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John J. Tilley [33]John Joseph Tilley [1]
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Profile: John J. Tilley (Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis)
  1. John J. Tilley (2012). Hedonism. In Ruth Chadwick (ed.), Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, 2nd ed., vol. 2. Academic Press 566-73.
    This article covers four types of hedonism: ancient hedonism; ethical hedonism; axiological hedonism; and psychological hedonism. It concentrates on the latter two types, both by clarifying them and by discussing arguments in their behalf. It closes with a few words about the relevance of those positions to applied ethics.
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  2. John J. Tilley (2015). John Clarke of Hull's Argument for Psychological Egoism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (1):69-89.
    John Clarke of Hull, one of the eighteenth century's staunchest proponents of psychological egoism, defended that theory in his Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice. He did so mainly by opposing the objections to egoism in the first two editions of Francis Hutcheson's Inquiry into Virtue. But Clarke also produced a challenging, direct argument for egoism which, regrettably, has received virtually no scholarly attention. In this paper I give it some of the attention it merits. In addition to reconstructing (...)
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  3. John J. Tilley (1998). The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism. Ratio Juris 11 (3):272-290.
    The key problem for normative (or moral) cultural relativism arises as soon as we try to formulate it. It resists formulations that are (1) clear, precise, and intelligible; (2) plausible enough to warrant serious attention; and (3) faithful to the aims of leading cultural relativists, one such aim being to produce an important alternative to moral universalism. Meeting one or two of these conditions is easy; meeting all three is not. I discuss twenty-four candidates for the label "cultural relativism," showing (...)
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  4. John J. Tilley (2009). Dismissive Replies to "Why Should I Be Moral?". Social Theory and Practice 35 (3):341–68.
    The question "Why should I be moral?," taken as a request for reasons to be moral, strikes many philosophers as silly, confused, or otherwise out of line. Hence we find many attempts to dismiss it as spurious. This paper addresses four such attempts and shows that they fail. It does so partly by discussing various errors about reasons for action, errors that lie at the root of the view that "Why should I be moral?" is ill-conceived. Such errors include the (...)
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  5. John J. Tilley (2012). Wollaston's Early Critics. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1097-1116.
    Some of the most forceful objections to William Wollaston's moral theory come from his early critics, namely, Thomas Bott (1688-1754), Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), and John Clarke of Hull (1687-1734). These objections are little known, while the inferior objections of Hume, Bentham, and later prominent critics are familiar. This fact is regrettable. For instance, it impedes a robust understanding of eighteenth-century British ethics; also, it fosters a questionable view as to why Wollaston's theory, although at first well received, soon faded in (...)
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  6. John J. Tilley (2006). Is "Why Be Moral?" A Pseudo-Question?: Hospers and Thornton on the Amoralist's Challenge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):549-66.
    Many arguments have been advanced for the view that "Why be moral?" is a pseudo-question. In this paper I address one of the most widely known and influential of them, one that comes from John Hospers and J. C. Thornton. I do so partly because, strangely, an important phase of that argument has escaped close attention. It warrants such attention because, firstly, not only is it important to the argument in which it appears, it is important in wider respects. For (...)
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  7. John J. Tilley (2012). Exciting Reasons and Moral Rationalism in Hutcheson's Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):53-83.
    One of the most oft-cited parts of Francis Hutcheson’s Illustrations upon the Moral Sense (1728) is his discussion of “exciting reasons.” In this paper I address the question: What is the function of that discussion? In particular, what is its relation to Hutcheson’s attempt to show that the rationalists’ normative thesis ultimately implies, contrary to their moral epistemology, that moral ideas spring from a sense? Despite first appearances, Hutcheson’s discussion of exciting reasons is not part of that attempt. Mainly, it (...)
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  8. John J. Tilley (2008). Reasons, Rational Requirements, and the Putative Pseudo-Question “Why Be Moral?”. Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323.
    In this paper, I challenge a familiar argument -- a composite of arguments in the literature -- for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The (...)
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  9.  12
    John J. Tilley (2016). Hutcheson's Theological Objection to Egoism. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (1):101-123.
    Francis Hutcheson's objections to psychological egoism usually appeal to experience or introspection. However, at least one of them is theological: It includes premises of a religious kind, such as that God rewards the virtuous. This objection invites interpretive and philosophical questions, some of which may seem to highlight errors or shortcomings on Hutcheson's part. Also, to answer the questions is to point out important features of Hutcheson's objection and its intellectual context. And nowhere in the scholarship on Hutcheson do we (...)
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  10. John J. Tilley (2012). The Problem of Inconsistency in Wollaston's Moral Theory. History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (3):265–80.
    This paper challenges Francis Hutcheson's and John Clarke of Hull's alleged demonstrations that William Wollaston's moral theory is inconsistent. It also present a form of the inconsistency objection that fares better than theirs, namely, that of Thomas Bott (1688-1754). Ultimately, the paper shows that Wollaston's moral standard is not what some have thought it to be; that consequently, his philosophy withstands the best-known efforts to expose it as inconsistent; and further, that one of the least-known British moralists is more important (...)
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  11. John J. Tilley (1997). Motivation and Practical Reasons. Erkenntnis 47 (1):105-127.
    In discussions of practical reason we often encounter the view that a fact is a reason for an agent to act only if the fact is capable of moving the agent to act. This view figures centrally in many philosophical controversies, and while taken for granted by some, it is vigorously disputed by others. In this essay I show that if the disputed position is correctly interpreted, it is well armored against stock objections and implied by a premise that is (...)
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  12. John J. Tilley (1994). Accounting for the 'Tragedy' in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Synthese 99 (2):251–76.
    The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) exhibits a tragedy in this sense: if the players are fully informed and rational, they are condemned to a jointly dispreferred outcome. In this essay I address the following question: What feature of the PD's payoff structure is necessary and sufficient to produce the tragedy? In answering it I use the notion of a trembling-hand equilibrium. In the final section I discuss an implication of my argument, an implication which bears on the persistence of the problem (...)
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  13. John J. Tilley (2009). Physical Objects and Moral Wrongness: Hume on the "Fallacy" in Wollaston's Moral Theory. Hume Studies 35 (1):87-101.
    In a well-known footnote in Book 3 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume calls William Wollaston's moral theory a "whimsical system" and purports to destroy it with a few brief objections. The first of those objections, although fatally flawed, has hitherto gone unrefuted. To my knowledge, its chief error has escaped attention. In this paper I expose that error; I also show that it has relevance beyond the present subject. It can occur with regard to any moral theory which, (...)
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  14. John J. Tilley (1995). Two Kinds of Moral Relativism. Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (2):187-192.
    Discussions of moral relativism commonly distinguish between normative relativism (NR) and moral judgment relativism (MJR) without highlighting the differences between the two. One significant difference—a difference between normative relativism and the most prevalent type of moral judgment relativism—is not immediately obvious and has not been discussed in print. This paper explains it and draws out some of its philosophical consequences.
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  15. John J. Tilley (2004). Justifying Reasons, Motivating Reasons, and Agent Relativism in Ethics. Philosophical Studies 118 (3):373-399.
    According to agent relativism, each person's moral requirements are relative to her desires or interests. That is, whether a person morally ought to ø depends on what interests or desires she has. Some philosophers charge that the main argument for agent relativism trades on an ambiguity in the term "reason," "reason for action,'' or the like. This paper shows that although the argument for agent relativism may indeed harbor an ambiguity, the ambiguity is no Achilles’ heel. To remove it is (...)
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  16. John J. Tilley (1994). Cultural Relativism and Tolerance. Lyceum 6 (1):1-11.
  17. John J. Tilley (2000). Cultural Relativism. Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2):501–547.
     
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  18.  16
    John J. Tilley (1996). Prisoner's Dilemma From a Moral Point of View. Theory and Decision 41 (2):187-193.
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  19.  6
    John J. Tilley (2013). Wollaston, William. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
    This is a brief reference article on William Wollaston's moral theory, including some influential objections to it.
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  20.  48
    John J. Tilley (1988). Inner Judgments and Moral Relativism. Philosophia 18 (2-3):171-190.
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  21.  17
    John J. Tilley (1992). Moral Relativism, Internalism, and the "Humean" View of Practical Reason. Modern Schoolman 69 (2):81-109.
  22.  35
    John J. Tilley (2004). Desires, Reasons, and Reasons to Be Moral. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):287–98.
  23.  27
    John J. Tilley (2006). Desires and Practical Reasons. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:123-128.
  24.  16
    John J. Tilley (1999). Prisoners' Dilemmas and Reciprocal Altruists. Philosophia 27 (1-2):261-272.
  25.  22
    John J. Tilley (1991). Altruism and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):264 – 287.
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  26.  35
    John J. Tilley (2004). On Desires and Practical Reasons. Acta Analytica 19 (32):5-18.
    A common and plausible assumption about the relation between desires and practical reasons—namely, that if øing is an optimal way (or even just a way) for a person, P, to satisfy one of his or her desires, then P has a (normative) reason to ø. This paper discusses that assumption. Although it does not deny that desires are a source of practical reasons, it shows that in some situations, rare though not impossible, P can lack a reason to ø despite (...)
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  27.  32
    John J. Tilley (2005). Living Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Thought, Third Edition. [REVIEW] Philosophia 33 (1-4):335-341.
  28.  10
    John J. Tilley (1993). Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offence. By Gregory Mellema. [REVIEW] Modern Schoolman 71 (1):73-75.
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  29.  15
    John J. Tilley (2012). Spectres of False Divinity: Hume's Moral Atheism (Review). [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (2):297-298.
  30.  23
    Joseph Agassi, Dorit Bar-on, D. S. Clarke, Paul Sheldon Davies, Anthony J. Graybosch, Lila Luce, Paul K. Moser, Saul Smilansky, Roger Smook, William Sweet, John J. Tilley & Ruth Weintraub (1994). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (1-4):359-362.
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  31. John J. Tilley (1998). Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of Proof. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27 (2):275-97.
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  32. John J. Tilley (1994). Moral Freedom. [REVIEW] Philosophia 23 (1-4):407-408.
     
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  33. John J. Tilley (1999). Troubles for Psychological Hedonism. Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 10.
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