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Profile: John Greco (Saint Louis University)
  1. John Greco & David Henderson (eds.) (Forthcoming). Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  2. David Henderson & John Greco (eds.) (forthcoming). Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  3. John Greco (2013). Reflective Knowledge and the Pyrrhonian Problematic. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. 179--191.
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  4. John Greco (2012). Recent Work on Testimonial Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):15-28.
    -/- Recent interest in the epistemology of testimony can be traced to C. A. J. Coady's Testimony: A Philosophical Study (1992) and then a collection of papers edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti, Knowing from Words (1994). These two volumes framed several issues in the epistemology of testimony and largely set the agenda for work in that area over the next two decades. -/- One major issue in this literature is whether testimonial knowledge can be "reduced" to some (...)
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  5. John Greco (2012). A (Different) Virtue Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):1-26.
    Section 1 articulates a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S’s success in believing the truth is attributable to S’s ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important (...)
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  6. Ruth Groff & John Greco (eds.) (2012). Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. Routledge.
    The book will be of interest to philosophers working in any of these areas, as well as to historians of philosophy, political theorists and critical realists.
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  7. John Greco (2011). 10.1 Evidentialism About Knowledge. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 167.
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  8. John Greco (2011). Evidentialism About Knowledge. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
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  9. John Greco (2011). Epistemic Circularity: Vicious, Virtuous and Benign. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (2):105-112.
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  10. John Greco & John Turri (2011). Virtue Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  11. John Greco (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface; Part I. Epistemic Normativity: 1. Knowledge as success from ability; 2. Against deontology; 3. Against internalism; 4. Against evidentialism; Part II. Problems for Everyone: 5. The nature of knowledge; 6. The value of knowledge; 7. Knowledge and context; 8. The Pyrrhonian problematic; Part III. Problems for Reliabilism: 9. The problem of strange and fleeting processes; 10. The problem of defeating evidence; 11. The problem of easy knowledge; Bibliography; Index.
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  12. John Greco (2010). A Virtue Epistemology. International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):399-401.
    Section 1 articulates a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S’s success in believing the truth is attributable to S’s ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important (...)
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  13. John Greco (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  14. John Greco (2009). Knowledge and Success From Ability. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):17 - 26.
    This paper argues that knowledge is an instance of a more general and familiar normative kind—that of success through ability (or success through excellence, or success through virtue). This thesis is developed in the context of three themes prominent in the recent literature: that knowledge attributions are somehow context sensitive; that knowledge is intimately related to practical reasoning; and that one purpose of the concept of knowledge is to flag good sources of information. Wedding these themes to the proposed account (...)
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  15. John Greco (2009). Religious Knowledge in the Context of Conflicting Testimony. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:61-76.
    An adequate account of testimonial knowledge in general explains how religious knowledge can be grounded in testimony, and even in the context of conflicting testimonial traditions. Three emerging trends in epistemology help to make that case. The first is to make a distinction between two projects of epistemology: “the project of explanation” and “the project of vindication.” The second is to emphasize a distinction between knowledge and understanding. The third is to ask what role the concept of knowledge plays in (...)
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  16. John Greco (2009). Skepticism and Internalism. Iris 1 (2):429-438.
    This paper explores a familiar skeptical problematic and considers some strategies for responding to it. Section 1 reconstructs and disambiguates the skeptical problematic, distinguishing between some importantly different lines of skeptical reasoning. Section 2 distinguishes two kinds of anti-skeptical strategy. “Cooperative strategies” accept the conditions on knowledge that are laid down by a target skeptical argument, and argue that those conditions can be satisfied in a relevant domain. “Critical strategies” respond to a skeptical argument by rejecting some condition on knowledge (...)
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  17. John Greco (2009). The Value Problem. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 313--22.
     
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  18. Daniel Breyer & John Greco (2008). Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief: Response to Bernecker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):173–184.
    This paper responds to Sven Bernecker’s argument that agent reliabilism cannot accommodate internalist intuitions about clarvoyance cases. In section 1 we clarify a version of agent reliabilism and Bernecker’s objections against it. In section 2 we say more about how the notion of cognitive integration helps to adjudicate clairvoyance cases and other proposed counterexamples to reliabilism. The central idea is that cognitive integration underwrites a kind of belief ownership, which in turn underwrites the sort of responsibility for belief required for (...)
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  19. John Greco (2008). Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):173-184.
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  20. John Greco (2008). Skepticism About the External World. In , The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. 108--128.
  21. John Greco (ed.) (2008). The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    In the history of philosophical thought, few themes loom as large as skepticism. Skepticism has been the most visible and important part of debates about knowledge. Skepticism at its most basic questions our cognitive achievements, challenges our ability to obtain reliable knowledge; casting doubt on our attempts to seek and understand the truth about everything from ethics, to other minds, religious belief, and even the underlying structure of matter and reality. Since Descartes, the defense of knowledge against skepticism has been (...)
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  22. John Greco (2008). What's Wrong with Contextualism? Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):416 - 436.
    This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interestdependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over-stated in any case. Finally, the paper offers (...)
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  23. John Greco (2007). Discrimination and Testimonial Knowledge. Episteme 4 (3):335-351.
    Sanford Goldberg has called our attention to an interesting problem: How is it that young children can learn from the testimony of their caregivers (their parents, teachers, and nannies, for example) even when the children themselves are undiscriminating consumers of testimony? Part One describes the importance and scope of the problem, showing that it generalizes beyond tots and their caregivers. Part Two considers and rejects several strategies for solving the problem, including Goldberg's own. Part Three defends a solution, positing a (...)
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  24. John Greco (2007). External World Skepticism. Philosophy Compass 2 (4):625–649.
    Recent literature in epistemology has focused on the following argument for skepticism (SA): I know that I have two hands only if I know that I am not a handless brain in a vat. But I don't know I am not a handless brain in a vat. Therefore, I don't know that I have two hands. Part I of this article reviews two responses to skepticism that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s: sensitivity theories and attributor contextualism. Part II considers (...)
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  25. John Greco (2007). Knowledge as Credit for True Belief. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press.
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  26. John Greco (2007). Reformed Epistemology. In P. Copan & C. Meister (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. 629--639.
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  27. John Greco (2007). The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.
    The claim that knowledge is a kind of success from ability has great theoretical power: it explains the nature of epistemic normativity, why knowledge is incompatible with luck, and why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This paper addresses objections to the view by wedding it with two additional ideas: that intellectual abilities display a certain structure, and that the concept of knowledge functions to flag good information, and good sources of information, for use in practical reasoning.
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  28. John Greco (2007). Worries About Pritchard's Safety. Synthese 158 (3):299 - 302.
    I take issue with two claims that Duncan Pritchard makes in his recent book, Epistemic Luck. The first concerns his safety-based response to the lottery problem; the second his account of the relationship between safety and intellectual virtue.
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  29. Mark Timmons, John Greco & Alfred R. Mele (eds.) (2007). Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi. Oxford University Press.
    For over thirty years, Robert Audi has produced important work in ethics, epistemology, and the theory of action. This volume features thirteen new critical essays on Audi by a distinguished group of authors: Fred Adams, William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Roger Crisp, Elizabeth Fricker, Bernard Gert, Thomas Hurka, Hugh McCann, Al Mele, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Raimo Tuomela, Candace Vogler, and Timothy Williamson. Audi's introductory essay provides a thematic overview interconnecting his views in ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of action. The volume concludes with (...)
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  30. John Corcoran, Stephen F. Barker, Eric Dayton, John Greco, Naomi Zack, Richard S. Robin, Joel Isaac & Murray G. Murphey (2006). A Symposium on Murray G. Murphey, CI Lewis: The Last Great Pragmatist. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):1-77.
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  31. John Greco (2006). How to Be a Pragmatist: C. I. Lewis and Humean Skepticism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):24-31.
    Murray G. Murphey’s masterful treatment of C. I. Lewis’s philosophy leaves two things amply clear: first, that Lewis struggled with skeptical arguments from Hume throughout his career; and second, that Lewis never adequately resolved the problems raised by those arguments. In this paper I will consider Lewis’s approach to Hume’s skepticism in Mind and the World Order (MWO) and in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (AKV), and I will argue that Lewis’s reply to Hume in these works did not (...)
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  32. John Greco (2006). Virtue, Luck and the Pyrrhonian Problematic. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):9--34.
    A number of contemporary philosophers endorse a Pyrrhonian theme: that one has knowledge only if one knows or understands that one’s beliefs are reliably formed. Otherwise, one is like a man who grasps gold in the dark: such a man is successful, but his success is a matter of luck, and so not creditable to him. It is argued that the skeptical problem and the problem of moral luck share a common structure and a common solution. Specifically, a virtue-theoretic approach (...)
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  33. William P. Alston, Laurence Bonjour, Carl Ginet, Alvin I. Goldman, John Greco, George I. Mavrodes, Philip L. Quinn, Alessandra Tanesini, Nicholas Wolterstorff & Linda Zagzebski (2005). Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  34. John Greco (2005). Evidentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):556-558.
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  35. John Greco (2005). Justification is Not Internal. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 257--269.
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  36. John Greco (2005). Review of Joseph Houston: Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance. [REVIEW] Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (2):186-190.
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  37. John Greco (2005). Review of Noah Lemos, Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (7).
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  38. John Greco (2005). Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (2):186-190.
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  39. John Greco (2004). A Different Sort of Contextualism. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):383 - 400.
    A number of virtue epistemologists endorse the following thesis: Knowledge is true belief resulting from intellectual virtue, where Ss true belief results from intellectual virtue just in case S believes the truth because S is intellectually virtuous. This thesis commits one to a sort of contextualism about knowledge attributions. This is because, in general, sentences of the form X occurred because Y occurred require a contextualist treatment. This sort of contextualism is contrasted with more familiar versions. It is argued that (...)
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  40. John Greco (2004). Externalism and Skepticism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 53.
    Part 1 argues that, despite rhetorical appearances, McDowell accepts a standard version of epistemic externalism. Moreover, epistemic externalism plays an important role in McDowell’s response to skepticism. Part 2 argues that, contra McDowell, epistemic externalism is necessary for rejecting skepticism, and content externalism is not sufficient for rejecting skepticism.
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  41. John Greco (2004). Epistemic Justification. Faith and Philosophy 21 (4):547-549.
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  42. John Greco (ed.) (2004). Ernest Sosa and His Critics. Blackwell Pub..
  43. John Greco (2004). How to Preserve Your Virtue While Losing Your Perspective. In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. 96--105.
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  44. John Greco (2004). 5 Reid's Reply to the Skeptic. In Terence Cuneo Rene van Woudenberg (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid. Cambridge University Press. 134.
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  45. John Greco (2004). Review: Skepticism: The Major Issues. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):766-768.
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  46. John Greco (2003). Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):466–480.
    This paper replies to various concerns raised in a symposium on Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry.
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  47. John Greco (2003). Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):466-480.
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  48. John Greco (2003). ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief&Quot;. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 111-134.
    The paper begins by reviewing two problems for fallibilism: the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery, and Gettier problems. It is then argued that both problems can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Alternatively, to say that a (...)
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