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John G. Taylor [22]John Gerald Taylor [2]
  1. John G. Taylor (2010). There is More Than Ai Beneath the Surface of Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (01):65-68.
  2. John G. Taylor (2009). Beyond Consciousness? International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):11-21.
  3. John G. Taylor (2007). Through Machine Attention to Machine Consciousness. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic. 24-47.
  4. John G. Taylor (2003). Bubbles in the Brain? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):429-431.
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  5. John G. Taylor (2003). Do Virtual Actions Avoid the Chinese Room? In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
     
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  6. John G. Taylor (2002). From Matter to Mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):3-22.
    The relation between mind and matter is considered in terms of recent ideas from both phenomenology and brain science. Phenomenology is used to give clues to help bridge the brain-mind gap by providing constraints on any underlying neural architecture suggested from brain science. A tentative reduction of mind to matter is suggested and used to explain various features of phenomenological experience and of ownership of conscious experience. The crucial mechanism is the extended duration of the corollary discharge of attention movement, (...)
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  7. John G. Taylor (2002). Paying Attention to Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (5):206-210.
  8. John G. Taylor (2001). Functional Brain Imaging to Search for Consciousness Needs Attention. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):39-43.
    The approach of Revonsuo is criticised as being based on a misplaced emphasis on coupled oscillatory dynamics, as well as on too limited an approach to recent advances in brain imaging. This results in the nature of attention as a basic component in consciousness being ignored, and prevents any attempt to attack the crucial problem for consciousness of inner experience: of ‘what it is like to be’.
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  9. John G. Taylor (2001). The Central Role of the Parietal Lobes in Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):379-417.
    There are now various approaches to understand where and how in the brain consciousness arises from neural activity, none of which is universally accepted. Difficulties among these approaches are reviewed, and a missing ingredient is proposed here to help adjudicate between them, that of ''perspectivalness.'' In addition to a suitable temporal duration and information content of the relevant bound brain activity, this extra component is posited as being a further important ingredient for the creation of consciousness from neural activity. It (...)
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  10. John G. Taylor (2001). The Race for Consciousness. MIT Press.
    MIT Press, 1999 Review by Paul Bohan Broderick, Ph.D. on May 26th 2002 Volume: 6, Number: 21.
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  11. John G. Taylor (2001). What Do Neuronal Network Models of the Mind Indicate About Animal Consciousness? Animal Welfare Supplement 10:63- 75.
  12. John G. Taylor (1999). The Slippery Slopes of Connectionist Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):168-169.
    The basic postulate that consciousness arises from stable states of recurrent activity is shown to need considerable modification from our current knowledge of the neural networks of the brain. Some of these modifications are outlined.
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  13. Bernard J. Baars, J. B. Newman & John G. Taylor (1998). Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness: A Relational Global Workspace Approach. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 269-278.
    This paper explores a remarkable convergence of ideas and evidence, previously presented in separate places by its authors. That convergence has now become so persuasive that we believe we are working within substantially the same broad framework. Taylor's mathematical papers on neuronal systems involved in consciousness dovetail well with work by Newman and Baars on the thalamocortical system, suggesting a brain mechanism much like the global workspace architecture developed by Baars (see references below). This architecture is relational, in the sense (...)
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  14. John G. Taylor (1998). Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):109-48.
    An exploration is given of neural network features now being uncovered in cortical processing which begins to go a little way to help bridge the ''Explanatory Gap'' between phenomenal consciousness and correlated brain activity. A survey of properties suggested as being possessed by phenomenal consciousness leads to a set of criteria to be required of the correlated neural activity. Various neural styles of processing are reviewed and those fitting the criteria are selected for further analysis. One particular processing style, in (...)
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  15. John G. Taylor (1998). Constructing the Relational Mind. Psyche 4 (10).
    The "relational mind" approach to the inner content of consciousness is developed in terms of various control structures and processing strategies and their possible neurobiological identifications in brain sites. This leads naturally to a division of consciousness into a passive and an active part. A global control structure for the "single strand" aspect of consciousness is proposed as the thalamo-nucleus reticularis thalami-cortex coupled system, which is related to experimental data on the electrical stimulation of awareness. Local control, in terms of (...)
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  16. John G. Taylor (1998). 24 Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness: A Relational Global-Workspace Framework Bernard J. Baars, James Newman, And. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Ii. Mit Press. 2--269.
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  17. John G. Taylor (1997). Neural Networks for Consciousness. Neural Networks 10:1207-27.
  18. John G. Taylor (1997). The Emergence of Mind. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 30 (3-4):301-343.
  19. John G. Taylor & H. Mueller-Gaertner (1997). Non-Invasive Analysis of Awareness. Neural Networks 10:1185-1194.
  20. John G. Taylor (1996). A Competition for Consciousness? Neurocomputing 11:271-96.
  21. John G. Taylor (1996). Modeling What It is Like to Be. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.
     
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  22. John G. Taylor, Seymour Martin Lipset, Wilbert E. Moore, Robert Nisbet, Bob Goudzwaard & Jonathan Gershuny (1982). From Modernization to Modes of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment. Ethics 93 (1):114-128.
     
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