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John L. Tienson [29]John Leander Tienson [1]
  1.  30
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1996). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  2. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter
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  3.  67
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2001). Deconstructing New Wave Materialism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  4.  43
    George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 468--484.
  5.  32
    Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2003). The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic 323.
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  6.  22
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) (1991). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
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  7.  55
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science. Synthese 101 (3):305-45.
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
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  8.  16
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1990). Soft Laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):256-279.
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  9.  45
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Cognitive Systems as Dynamic Systems. Topoi 11 (1):27-43.
  10.  55
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2006). Cognition Needs Syntax but Not Rules. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing 147--158.
    Human cognition is rich, varied, and complex. In this Chapter we argue that because of the richness of human cognition (and human mental life generally), there must be a syntax of cognitive states, but because of this very richness, cognitive processes cannot be describable by exceptionless rules. The argument for syntax, in Section 1, has to do with being able to get around in any number of possible environments in a complex world. Since nature did not know where in the (...)
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  11.  25
    John L. Tienson (1988). An Introduction to Connectionism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (S1):1-16.
  12.  16
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science. Philosophy 34:159-188.
    David Marr provided an influential account of levels of description in classical cognitive science. In this paper we contrast Marr'ent with some alternatives that are suggested by the recent emergence of connectionism. Marr's account is interesting and important both because of the levels of description it distinguishes, and because of the way his presentation reflects some of the most basic, foundational, assumptions of classical AI-style cognitive science . Thus, by focusing on levels of description, one can sharpen foundational differences between (...)
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  13.  35
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1995). Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 9:127-52.
  14.  28
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1989). Representation Without Rules. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):147-74.
  15.  39
    John L. Tienson (1987). Brains Are Not Conscious. Philosophical Papers 16 (November):187-93.
  16.  11
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1987). Settling Into a New Paradigm. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1):97-113.
  17.  42
    John L. Tienson (2002). Higher-Order Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):89-101.
    We have a familiar idea of levels of description or levels of theory in science: microphysics, atomic physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the various social sciences. It is clear that philosophers - such as Terry Horgan - who want to be nonreductive materialists with regard to the mental must hold that this is not mere description; there must be genuine higher-level causes, and hence, genuine higher-level properties, in particular mental properties and causes. But there appears to be a deep problem (...)
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  18.  26
    John L. Tienson (1988). Resemblance and General Terms. Philosophical Studies 54 (1):87 - 108.
    Any successful account of general terms must explain our ability to apply terms correctly to new instances. Many philosophers have thought resemblance offers an ontologically sparse basis for such an account. However, Any natural and plausible account of general terms on the basis of resemblance requires quite a rich ontology, Including at least second order properties and relations. Given a sufficiently rich structure of resemblances, We can surely account for the application of many general terms. I argue, However, That our (...)
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  19. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1991). Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems? In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice. OUP
     
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  20.  8
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). Representations Don't Need Rules: Reply to James Garson. Mind and Language 9 (1):1-24.
  21. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press 41-61.
  22.  25
    John L. Tienson (1982). Synonyms and the Objects of Belief. Philosophical Studies 42 (3):297 - 313.
  23.  19
    John L. Tienson (1987). An Argument Concerning Quantification and Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 51 (2):145 - 168.
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  24.  8
    John L. Tienson (1989). A Conception of Metaphysics. American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1):63 - 71.
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  25.  14
    John L. Tienson (1985). Entia Successiva and Ordinary Things. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):475-479.
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  26.  4
    John L. Tienson (1990). About Competence. Philosophical Papers 19 (1):19-36.
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  27. John L. Tienson (1987). Introduction to Connectionism. Southern Journal of Philosophy (Suppl.) 1:1-16.
     
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  28.  2
    John L. Tienson (1990). Is This Any Way to Be a Realist? Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):155-164.
    Abstract Andy Clark argues that the reality and causal efficacy of the folk psychological attitudes do not require in?the?head correlates of the that?clauses by which they are attributed. The facts for which Fodor invokes a language of thought as empirical explanation?systemati?city, for example?are, Clark argues, an a priori conceptual demand upon propositional attitude ascription, and hence not in need of empirical explanation. However, no such strategy can work. A priori demands imposed by our practices do not eliminate the need for (...)
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  29. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1999). Authors' Replies. Acta Analytica 22 (22):275-287.
     
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