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Profile: John H Campbell (University of California, Los Angeles)
  1.  342 DLs
    John Campbell (2011). Tyler Burge: Origins of Objectivity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (5).
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  2.  264 DLs
    John Campbell (2011). Consciousness and Reference. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
  3.  262 DLs
    John Campbell (1993). A Simple View of Colour. In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. OUP 257-268.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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  4.  144 DLs
    John Campbell (2005). Information-Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness and Molyneux's Question. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press
    Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we apply indifferently on the bases of sight and touch. Yet we understand the shape concepts, we know what shape properties are, only because we have experience of shapes. And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of shape in touch seem to be quite different. So how can the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of vision be the same as (...)
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  5.  134 DLs
    Julia A. Jones, Irena F. Creed, Kendra L. Hatcher, Robert J. Warren, Mary Beth Adams, Melinda H. Benson, Emery Boose, Warren A. Brown, John L. Campbell & Alan Covich (2012). Ecosystem Processes and Human Influences Regulate Streamflow Response to Climate Change at Long-Term Ecological Research Sites. BioScience 62 (4):390-404.
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  6.  128 DLs
    John Campbell (2002). Berkeley's Puzzle. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. MIT Press
    But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of (...)
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  7.  127 DLs
    John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666-673.
  8.  125 DLs
    John Campbell (1996). Molyneux's Question. Philosophical Issues 7:301-318.
    in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig.
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  9.  121 DLs
    John Campbell, 1. Acquaintance Vs. Knowledge of Truths.
    Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that (...)
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  10.  119 DLs
    John Campbell (2007). The Metaphysics of Perception. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1–15.
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  11.  114 DLs
    John Campbell (2005). Transparency Vs. Revelation in Color Perception. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
    What knowledge of the colors does perception of the colors provide? My first aim in this essay is to characterize the way in which color experience seems to provide knowledge of colors. This in turn tells us something about what it takes for there to be colors. Color experience provides knowledge of the aspect of the world that is being acted on when we, or some external force, act on the color of an object and thus make a difference to (...)
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  12.  111 DLs
    John Campbell (2007). What's the Role of Spatial Awareness in Visual Perception of Objects? Mind and Language 22 (5):548–562.
    I set out two theses. The first is Lynn Robertson’s: (a) spatial awareness is a cause of object perception. A natural counterpoint is: (b) spatial awareness is a cause of your ability to make accurate verbal reports about a perceived object. Zenon Pylyshyn has criticized both. I argue that nonetheless, the burden of the evidence supports both (a) and (b). Finally, I argue conscious visual perception of an object has a different causal role to both: (i) non-conscious perception of the (...)
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  13.  110 DLs
    John Campbell, An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology by John Campbell.
    My project in this paper is to extend the interventionist analysis of causation to give an account of causation in psychology. Many aspects of empirical investigation into psychological causation fit straightforwardly into the interventionist framework. I address three problems. First, the problem of explaining what it is for a causal relation to be properly psychological rather than merely biological. Second, the problem of rational causation: how it is that reasons can be causes. Finally, I look at the implications of an (...)
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  14.  109 DLs
    John Campbell, Philosophical Lecture.
    Ir IS winmx HELD that the capacity for spatial thought depends upon the ability to refer to physical things. The argument is that the identification of places depends upon the identification of things; places in themselves are all very much alike and can be distinguished only by their spatial relations to things. So one could not so much as think about places unless one could think about things (Strawson, 1959). It has to be acknowledged that our identifications of places are (...)
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  15.  105 DLs
    John L. Campbell, Lindsey E. Rustad, John H. Porter, Jeffrey R. Taylor, Ethan W. Dereszynski, James B. Shanley, Corinna Gries, Donald L. Henshaw, Mary E. Martin & Wade M. Sheldon (2013). Quantity is Nothing Without Quality. BioScience 63 (7).
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  16.  104 DLs
    John Campbell (2005). Precis of Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):103-114.
  17.  101 DLs
    John Campbell (2006). An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology. In Alison Gopnik & Larry J. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation. OUP 58--66.
  18.  100 DLs
    John Campbell (2002). The Ownership of Thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):35-39.
  19.  97 DLs
    John Campbell (2006). Manipulating Colour: Pounding an Almond. In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. OUP 31--48.
    It seems a compelling idea that experience of colour plays some role in our having concepts of the various colours, but in trying to explain the role experience plays the first thing we have to describe is what sort of colour experience matters here. I will argue that the kind of experience that matters is conscious attention to the colours of objects as an aspect of them on which direct intervention is selectively possible. As I will explain this idea, it (...)
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  20.  96 DLs
    John Campbell (1997). Sense, Reference and Selective Attention. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):55-98.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin.
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  21.  89 DLs
    John Campbell (2005). Molyneux's Question and Cognitive Impenetrability. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints. New York: Nova Science
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  22.  88 DLs
    John Campbell (2004). What is It to Know What 'I' Refers To? The Monist 87 (2):206-218.
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  23.  87 DLs
    John Campbell (1997). The Simple View of Colour. In Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color. MIT Press 177-90.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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  24.  86 DLs
    John Campbell (2006). What is the Role of Location in the Sense of a Visual Demonstrative? Reply to Matthen. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):239-254.
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  25.  85 DLs
    John Campbell (1992). British Academy: One-Day Conference on the Philosophy of Mind. Mind 101:404.
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  26.  68 DLs
    John Campbell (2013). Susanna Siegel's the Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):819-826.
  27.  68 DLs
    John Campbell (2006). Does Visual Reference Depend on Sortal Classification? Reply to Clark. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):221-237.
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  28.  67 DLs
    John Campbell (1993). The Role of Physical Objects in Spatial Thinking. In Naomi M. Eilan, R. McCarthy & M. W. Brewer (eds.), Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation. Blackwell
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  29.  66 DLs
    John Campbell (2010). Control Variables and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):15-30.
    I introduce the notion of a ‘control variable’ which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world.
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  30.  62 DLs
    John Campbell (2005). Joint Attention and Common Knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press 287--297.
    This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending (...)
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  31.  60 DLs
    John Campbell (2008). Interventionism, Control Variables and Causation in the Qualitative World. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):426-445.
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  32.  57 DLs
    John Campbell (1996). Shape Properties, Experience of Shape and Shape Concepts. Philosophical Issues 7:351-363.
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  33.  56 DLs
    John Campbell (1982). Extension and Psychic State: Twin Earth Revisited. Philosophical Studies 42 (June):67-90.
    Argues that natural kind terms are token-reflexive, with reference ultimately fixed to the underlying explanatory properties of the surface qualities of local matter.
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  34.  56 DLs
    John Campbell (1982). Knowledge and Understanding. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (126):17-34.
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  35.  56 DLs
    John Campbell (2009). Does Knowledge of Material Objects Depend on Spatial Perception? Comments on Quassim Cassam's the Possibility of Knowledge. Analysis 69 (2):309-317.
    1. The spatial perception requirementCassam surveys arguments for what he calls the ‘Spatial Perception Requirement’ . This is the following principle: " SPR: In order to perceive that something is the case and thereby to know that it is the case one must be capable of spatial perception. " A couple of preliminary glosses. By ‘spatial perception’ Cassam means either perception of location, or perception of specifically spatial properties of an object, such as its size and shape. Second, Cassam takes (...)
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  36.  55 DLs
    John Campbell (2010). Independence of Variables in Mental Causation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):64-79.
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  37.  54 DLs
    John Campbell (1987). Is Sense Transparent? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.
  38.  53 DLs
    John Campbell (2006). Ordinary Thinking About Time. In Michael Stöltzner & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Time and History: Proceedings of the 28. International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 2005. De Gruyter 1-12.
    I will describe two non-standard ways of thinking about time. The first is ubiquitous in animal cognition. I will call it ‘phase time’. Suppose for example you consider a hibernating animal. This animal might have representation of the various seasons of the year, and modulate its actions dependent on the season. But it need have no distinction between the winter of one year and the winter of another; it thinks of time only in terms of repeatable phases.
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  39.  47 DLs
    John Campbell (1986). Conceptual Structure. In C. Travis (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation. Blackwell
    in Charles Travis (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation (Oxford and New York: Blackwell 1986), 159-174.
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  40.  44 DLs
    John Campbell (1999). Can Philosophical Accounts of Altruism Accommodate Experimental Data on Helping Behaviour? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):26 – 45.
    Philosophers often discuss altruism, how it is to be understood, explained, justified, evaluated, etc. Few refer to any experimental data on helping behaviour. I will argue that some of these data seem at least initially to present a challenge to various philosophical accounts of altruism. Put very broadly, when one looks at various philosophical accounts of altruism in light of various data on helping behaviour, one might wonder whether many philosophical accounts fall prey to the 'fundamental attribution error', overestimating people's (...)
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  41.  43 DLs
    John Campbell (2003). Philosophy of Mind. In Peter Clark & Katherine Hawley (eds.), Philosophy of Science Today. Oxford University Press 131.
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  42.  38 DLs
    John Campbell (2000). Wittgenstein on Attention. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):35-47.
  43.  35 DLs
    John Campbell (1980). Locke on Qualities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):567 - 585.
    cellence of current Locke exegesis, however, should not blind us to the fact that recent readings are in urgent need of supplementation: and one aim of this paper is to show how this might be achieved.
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  44.  35 DLs
    John Campbell, If Truth is Dethroned, What Role is Left for It?
    in Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn (eds.), Library of Living Philosophers: The Philosophy of Michael Dummett.
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  45.  32 DLs
    John Campbell (2011). Origins of Objectivity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):269-285.
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  46.  30 DLs
    John Campbell (1985). Possession of Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85:149-170.
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  47.  29 DLs
    John Angus Campbell, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science & Theology.
    In the movie Contact, an astronomer played by Jodie Foster discovers a radio signal with a discernable pattern, a sequence representing prime numbers from 2 to 101. Because the pattern is too specifically arranged to be mere random space noise, the scientists infer from this data that an extraterrestrial intelligence has transmitted this signal on purpose.
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  48.  27 DLs
    John Campbell (2012). Cogito Ergo Sum: Christopher Peacocke and John Campbell: II—Lichtenberg and the Cogito. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3):361-378.
    Our use of ‘I’, or something like it, is implicated in our self-regarding emotions, in the concern to survive, and so seems basic to ordinary human life. But why does that pattern of use require a referring term? Don't Lichtenberg's formulations show how we could have our ordinary pattern of use here without the first person? I argue that what explains our compulsion to regard the first person as a referring term is our ordinary causal thinking, which requires us to (...)
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  49.  25 DLs
    John Campbell (1997). Attention and Frames of Reference in Spatial Reasoning: A Reply to Bryant. Mind and Language 12 (3&4):265–277.
  50.  24 DLs
    John Campbell (1998). Joint Attention and the First Person. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 123-136..
    It is sometimes said that ordinary linguistic exchange, in ordinary conversation, is a matter of securing and sustaining joint attention. The minimal condition for the success of the conversation is that the participants should be attending to the same things. So the psychologist Michael Tomasello writes, ‘I take it as axiomatic that when humans use language to communicate referentially they are attempting to manipulate the attention of another person or persons.’ I think that this is an extremely fertile approach to (...)
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