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Profile: John Gibbons
Profile: John Gibbons (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
  1. John Gibbons, Levels.
    Natural realism is the view that there is a real, metaphysical distinction between those properties, perhaps like being a quark, that are natural kinds and those, perhaps like being either red or round that are not. This is a fairly respectable doctrine, though by no means universally accepted. Perhaps slightly less well entrenched is the idea that there is a relation of causal relevance that sometimes holds between a property of a cause and a property of an effect. If causation (...)
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  2. John Gibbons (2013). The Norm of Belief. Oup Oxford.
    John Gibbons presents a new account of epistemic normativity. Belief seems to come with a built-in set of standards or norms--truth and reasonableness, for example--but which one is the fundamental norm of belief? He explains both the norms of knowledge and of truth in terms of the fundamental norm, the one that tells you to be reasonable.
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  3. John Gibbons (2010). Seeing What You're Doing. In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Do we have privileged access to what we’re intentionally doing? Well, that probably depends on what privileged access is. One way to think about privileged access is to try to identify a true formal principle. One thing you’ll need to do when identifying the formal principle is to specify the relevant range of propositions to which you have privileged access. These ranges are usually specified by subject matter: propositions about your own current, conscious propositional attitudes, propositions about your own sensations, (...)
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  4. John Gibbons (2010). Things That Make Things Reasonable. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):335-361.
  5. John Gibbons (2009). Reason in Action. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. 72.
    There is a problem with a very common theory of the nature of action. The problem stems from the fact that causation by practical reasons may be a necessary condition for being an intentional action, but it can’t be a sufficient condition. After all, desires and intentions are caused by practical reasons that rationalize them, but they’re clearly not actions. Even if all actions are events or changes and desires and intentions aren’t, the acquistion of a desire or an intention (...)
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  6. John Gibbons (2009). You Gotta Do What You Gotta Do. Noûs 43 (1):157-177.
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  7. John Gibbons (2006). Access Externalism. Mind 115 (457):19-39.
    This paper argues for externalism about justification on the basis of thought experiments. I present cases in which two individuals are intrinsically and introspectively indistinguishable and in which intuitively, one is justified in believing that p while the other is not. I also examine an argument for internalism based on the ideas that we have privileged access to whether or not our own beliefs are justified and that only internalism is compatible with this privilege. I isolate what I take to (...)
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  8. John Gibbons (2006). Mental Causation Without Downward Causation. Philosophical Review 115 (1):79-103.
    to counterintuitive results. Suppose a mental event, m1, causes another mental event, m2. Unless the mental and the physical are completely independent, there will be a physical event in your brain or your body or the physical world as a whole that underlies this event. The mental event occurs at least partly in virtue of the physical event’s occurring. And the same goes for m2 [2] and p2. Let’s not worry about what exactly “underlying” or “in virtue of” means here. (...)
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  9. John Gibbons (2005). Qualia: They're Not What They Seem. Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.
    Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing (...)
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  10. John Gibbons (2001). Externalism and Knowledge of the Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):13-28.
    Knowledge of your own propositional attitudes requires at least two things. You need to know the content of the relevant mental state, and you need to know what attitude you take towards that content. If it is possible to mistake a wish for a belief, this is a mistake about the attitude, not the content. One need not believe that we are generally infallible about our mental states to hold that, typically, when I sincerely say..
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  11. John Gibbons (2001). Knowledge in Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):579-600.
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  12. John Gibbons, Nathan Tarcov, Ralph Hancock, Jerry Weinberger, Paul A. Cantor, Mark Blitz, James W. Muller, Kenneth Weinstein, Clifford Orwin, Arthur Melzer, Susan Meld Shell, Peter Minowitz, James Stoner, Jeremy Rabkin, David F. Epstein, Charles R. Kesler, Glen E. Thurow, R. Shep Melnick, Jessica Korn & Robert P. Kraynak (2000). Educating the Prince: Essays in Honor of Harvey Mansfield. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  13. John Gibbons (1996). Externalism and Knowledge of Content. Philsophical Review 105 (3):287-310.
    Many bclicvc that content cxtcrnalism is inconsistent with commonscnsc views about our kmowlcdgc of thc contents of our own thoughts} Content cxtcrnalism is thc vicw that thc propositional contents of an individual’s thoughts do not supcrvcnc on thc intrinsic properties of that individual. Relations bctwccn you and your social and physical environment partly dctcrminc thc comtents of your thoughts.? But if what dctcrmimcs thc content of your thoughts lics partly outside your mind, it might sccm that you have to investigate (...)
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  14. John Gibbons (1994). Language and Disadvantage Before the Law. In , Language and the Law. Longman.
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  15. John Gibbons (ed.) (1994). Language and the Law. Longman.
     
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  16. John Gibbons (1994). Language Constructing Law. In , Language and the Law. Longman. 3--10.
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  17. John Gibbons (1993). Identity Without Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):59-79.
  18. John Presley[from old catalog] Gibbons (1959/1960). Celestial Science, Total Creation. New York, Pageant Press.
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