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  1. John F. Boler (1994). An Image for the Unity of Will in Duns Scotus. Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1):23-44.
    Scotus argues that the will of a rational agent has two basic inclinations: for benefit and for justice. Having examined in other articles why he picks these two, I ask here how the combination produces a unified thing. At one point, Scotus proposes an analogy for the two inclinations with the relations of genus and differentia which produce a unified definition. In arguing that the analogy does not succeed, I hope to have given a clearer understanding of the theory of (...)
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  2. John F. Boler (1985). Connotative Terms In Ockham. History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (January):21-38.
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  3. John F. Boler (1973). Ockham on Intuitive Cognition. Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 (1).
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  4. John F. Boler (1968). Agency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (2):165-181.
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  5. John F. Boler (1965). Scotus and Intuition. The Monist 49 (4):551-570.
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  6. Timothy C. Potts & John F. Boler (1965). Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism: A Study of Peirce's Relation to John Duns Scotus. Philosophical Quarterly 15 (61):361.
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  7. John F. Boler (1963). Abailard and the Problem of Universals. Journal of the History of Philosophy 1 (1):37-51.
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  8. John F. Boler (1963). Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism. Seattle, University of Washington Press.
    IN 1903, commenting on an article he had written more than thirty years before, Charles Peirce said that he had changed his mind on many issues at least a half-dozen times but had "never been able to think differently on that question of nominalism and realism" (1.20). For anyone acquainted with Peirce's writings, this remark alone could justify a study of "that question.".
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