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  1. Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Caj Strandberg (2012). Recent Work on Motivational Internalism. Analysis 72 (1):124-137.
    Reviews work on moral judgment motivational internalism from the last two decades.
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  2.  79
    John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo (2016). Matters of Ambiguity: Faultless Disagreement, Relativism and Realism. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1517-1536.
    In some cases of disagreement it seems that neither party is at fault or making a mistake. This phenomenon, so-called faultless disagreement, has recently been invoked as a key motivation for relativist treatments of domains prone to such disagreements. The conceivability of faultless disagreement therefore appears incompatible with traditional realists semantics. This paper examines recent attempts to accommodate faultless disagreement without giving up on realism. We argue that the accommodation is unsatisfactory. However, the examination highlights that “faultless” is multiply ambiguous. (...)
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  3. Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund (2014). Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):715-734.
    Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral disagreement, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority (...)
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  4.  24
    John Eriksson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (forthcoming). Non-Cognitivism and the Classification Account of Moral Uncertainty. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    ABSTRACTIt has been objected to moral non-cognitivism that it cannot account for fundamental moral uncertainty. A person is derivatively uncertain about whether an act is, say, morally wrong, when her certainty is at bottom due to uncertainty about whether the act has certain non-moral, descriptive, properties, which she takes to be wrong-making. She is fundamentally morally uncertain when her uncertainty directly concerns whether the properties of the act are wrong-making. In this paper we advance a new reply to the objection (...)
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  5.  40
    John Eriksson (2016). Expressivism, Attitudinal Complexity and Two Senses of Disagreement in Attitude. Erkenntnis 81 (4):775-794.
    It has recently become popular to apply expressivism outside the moral domain, e.g., to truth and epistemic justification. This paper examines the prospects of generalizing expressivism to taste. This application has much initial plausibility. Many of the standard arguments used in favor of moral expressivism seem to apply to taste. For example, it seems conceivable that you and I disagree about whether chocolate is delicious although we don’t disagree about the facts, which suggests that taste judgments are noncognitive attitudes rather (...)
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  6.  59
    John Eriksson (2014). Elaborating Expressivism: Moral Judgments, Desires and Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.
    According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In this paper I (...)
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  7.  71
    John Eriksson (2009). Homage to Hare: Ecumenism and the Frege‐Geach Problem. Ethics 120 (1):8-35.
    The Frege‐Geach problem is probably the most serious worry for the prospects of any kind of metaethical expressivism. In a recent article, Ridge suggests that a new version of expressivism, a view he calls ecumenical expressivism, can avoid the Frege‐Geach problem.1 In contrast to pure expressivism, ecumenical expressivism is the view that moral utterances function to express not only desire‐like states of mind but also beliefs with propositional content. Whereas pure expressivists’ solutions to the Frege‐Geach problem usually have rested on (...)
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  8.  85
    John Eriksson (2011). Straight Talk: Conceptions of Sincerity in Speech. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):213-234.
    What is it for a speech act to be sincere? The most common answer amongst philosophers is that a speech act is sincere if and only if the speaker is in the state of mind that the speech act functions to express. However, a number of philosophers have advanced counterexamples purporting to demonstrate that having the expressed state of mind is neither necessary nor sufficient for speaking sincerely. One may nevertheless doubt whether these considerations refute the orthodox conception. Instead, it (...)
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  9.  22
    John Eriksson (2015). Review: Terence Cuneo, Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. [REVIEW] Ethics 126 (1):220-225.
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  10.  2
    John Eriksson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (forthcoming). Non-Cognitivism and the Classification Account of Moral Uncertainty. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    ABSTRACTIt has been objected to moral non-cognitivism that it cannot account for fundamental moral uncertainty. A person is derivatively uncertain about whether an act is, say, morally wrong, when her certainty is at bottom due to uncertainty about whether the act has certain non-moral, descriptive, properties, which she takes to be wrong-making. She is fundamentally morally uncertain when her uncertainty directly concerns whether the properties of the act are wrong-making. In this paper we advance a new reply to the objection (...)
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  11.  6
    Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (2015). Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates. In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press 1–20.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, internalism has provided a challenge for theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, and rationalism. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism (...)
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  12.  15
    John Eriksson (2006). Moved by Morality: An Essay on the Practicality of Moral Thought and Talk. Dissertation, Uppsala University
    It is part of our everyday experience that there is a reliable connection between moral opinions and motivation. Thinking that an act is right (wrong) tends to be accompanied by motivation to (avoid to) perform the act in question. This is mirrored in moral talk. We tend to think that someone who says that he thinks that it is right (wrong) to act in a certain way without being motivated, to some extent, will most likely be speaking insincerely. Moveover, moral (...)
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  13.  18
    John Eriksson (2015). Explaining Disagreement: A Problem for Hybrid Expressivists. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):39-53.
    Hybrid expressivists depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express beliefs and desires. Daniel Boisvert and Michael Ridge, two prominent defenders of hybrid views, also depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express general attitudes rather than an attitude towards the subject of the sentence. This article argues that even if the shift to general attitudes helps solve some of the traditional problems associated with pure expressivism, a view like Ridge's, according to which the descriptive meaning (...)
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  14.  36
    John Eriksson (2010). Self-Expression, Expressiveness, and Sincerity. Acta Analytica 25 (1):71-79.
    This paper examines some aspects of Mitchell Green’s account of self-expression. I argue that Green fails to address the distinction between success and evidential notions of expression properly, which prevents him from adequately discussing the relation between these notions. I then consider Green’s explanation of how a speech act shows what is within, i.e., because of the liabilities one incurs and argue that this is false. Rather, the norms governing speech acts and liabilities incurred give us reason to think that (...)
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  15.  42
    John Eriksson (2010). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism – Mark Schroeder. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):878-882.
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  16.  1
    John Eriksson (2015). Cuneo, Terence.Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 259. $55.00. [REVIEW] Ethics 126 (1):220-225.
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  17.  14
    John Eriksson (2009). Self-Expression – Mitchell S. Green. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):375-379.
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  18.  41
    Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.) (2015). Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation—is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptoins of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly (...)
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  19. John Eriksson (2008). Ärligt talat. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 4.
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