hear they have a duty to offset all their carbon emissions, while policy (...)
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  6.  47
    John Broome (2004). Weighing Lives. Oxford University Press.
    We are often faced with choices that involve the weighing of people's lives against each other, or the weighing of lives against other good things. These are choices both for individuals and for societies. A person who is terminally ill may have to choose between palliative care and more aggressive treatment, which will give her a longer life but at some cost in suffering. We have to choose between the convenience to ourselves of road and air travel, and the lives (...)
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  7.  38
    John Broome (1999). Ethics Out of Economics. Cambridge University Press.
    Many economic problems are also ethical problems: should we value economic equality? how much should we care about preserving the environment? how should medical resources be divided between saving life and enhancing life? This book examines some of the practical issues that lie between economics and ethics, and shows how utility theory can contribute to ethics. John Broome's work has, unusually, combined sophisticated economic and philosophical expertise, and Ethics Out of Economics brings together some of his most important essays, augmented (...)
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  8. John Broome (2005). Does Rationality Give Us Reasons? Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.
  9.  77
    John Broome (2007). Is Rationality Normative? Disputatio 2 (23):161-178.
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  10.  65
    John Broome (2015). Reason Versus Ought. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):80-97.
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  11. John Broome (2007). Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374.
    Some philosophers think that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons, or alternatively in responding correctly to beliefs about reasons. This paper considers various possible interpretations of ‘responding correctly to reasons’ and of ‘responding correctly to beliefs about reasons’, and concludes that rationality consists in neither, under any interpretation. It recognizes that, under some interpretations, rationality does entail responding correctly to beliefs about reasons. That is: necessarily, if you are rational you respond correctly to your beliefs about reasons.
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  12. John Broome (2001). Normative Practical Reasoning: John Broome. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175–193.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...)
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  13.  35
    John Broome (2016). A Linguistic Turn in the Philosophy of Normativity? Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):1-14.
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  14. John Broome (2013). Rationality Through Reasoning. Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Rationality Through Reasoning_ answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us Gives (...)
     
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  15.  39
    John Broome (2014). Normativity in Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):622-633.
    Reasoning is a process through which premise-attitudes give rise to a conclusion-attitude. When you reason actively you operate on the propositions that are the contents of your premise-attitudes, following a rule, to derive a new proposition that is the content of your conclusion-attitude. It may seem that, when you follow a rule, you must, at least implicitly, have the normative belief that you ought to comply with the rule, which guides you to comply. But I argue that to follow a (...)
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  16.  30
    John Broome (2015). Synchronic Requirements and Diachronic Permissions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):630-646.
    Reasoning is an activity of ours by which we come to satisfy synchronic requirements of rationality. However, reasoning itself is regulated by diachronic permissions of rationality. For each synchronic requirement there appears to be a corresponding diachronic permission, but the requirements and permissions are not related to each other in a systematic way. It is therefore a puzzle how reasoning according to permissions can systematically bring us to satisfy requirements.
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  17.  24
    John Broome (2002). Practical Reasoning. In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Oxford University Press 85--111.
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  18.  28
    John Broome (2001). Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values. In Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press 98--120.
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  19.  16
    John Broome (2009). The Unity of Reasoning. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press
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  20. John Broome (2012). Comments on Boghossian. Philosophical Studies 169 (1):19-25.
  21.  29
    John Broome (2004). Reasons. In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press 2004--28.
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  22.  10
    John Broome (1997). Is Incommensurability Vagueness? In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press
  23. John Broome (2008). Reply to Southwood, Kearns and Star, and Cullity. Ethics 119 (1):96-108.
  24.  70
    John Broome (2015). Equality Versus Priority: A Useful Distinction. Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):219-228.
  25.  81
    John Broome (1990). Fairness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:87 - 101.
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  26. John Broome (1997). Reasons and Motivation: John Broome. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
    Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.
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  27. John Broome, Requirements. Hommage à Wlodek; 60 Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    The object of this paper is to explore the intersection of two issues – both of them of considerable interest in their own right. The first concerns the role that feasibility considerations play in constraining normative claims – claims, say, about what we (individually and collectively) ought to do and to be. This issue has particular relevance for the confrontation of moral philosophy with economics (and social science more generally). The second issue concerns whether normative claims are to be understood (...)
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  28.  8
    John Broome (1993). Goodness is Reducible to Betterness the Evil of Death is the Value of Life. In Peter Koslowski Yuichi Shionoya (ed.), The Good and the Economical: Ethical Choices in Economics and Management. Springer-Verlag 70–84.
    Most properties have comparatives, which are relations. For instance, the property of width has the comparative relation denoted by `_ is wider than _'. Let us say a property is reducible to its comparative if any statement that refers to the property has the same meaning as another statement that refers to the comparative instead. Width is not reducible to its comparative. To be sure, many statements that refer to width are reducible: for instance, `The Mississippi is wide' means the (...)
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  29.  59
    John Broome (2009). Reply to Rabinowicz. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):412-417.
  30. John Broome (2006). Weighing Lives. Oxford University Press Uk.
    We are often faced with choices that involve the weighing of people's lives against each other, or the weighing of lives against other good things. These are choices both for individuals and for societies. A person who is terminally ill may have to choose between palliative care and more aggressive treatment, which will give her a longer life but at some cost in suffering. We have to choose between the convenience to ourselves of road and air travel, and the lives (...)
     
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  31.  26
    John Broome (1998). Kamm on Fairness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):955-961.
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  32.  7
    Dale Jamieson & John Broome (1996). Counting the Cost of Global Warming. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):263.
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  33. John Broome (1994). Discounting the Future. Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (2):128–156.
  34. John Broome (1991). Utility. Economics and Philosophy 7 (1):1-12.
    “Utility,” in plain English, means usefulness. In Australia, a ute is a useful vehicle. Jeremy Bentham specialized the meaning to a particular sort of usefulness. “By utility,” he said, “is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered”. The “principle of utility” is the principle that actions are to be judged by their usefulness (...)
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  35.  61
    John Broome (1984). Selecting People Randomly. Ethics 95 (1):38-55.
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  36.  5
    John Broome (2012). Williams on Ought. In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa
    In 2002, Bernard Williams delivered a lecture that revisited the arguments of his article 'Ought and moral obligation', published in his Moral Luck. The lecture attributed to the earlier article the thesis that there are no ‘personal’ or (as I put it) ‘owned’ oughts. It also rejected this thesis. This paper explains the idea of an owned ought, and supports Williams’s lecture in asserting that there are owned oughts. It also examines the question of how accurately Williams’s later lecture interprets (...)
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  37. John Broome (2009). Motivation. Theoria 75 (2):79-99.
    I develop a scheme for the explanation of rational action. I start from a scheme that may be attributed to Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism , and develop it step by step to arrive at a sharper and more accurate scheme. The development includes a progressive refinement of the notion of motivation. I end by explaining the role of reasoning within the scheme.
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  38.  16
    John Broome (1998). Review: Kamm on Fairness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):955 - 961.
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  39. John Broome (1991). Desire, Belief and Expectation. Mind 100 (2):265-267.
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  40.  7
    John Broome (2008). Why Economics Needs Ethical Theory. In Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement and Volume Ii: Society, Institutions, and Development. OUP Oxford
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  41. John Broome (1995). The Two-Envelope Paradox. Analysis 55 (1):6 - 11.
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  42.  23
    John Broome (2015). Responses to Setiya, Hussain, and Horty. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):230-242.
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  43. John Broome (2005). Should We Value Population? Journal of Political Philosophy 13 (4):399-413.
  44.  21
    John Broome (2015). Précis of Rationality Through Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):200-203.
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  45.  71
    John Broome (1984). Indefiniteness in Identity. Analysis 44 (1):6 - 12.
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  46.  91
    John Broome & Adam Morton (1994). The Value of a Person. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68:167 - 198.
    (for Adam Morton's half) I argue that if we take the values of persons to be ordered in a way that allows incomparability, then the problems Broome raises have easy solutions. In particular we can maintain that creating people is morally neutral while killing them has a negative value.
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  47.  9
    John Broome (2010). The Most Important Thing About Climate Change. In Jonathan Boston, Andrew Bradstock & David Eng (eds.), Public Policy: Why Ethics Matters. ANU E Press 101-16.
    This book chapter is not available in ORA, but you may download, display, print and reproduce this chapter in unaltered form only for your personal, non-commercial use or use within your organization from the ANU E Press website.
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  48. John Broome (1993). Weighing Goods. Ethics 103 (4):792-806.
     
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  49.  5
    John Broome (2000). Instrumental Reasoning. In Julian Nida-Rümelin & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Rationality, Rules and Structure. Kluwer 195-207.
    Like all reasoning, practical reasoning is a process that takes a person from some of her existing mental states to a new mental state. Theoretical reasoning concludes in a belief; practical reasoning in an intention. This paper concentrates on instrumental reasoning, a species of practical reasoning in general. It argues that instrumental reasoning is correct if the content of the reasoning is a valid derivation, just as theoretical reasoning is correct if its content is a valid derivation. It also argues (...)
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  50.  6
    John Broome (2000). Incommensurable values. In Roger Crisp & Brad Hooker (eds.), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Clarendon Press 21--38.
    Two options are incommensurate in value if neither is better than the other, and if a small improvement or worsening of one does not necessarily make it determinately better or worse than the other. If a person faces a sequence of choices between incommensurate options, she may end up with a worse options than she could have had, even though none of her choices are irrational. Yet it seems that rationality should save her from this bad outcome. This is the (...)
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