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John Justice [4]John Keith Justice [1]
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Profile: John Justice (Randolph College)
  1.  37 DLs
    John Justice (2007). Unified Semantics of Singular Terms. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):363–373.
    Singular-term semantics has been intractable. Frege took the referents of singular terms to be their semantic values. On his account, vacuous terms lacked values. Russell separated the semantics of definite descriptions from the semantics of proper names, which caused truth-values to be composed in two different ways and still left vacuous names without values. Montague gave all noun phrases sets of verb-phrase extensions for values, which created type mismatches when noun phrases were objects and still left vacuous names without values. (...)
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  2.  25 DLs
    John Justice (2002). Mill-Frege Compatibalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:567-576.
    It is generally accepted that Mill’s classification of names as nonconnotative terms is incompatible with Frege’s thesis that names have senses. However, Milldescribed the senses of nonconnotative terms—without being aware that he was doing so. These are the senses for names that were sought in vain by Frege. When Mill’s and Frege’s doctrines are understood as complementary, they constitute a fully satisfactory theory of names.
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  3.  22 DLs
    John Justice (2001). On Sense and Reflexivity. Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):351-364.
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  4.  19 DLs
    John Justice (2003). The Semantics of Rigid Designation. Ratio 16 (1):33–48.
    Frege's thesis that each singular term has a sense that determines its reference and serves as its cognitive value has come to be widely doubted. Saul Kripke argued that since names are rigid designators, their referents are not determined by senses. David Kaplan has argued that the rigid designation of indexical terms entails that they also lack referent–determining senses. Kripke's argument about names and Kaplan's argument about indexical terms differ, but each contains a false premise. The referents of both names (...)
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