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  1. John Fennell (forthcoming). Davidson: Normativist or Anti-Normativist? Acta Analytica:1-20.
    This paper contests the standard reading, due to Bilgrami and Glüer, that Davidson is an anti-normativist about word-meaning. Their case for his anti-normativism rests on his avowed anti-conventionalism about word-meaning. While not denying Davidson’s anti-conventionalism, I argue in the central part of the paper devoted to Bilgrami that the constitutive role that charity must play in interpretation for Davidson puts pressure on his anti-conventionalism, ultimately forcing a more tempered anti-conventionalism than Bilgrami (and indeed Davidson himself) allows. Simply put, my argument (...)
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  2. John Fennell (2013). “The Meaning of 'Meaning is Normative' ”. Philosophical Investigations 36 (1):56-78.
    This paper defends the thesis that meaning is intrinsically normative. Recent anti-normativist objectors have distinguished two versions of the thesis – correctness and prescriptivity – and have attacked both. In the first two sections, I defend the thesis against each of these attacks; in the third section, I address two further, closely related, anti-normativist arguments against the normativity thesis and, in the process, clarify its sense by distinguishing a universalist and a contextualist reading of it. I argue that the anti-normativist (...)
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  3. John Fennell (2003). The Three Quines. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (3):261 – 292.
    This paper concerns Quine's stance on the issue of meaning normativity. I argue that three distinct and not obviously compatible positions on meaning normativity can be extracted from his philosophy of language - eliminative ]naturalism (Quine I), deflationary pragmatism (Quine II), and (restricted) strong normativism (Quine III) - which result from Quine's failure to separate adequately four different questions that surround the issue: the reality, source, sense, and scope of the normative dimension. In addition to the incompatibility of the views (...)
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  4. John Fennell (2000). Davidson on Meaning Normativity: Public or Social. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):139–154.