This article argues that the apparent incompatibility between Social Theses about the nature of law and the Coherence (or Interpretivist) Thesis should be resolved by seeing them as representing two different conceptions of law. The Social Thesis associated with Exclusive Positivism is a powerful device for understanding the relationship between law and the citizen. But its central features, which turn on the authoritative nature of law, do not necessarily apply to the conception of law used by judges when deciding cases. (...) Failure to recognize the concurrence of the two conceptions of law can conceal some important issues of justice. (shrink)

The recent “Windrush” scandal in the United Kingdom involved the application of law by Home Office officials in a manner that demonstrated gross lack of concern and humanity for its impact on many individuals. In an endeavour to reach some understanding of how ordinary individuals could have inflicted such hardships on others, this article considers the possible effect that acting within a legal environment might have on the actors’ response to moral norms. The inquiry leads to reconsideration of established theories (...) on the relationship between law and morality, concluding that the main theories ignore important aspects of that relationship. (shrink)

This paper considers whether the positivist account of law is useful in guiding states in how they should deal with religious or customary legal orders followed by minority groups within their jurisdiction. It argues, first, that such orders can be said to exist despite the prevalence of disagreement about the grounds of law. It then argues, contrary to views advanced by Scott Shapiro and Joseph Raz, that there are good reasons for perceiving that the resolution of legal disputes by reference (...) to moral principle involves the application of pre‐existing law. However, the paper concludes by arguing that the Social Thesis has an important role in supplying the basis upon which the application of law can be deemed to be legitimate, and that this has relevance to the way states might respond to minority legal orders. (shrink)

Representations of contemporary individualism as “selfish” can lead to the perception that social and community relationships take place in a normative vacuum, which the law should attempt to fill. In this Article I argue that the representation is inaccurate and that replacing moral or social norms with legal norms carries serious risks. I suggest three models for the relationship between state law and family norms: the “authorization” model; the “delegation” model; and the “purposive abstention” model. Since I maintain that moral (...) and social norms do pertain within families, I argue that the “purposive abstention” model should normally be preferred. (shrink)