10 found
Sort by:
See also:
  1. John Hacker-Wright (forthcoming). Skill, Practical Wisdom, and Ethical Naturalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-11.
    IntroductionRecent work in virtue theory has breathed new life into the analogy between virtue and skill.See, for example, Annas ; Bloomfield ; Stichter ; Swartwood . There is good reason to think that this analogy is worth pursuing since it may help us understand the distinctive nexus of reasoning, knowledge, and practical ability that is found in virtue by pointing to a similar nexus found outside moral contexts in skill. In some ways, there is more than an analogy between skill (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. John Hacker-Wright (2013). Human Nature, Virtue, and Rationality. In Julia Peters (ed.), Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective. Routledge 83.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. John Hacker-Wright (2012). Ethical Naturalism and the Constitution of Agency. Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (1):13-23.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. John Hacker-Wright (2012). Teichmann , Roger . Nature, Reason, and the Good Life: Ethics for Human Beings . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 224. $65.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (3):637-641.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. John Hacker-Wright (2011). Normativity Judith Jarvis Thomson Chicago: Open Court Press, 2008, Ix + 271 Pp., $39.93 (Paperback). [REVIEW] Dialogue 50 (1):220-222.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. John Hacker-Wright (2010). Virtue Ethics Without Right Action: Anscombe, Foot, and Contemporary Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2):209-224.
  7. John Hacker-Wright (2009). Human Nature, Personhood, and Ethical Naturalism. Philosophy 84 (3):413-427.
    John McDowell has argued that for human needs to matter in practical deliberation, we must have already acquired the full range of character traits that are imparted by an ethical upbringing. Since our upbringings can diverge considerably, his argument makes trouble for any Aristotelian ethical naturalism that wants to support a single set of moral virtues. I argue here that there is a story to be told about the normal course of human life according to which it is no coincidence (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. John Hacker-Wright (2009). What is Natural About Foot's Ethical Naturalism? Ratio 22 (3):308-321.
    Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness is in the midst of a cool reception. It appears that this is due to the fact that Foot's naturalism draws on a picture of the biological world at odds with the view embraced by most scientists and philosophers. Foot's readers commonly assume that the account of the biological world that she must want to adhere to, and that she nevertheless mistakenly departs from, is the account offered by contemporary neo-Darwinian biological sciences. But as is evident (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. John Hacker-Wright (2008). Blasphemy And Virtue Ethics. Florida Philosophical Review 1 (1):41-50.
    In this paper I argue for a secular conception of blasphemy as a grave moral wrong. I argue for this conception on the basis of a neo-Aristotelian conception of virtue ethics. Specifically, I argue that there is a virtue of intellectual fidelity to matters of great importance: morally permissible ends. In order to structure our lives around such ends, which is essential to living a characteristic human life, we must consistently bear in mind what we know to be true about (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. John Hacker-Wright (2007). Moral Status in Virtue Ethics. Philosophy 82 (3):449-473.
    My contention is that virtue ethics offers an important critique of traditional philosophical conceptions of moral status as well as an alternative view of important moral issues held to depend on moral status. I argue that the scope of entities that deserve consideration depends on our conception of the demands of virtues like justice; which entities deserve consideration emerges from a moral view of a world shaped by that conception. The deepest disputes about moral status depend on conflicting conceptions of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation