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  1. John Lemos (2014). Libertarianism and Free Determined Decisions. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):675-688.
    Free determined decisions are free decisions that are causally determined by the character of the agent. Robert Kane is a libertarian about free will who believes some of our free decisions are determined in this way. According to Kane, for a determined decision to be free it must proceed from the agent's character and the agent must have shaped that character through previous undetermined free decisions. In recent writings, Mark Balaguer has argued that human beings may well possess libertarian freedom, (...)
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  2. John Lemos (2011). Kane's Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith. Philosophia 39 (2):357-367.
    In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which (...)
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  3. John Lemos (2011). Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will. Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.
    Robert Kane's event-causal libertarian theory of free will has been subjected to a variety of criticisms. In response to the luck objection, he has provided an ambiguous answer which results in additional criticisms that are avoidable. I explain Kane's theory, the luck objection and Kane's reply to the problem of luck. I note that in some places he suggests that the dual wantings of agents engaged in self-forming actions (SFAs) provides the key to answering the luck objection, whereas in other (...)
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  4. John Lemos, Thomas J. McPartland, John C. Médaille, Robert J. Spitzer, Runar M. Thorsteinsson, John R. Welch & Notre Dame (2010). American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 842. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4).
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  5. John Lemos (2009). In Defense of Organizational Evolution: A Reply to Reydon and Scholz. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (3):463-474.
    Organizational ecology applies Darwinian principles of natural selection to understand the evolution of new forms of organizations over time. The idea here is that there are different forms of human organizations, such as different business organizations, religious organizations, political organizations, etc. The growth of new forms of organizations within each of these fields is to be understood in terms of a struggle for existence among organizations with different traits. In a recent article, Reydon and Scholz (2009) argue that this Darwinian (...)
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  6. John Lemos (2008). Commonsense Darwinism: Evolution, Morality, and the Human Condition. Open Court.
    Introduction -- Defending a socio-biological account of morality -- Non-objectivist evolutionary ethics -- Recent objectivist approaches to evolutionary ethics -- Sketch of an Aristotelian evolutionary ethics -- Evolutionary biology and the moral status of animals -- Faith, reason, and evolutionary epistemology -- Psychological egoism and evolutionary biology -- Evolution and free will : darwinian non-naturalism defended -- Recent developments in philosophy of evolution.
     
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  7. John Lemos (2007). Foot and Aristotle on Virtues and Flourishing. Philosophia 35 (1):43-62.
    This article compares the views of Foot and Aristotle on virtues and flourishing. It is argued that the view put forward in Philippa Foot’s recent book, Natural Goodness, suffers from a certain sort of vagueness and it is open to other criticisms which the Aristotelian view can avoid. Foot’s views have been subjected to criticism in the recent literature by David Copp and David Sobel. These criticisms are given consideration in the article and it is argued that the more traditional (...)
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  8. John Lemos (2007). Kanian Freedom and the Problem of Luck. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):515-532.
    This article provides a brief explanation of Robert Kane’s indeterministic, event-causal libertarian theory of freedom and responsibility. It is noted that a number of authors have criticized libertarian theories,such as Kane’s, by presenting the problem of luck. After noting how Kane has tried to answer this problem in his recent writings, the author goes on to explain Ishtiyaque Haji’s recent version of the luckargument. The author considers three possible Kanian replies to Haji’s luck argument and argues that the third reply (...)
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  9. John Lemos (2006). Critical Notice Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation. Disputatio 2 (21).
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  10. John Lemos (2006). Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation. Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.
  11. John Lemos (2006). Morality, Self-Interest, and Two Kinds of Prudential Practical Rationality. Philosophia 34 (1):85-93.
    : In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that (1) there is a difference between moral practical reasoning (MPR) and prudential practical reasoning (PPR) and (2) what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued (...)
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  12. John Lemos (2004). Happiness Is Overrated. Review of Metaphysics 58 (2):423-425.
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  13. John Lemos (2004). Psychological Hedonism, Evolutionary Biology, and the Experience Machine. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):506-526.
    In the second half of their recent, critically acclaimed book Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior , Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson discuss psychological hedonism. This is the view that avoiding our own pain and increasing our own pleasure are the only ultimate motives people have. They argue that none of the traditional philosophical arguments against this view are good, and they go on to present theirownevolutionary biological argument against it. Interestingly, the first half of their (...)
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  14. John Lemos (2003). A Defense of Naturalistic Naturalized Epistemology (Una defensa de la epistemología naturalizada naturalista). Critica 35 (105):49 - 63.
    Naturalistic naturalized epistemology combines ontological naturalism with naturalized epistemology. Ontological naturalism is the view that nothing exists other than spatio-temporal beings embedded within a space-time framework. Naturalized epistemology is a view about the nature of knowledge characterized by its commitment to externalism and the idea that knowledge consists in beliefs reliably generated by cognitive mechanisms operating in a suitable environment. Alvin Plantinga has provided a much discussed evolutionary biological argument against naturalistic naturalized epistemology. In this article I defend naturalistic naturalized (...)
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  15. John Lemos (2003). Rachels on Darwinism and Theism. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (3):399-415.
    In his book, Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (1990), James Rachels argues that the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection undermines the view that human beings are made in the image of God. By this he means that Darwinism makes things such that there is no longer any good reason to think that human beings are made in the image of God. Some other widely read and respected authors seem to share this view of the implications (...)
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  16. John Lemos (2002). Evolution and Free Will: A Defense of Darwinian Non-Naturalism. Metaphilosophy 33 (4):468-482.
  17. John Lemos (2002). Sober and Wilson and Nozick and the Experience Machine. Philosophia 29 (1-4):401-409.
    Years ago Robert Nozick provided the experience machine argument, which states that since many people would forgo a life of artificially stimulated tremendous pleasure provided by an "experience machine," it must be that sometimes people are motivated by things other than the pursuit of their own pleasure. This is to say that he rejected psychological hedonism. In a recent book Elliot Sober and David Wilson defend the view that Nozick's argument does not provide adequate refutation of psychological hedonism. This article (...)
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  18. John Lemos (2002). Theism, Evolutionary Epistemology, and Two Theories of Truth. Zygon 37 (4):789-801.
  19. John Lemos (2001). A Defense of Darwinian Accounts of Morality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (3):361-385.
    This article is a defense of Michael Ruse's sociobiological account of the origins and nature of morality. In the piece, the author provides a summary explanation of Ruse's views and arguments. Then he goes on to explain and critically discuss a variety of objections that have been made against sociobiological accounts of morality. He argues that the criticisms that have been made often work against less sophisticated sociobiological theories but that Ruse's theory is immune to the criticisms. The author responds (...)
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  20. John Lemos (2001). Morality Without Foundations. Teaching Philosophy 24 (3):295-298.
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  21. John Lemos (2000). Darwinian Natural Right and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):119-132.
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  22. John Lemos (2000). Ruling Passions. Teaching Philosophy 23 (3):286-290.
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  23. John Lemos (2000). The Problems with Emotivism. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:285-309.
    This article provides a defense of a variety of MacIntyrean arguments against emotivism. In After Virtue MacIntyre explains that emotivism might be understood either as a theory about the meaning or about the function of moral language. He also argues that emotivism is false either way. I argue that MacIntyre is right about this by explaining and then answering the recent defenses of emotivism that have appeared in the literature. I conclude by reminding the reader that according to MacIntyre his (...)
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  24. John Lemos (1999). Bridging the Is/Ought Gap with Evolutionary Biology: Is This a Bridge Too Far? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):559-577.
  25. John Lemos (1999). Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Teaching Philosophy 22 (1):91-95.
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  26. John Lemos (1998). An Agnostic Defence of Obligatory Prayer. Sophia 37 (2):70-87.
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  27. John Lemos (1998). Bridging the Is/Ought Gap with Evolutionary Biology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):559-577.
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  28. John Lemos (1997). Moral Crutches and Nazi Theists. Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1):147-154.
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  29. John Lemos (1997). Virtue, Happiness, and Intelligibility. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:307-320.
    In such works as A Short History of Ethics, Against the Self-lmages of the Age, and After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the intelligibility of the moral life hinges upon viewing the moral life as essential to the happy life, or eudaimonia. In my article I examine the reasons he gives for saying this, arguing that this thesis is not sufficiently defended by MacIntyre. I also draw connections between this thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life and other (...)
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  30. John Lemos (1994). The Unity of the Virtues and Its Defenses. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):85-106.
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  31. John Lemos (1994). The Unity of the Virtues and Its Recent Defenses. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):85-106.
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