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  1. George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 468--484.
  2. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2006). Cognition Needs Syntax but Not Rules. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 147--158.
    Human cognition is rich, varied, and complex. In this Chapter we argue that because of the richness of human cognition (and human mental life generally), there must be a syntax of cognitive states, but because of this very richness, cognitive processes cannot be describable by exceptionless rules. The argument for syntax, in Section 1, has to do with being able to get around in any number of possible environments in a complex world. Since nature did not know where in the (...)
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  3. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 41-61.
  4. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter.
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  5. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2003). The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 323.
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  6. John L. Tienson (2002). Higher-Order Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):89-101.
    We have a familiar idea of levels of description or levels of theory in science: microphysics, atomic physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the various social sciences. It is clear that philosophers - such as Terry Horgan - who want to be nonreductive materialists with regard to the mental must hold that this is not mere description; there must be genuine higher-level causes, and hence, genuine higher-level properties, in particular mental properties and causes. But there appears to be a deep problem (...)
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  7. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2001). Deconstructing New Wave Materialism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  8. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1999). Authors' Replies. Acta Analytica 22 (22):275-287.
     
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  9. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1996). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  10. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1995). Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 9:127-52.
  11. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science. Synthese 101 (3):305-45.
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
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  12. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). Representations Don't Need Rules: Reply to James Garson. Mind and Language 9 (1):1-24.
  13. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Cognitive Systems as Dynamic Systems. Topoi 11 (1):27-43.
  14. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science. Philosophy 34:159-188.
  15. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) (1991). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
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  16. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1991). Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems? In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice. Oup.
     
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  17. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1990). Soft Laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):256-279.
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  18. John L. Tienson (1990). About Competence. Philosophical Papers 19 (1):19-36.
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  19. John L. Tienson (1990). Is This Any Way to Be a Realist? Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):155-164.
    Abstract Andy Clark argues that the reality and causal efficacy of the folk psychological attitudes do not require in?the?head correlates of the that?clauses by which they are attributed. The facts for which Fodor invokes a language of thought as empirical explanation?systemati?city, for example?are, Clark argues, an a priori conceptual demand upon propositional attitude ascription, and hence not in need of empirical explanation. However, no such strategy can work. A priori demands imposed by our practices do not eliminate the need for (...)
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  20. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1989). Representation Without Rules. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):147-74.
  21. John L. Tienson (1989). A Conception of Metaphysics. American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1):63 - 71.
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  22. John L. Tienson (1988). An Introduction to Connectionism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (S1):1-16.
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  23. John L. Tienson (1988). Resemblance and General Terms. Philosophical Studies 54 (1):87 - 108.
    Any successful account of general terms must explain our ability to apply terms correctly to new instances. Many philosophers have thought resemblance offers an ontologically sparse basis for such an account. However, Any natural and plausible account of general terms on the basis of resemblance requires quite a rich ontology, Including at least second order properties and relations. Given a sufficiently rich structure of resemblances, We can surely account for the application of many general terms. I argue, However, That our (...)
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  24. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1987). Settling Into a New Paradigm. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1):97-113.
  25. John L. Tienson (1987). An Argument Concerning Quantification and Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 51 (2):145 - 168.
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  26. John L. Tienson (1987). Brains Are Not Conscious. Philosophical Papers 16 (November):187-93.
  27. John L. Tienson (1987). Introduction to Connectionism. Southern Journal of Philosophy (Suppl.) 1:1-16.
     
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  28. John L. Tienson (1985). Entia Successiva and Ordinary Things. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):475-479.
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  29. John L. Tienson (1982). Synonyms and the Objects of Belief. Philosophical Studies 42 (3):297 - 313.