Why should one believe that conscious awareness is solely the result of organizational complexity? What is the connection between consciousness and combinatorics: transformation of quantity into quality? The claim that the former is reducible to the other seems unconvincing—as unlike as chalk and cheese! In his book1 Penrose is at least attempting to compare like with like: the enigma of consciousness with the progress of physics.
to indicate that the object a is an element or member of the class A. We assume that every member of a class is an object. Lower-case letters a, b, c, x, y, z, … will always denote objects, and later, sets. Equality between classes is governed by the Axiom of Extensionality.
ABSTRACT: It is characteristic of a continuum that it be “all of one piece”, in the sense of being inseparable into two (or more) disjoint nonempty parts. By taking “part” to mean open (or closed) subset of the space, one obtains the usual topological concept of connectedness . Thus a space S is defined to be connected if it cannot be partitioned into two disjoint nonempty open (or closed) subsets – or equivalently, given any partition of S into two open (...) (or closed) subsets, one of the members of the partition must be empty. This holds, for example, for the space R of real numbers and for all of its open or closed intervals. Now a truly radical condition results from taking the idea of being “all of one piece” literally, that is, if it is taken to mean inseparability into any disjoint nonempty parts, or subsets, whatsoever . A space S satisfying this condition is called cohesive or indecomposable. While the law of excluded middle of classical logic reduces indecomposable spaces to the trivial empty space and one-point spaces, the use of intuitionistic logic makes it possible not only for nontrivial cohesive spaces to exist, but for every connected space to be cohesive.In this paper I describe the philosophical background to cohesiveness as well as some of the ways in which the idea is modelled in contemporary mathematics. (shrink)
The usual meaning of the word continuous is “unbroken” or “uninterrupted”: thus a continuous entity —a continuum—has no “gaps.” We commonly suppose that space and time are continuous, and certain philosophers have maintained that all natural processes occur continuously: witness, for example, Leibniz's famous apothegm natura non facit saltus—“nature makes no jump.” In mathematics the word is used in the same general sense, but has had to be furnished with increasingly precise definitions. So, for instance, in the later 18th century (...) continuity of a function was taken to mean that infinitesimal changes in the value of the argument induced infinitesimal changes in the value of the function. With the abandonment of infinitesimals in the 19th century this definition came to be replaced by one employing the more precise concept of limit. (shrink)
One of the most familiar uses of the Russell paradox, or, at least, of the idea underlying it, is in proving Cantor's theorem that the cardinality of any set is strictly less than that of its power set. The other method of proving Cantor's theorem Ã¢â¬â employed by Cantor himself in showing that the set of real numbers is uncountable Ã¢â¬â is that of diagonalization. Typically, diagonalization arguments are used to show that function spaces are "large" in a suitable sense. (...) Classically, these two methods are equivalent. But constructively they are not: while the argument for Russell's paradox is perfectly constructive, (i.e., employs intuitionistically acceptable principles of logic) the method of diagonalization fails to be so. I describe the ways in which these two methods.. (shrink)
Axioms for the continuum, or smooth real line R. These include the usual axioms for a commutative ring with unit expressed in terms of two operations + and i , and two distinguished elements 0 ≠ 1. In addition we stipulate that R is a local ring, i.e., the following axiom: ∃y x i y = 1 ∨ ∃y (1 – x) i y = 1. Axioms for the strict order relation < on R. These are: 1. a < b (...) and b < c implies a < c. 2. ¬(a < a) 3. a < b implies a + c < b + c for any c. ≤ 4. a < b and 0 < c implies acbc.. (shrink)
IN THEIR WELL-KNOWN PAPER, Kochen and Specker (1967) introduce the concept of partial Boolean algebra (pBa) and show that certain (finitely generated) partial Boolean algebras arising in quantum theory fail to possess morphisms to any Boolean algebra (we call such pBa's intractable in the sequel). In this note we begin by discussing partial..
A weak form of intuitionistic set theory WST lacking the axiom of extensionality is introduced. While WST is too weak to support the derivation of the law of excluded middle from the axiom of choice, we show that beeﬁng up WST with moderate extensionality principles or quotient sets enables the derivation to go through.
On the contrary, I find nothing in logistic but shackles. It does not help us at all in the direction of conciseness, far from it; and if it requires 27 equations to establish that 1 is a number, how many will it require to demonstrate a real theorem?
I describe two approaches to modelling the universe, the one having its origin in topos theory and differential geometry, the other in set theory. The first is synthetic differential geometry. Traditionally, there have been two methods of deriving the theorems of geometry: the analytic and the synthetic. While the analytical method is based on the introduction of numerical coordinates, and so on the theory of real numbers, the idea behind the synthetic approach is to furnish the subject of geometry with (...) a purely geometric foundation in which the theorems are then deduced by purely logical means from an initial body of postulates. The most familiar examples of the synthetic geometry are classical Euclidean geometry and the synthetic projective geometry introduced by Desargues in the 17th century and revived and developed by Carnot, Poncelet, Steiner and others during the 19th century. The power of analytic geometry derives very largely from the fact that it permits the methods of the calculus, and, more generally, of mathematical analysis, to be introduced into geometry, leading in particular to differential geometry (a term, by the way, introduced in 1894 by the Italian geometer Luigi Bianchi). That being the case, the idea of a “synthetic” differential geometry seems elusive: how can differential geometry be placed on a “purely geometric” or “axiomatic” foundation when the apparatus of the calculus seems inextricably involved? To my knowledge there have been two attempts to develop a synthetic differential geometry. The first was initiated by Herbert Busemann in the 1940s, building on earlier work of Paul Finsler. Here the idea was to build a differential geometry that, in its author’s words, “requires no derivatives”: the basic objects in Busemann’s approach are not differentiable manifolds, but metric spaces of a certain type in which the notion of a geodesic can be defined in an intrinsic manner. I shall not have anything more to say about this approach. The second approach, that with which I shall be concerned here, was originally proposed in the 1960s by F.. (shrink)
Traditionally, there have been two methods of deriving the theorems of geometry: the analytic and the synthetic. While the analytical method is based on the introduction of numerical coordinates, and so on the theory of real numbers, the idea behind the synthetic approach is to furnish the subject of geometry with a purely geometric foundation in which the theorems are then deduced by purely logical means from an initial body of postulates. The most familiar examples of the synthetic geometry are (...) classical Euclidean geometry and the synthetic projective geometry introduced by Desargues in the 17th century and revived and developed by Carnot, Poncelet, Steiner and others during the 19th century. The power of analytic geometry derives very largely from the fact that it permits the methods of the calculus, and, more generally, of mathematical analysis, to be introduced into geometry, leading in particular to differential geometry (a term, by the way, introduced in 1894 by the Italian geometer Luigi Bianchi). That being the case, the idea of a “synthetic” differential geometry seems elusive: how can differential geometry be placed on a “purely geometric” or “axiomatic” foundation when the apparatus of the calculus seems inextricably involved? To my knowledge there have been two attempts to develop a synthetic differential geometry. The first was initiated by Herbert Busemann in the 1940s, building on earlier work of Paul Finsler. Here the idea was to build a differential geometry that, in its author’s words, “requires no derivatives”: the basic objects in Busemann’s approach are not differentiable manifolds, but metric spaces of a certain type in which the notion of a geodesic can be defined in an intrinsic manner. I shall not have anything more to say about this approach. The second approach, that with which I shall be concerned here, was originally proposed in the 1960s by F. W. Lawvere, who was in fact striving to fashion a decisive axiomatic framework for continuum mechanics.. (shrink)
This essay is an attempt to sketch the evolution of type theory from its beginnings early in the last century to the present day. Central to the development of the type concept has been its close relationship with set theory to begin with and later its even more intimate relationship with category theory. Since it is effectively impossible to describe these relationships (especially in regard to the latter) with any pretensions to completeness within the space of a comparatively short article, (...) I have elected to offer detailed technical presentations of just a few important instances. (shrink)
This book is written for those who are in sympathy with its spirit. This spirit is different from the one which informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us stand. That spirit expresses itself in an onwards movement, in building ever larger and more complicated structures; the other in striving in clarity and perspicuity in no matter what structure. The first tries to grasp the world by way of its periphery—in its variety; the second (...) at its centre—in its essence. And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, from one thing to the next, while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same. (shrink)
This third edition, now available in paperback, is a follow up to the author's classic Boolean-Valued Models and Independence Proofs in Set Theory,. It provides an exposition of some of the most important results in set theory obtained in the 20th century: the independence of the continuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice. Aimed at graduate students and researchers in mathematics, mathematical logic, philosophy, and computer science, the third edition has been extensively updated with expanded introductory material, new chapters, and (...) a new appendix on category theory. It covers recent developments in the field and contains numerous exercises, along with updated and increased coverage of the background material. This new paperback edition includes additional corrections and, for the first time, will make this landmark text accessible to students in logic and set theory. (shrink)
Traditionally, expressions in formal systems have been regarded as signifying finite inscriptions which are—at least in principle—capable of actually being written out in primitive notation. However, the fact that (first-order) formulas may be identified with natural numbers (via "Gödel numbering") and hence with finite sets makes it no longer necessary to regard formulas as inscriptions, and suggests the possibility of fashioning "languages" some of whose formulas would be naturally identified as infinite sets . A "language" of this kind is called (...) an infinitary language : in this article I discuss those infinitary languages which can be obtained in a straightforward manner from first-order languages by allowing conjunctions, disjunctions and, possibly, quantifier sequences, to be of infinite length. In the course of the discussion it will be seen that, while the expressive power of such languages far exceeds that of their finitary (first-order) counterparts, very few of them possess the "attractive" features (e.g., compactness and completeness) of the latter. Accordingly, the infinitary languages that do in fact possess these features merit special attention. (shrink)
The principle of set theory known as the Axiom of Choice has been hailed as “probably the most interesting and, in spite of its late appearance, the most discussed axiom of mathematics, second only to Euclid's axiom of parallels which was introduced more than two thousand years ago” (Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel & Levy 1973, §II.4). The fulsomeness of this description might lead those unfamiliar with the axiom to expect it to be as startling as, say, the Principle of the Constancy of (...) the Velocity of Light or the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. But in fact the Axiom of Choice as it is usually stated appears humdrum, even self-evident. For it amounts to nothing more than the claim that, given any collection of mutually disjoint nonempty sets, it is possible to assemble a new set — a transversal or choice set — containing exactly one element from each member of the given collection. Nevertheless, this seemingly innocuous principle has far-reaching mathematical consequences — many indispensable, some startling — and has come to figure prominently in discussions on the foundations of mathematics. It (or its equivalents) have been employed in countless mathematical papers, and a number of monographs have been exclusively devoted to it. (shrink)
In this paper a number of oppositions which have haunted mathematics and philosophy are described and analyzed. These include the Continuous and the Discrete, the One and the Many, the Finite and the Infinite, the Whole and the Part, and the Constant and the Variable.
The centrality of the whole/part relation in mathematics is demonstrated through the presentation and analysis of examples from algebra, geometry, functional analysis,logic, topology and category theory.
is a presentation of mathematics in terms of the fundamental concepts of transformation, and composition of transformations. While the importance of these concepts had long been recognized in algebra (for example, by Galois through the idea of a group of permutations) and in geometry (for example, by Klein in his Erlanger Programm), the truly universal role they play in mathematics did not really begin to be appreciated until the rise of abstract algebra in the 1930s. In abstract algebra the idea (...) of transformation of structure (homomorphism) was central from the beginning, and it soon became apparent to algebraists that its most important concepts and constructions were in fact formulable in terms of that idea alone. Thus emerged the view that the essence of a mathematical structure is to be sought not in its internal constitution, but rather in the nature of its relationships with other structures of the same kind, as manifested through the network of transformations. This idea has achieved its fullest expression in category theory, an axiomatic framework within which the notions of transformation (as morphism or arrow) and composition (and also structure, as object) are fundamental, that is, are not defined in terms of anything else. (shrink)
If we imagine a chess-board with alternate blue and red squares, then this is something in which the individual red and blue areas allow themselves to be distinguished from each other in juxtaposition, and something similar holds also if we imagine each of the squares divided into four smaller squares also alternating between these two colours. If, however, we were to continue with such divisions until we had exceeded the boundary of noticeability for the individual small squares which result, then (...) it would no longer be possible to apprehend the individual red and blue areas in their respective positions. But would we then see nothing at all? Not in the least; rather we would see the whole chessboard as violet, i.e. apprehend it as something that participates simultaneously in red and blue. (shrink)
Hermann Weyl, one of the twentieth century's greatest mathematicians, was unusual in possessing acute literary and philosophical sensibilities—sensibilities to which he gave full expression in his writings. In this paper I use quotations from these writings to provide a sketch of Weyl's philosophical orientation, following which I attempt to elucidate his views on the mathematical continuum, bringing out the central role he assigned to intuition.
In this paper the view is developed that classes should not be understood as individuals, but, rather, as "classes as many" of individuals. To correlate classes with individuals "labelling" and "colabelling" functions are introduced and sets identified with a certain subdomain of the classes on which the labelling and colabelling functions are mutually inverse. A minimal axiomatization of the resulting system is formulated and some of its extensions are related to various systems of set theory, including nonwellfounded set theories.
then E has a subset which is the domain of a model of Peano's axioms for the natural numbers. (This result is proved explicitly, using classical reasoning, in section 3 of .) My purpose in this note is to strengthen this result in two directions: first, the premise will be weakened so as to require only that the map ν be defined on the family of (Kuratowski) finite subsets of the set E, and secondly, the argument will be constructive, i.e., (...) will involve no use of the law of excluded middle. To be precise, we will prove, in constructive (or intuitionistic) set theory3, the following.. (shrink)
This paper is concerned with Wittgenstein's early doctrine of the independence of elementary propositions. Using the notion of a free generator for a logical calculus–a concept we claim was anticipated by Wittgenstein–we show precisely why certain difficulties associated with his doctrine cannot be overcome. We then show that Russell's version of logical atomism–with independent particulars instead of elementary propositions–avoids the same difficulties.