ABSTRACT Against a Kantian notion of freedom as autonomy, this article defends a conception of freedom that is relational, dependent, and experimental, and that operates without anything like a will. In the author’s view, freedom is a characteristic of a relation between a person and the world that allows for the predictable realization of specified ends, that is, a mode of power.

How do I live a good life, one that is deeply personal and sensitive to others? John T. Lysaker suggests that those who take this question seriously need to reexamine the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson. In philosophical reflections on topics such as genius, divinity, friendship, and reform, Lysaker explores "self-culture" or the attempt to remain true to one's deepest commitments. He argues that being true to ourselves requires recognition of our thoroughly dependent and relational nature. Lysaker guides readers from (...) simple self-absorption toward a more fulfilling and responsive engagement with the world. (shrink)

With ever more detailed models of the neurobiological and social systems out of which schizophrenia is born, it is possible to overlook how suffering persons actually experience their symptoms.This book examines the experiences of persons who suffer from schizophrenia. It provides a highly readable and humane examination of this common condition.

Many with schizophrenia find social interactions a profound and terrifying threat to their sense of self. To better understand this we draw upon dialogical models of the self that suggest that those with schizophrenia have difficulty sustaining dialogues among diverse aspects of self. Because interpersonal exchanges solicit and evoke movement among diverse aspects of self, many with schizophrenia may consequently find those exchanges overwhelming, resulting in despair, the sensation of fusion with another, and/or self-dissolution. In short, compromised dialogical capacities may (...) be a contributing factor to social dysfunction in schizophrenia. (shrink)

Where do we find ourselves? -- Not with syllables but men -- Essaying America -- Living multiplicity: a matter of course -- Emerson, race, and the conduct of life -- Reforming ethical life -- Emerson and the case of philosophy -- Abbreviations for Emerson's works.

ABSTRACT Hope is a complex social-psychological phenomenon. It combines cognitive and affective dimensions, and it is temporally extended, drawing upon the past in order to orient the present toward the future. In conversation with various texts, ranging from Ernst Bloch to Cornel West to Patrick Shade, the article offers a multidimensional account of hope, arguing that it is integral to human action and possibility.

American life storms about us daily, and is slow to find a tongue.Early in his Meditations, Descartes suggests that, at least once, one should set one's epistemic bushel in order, as if beliefs were apples to be sorted. But that is not quite right, even though he uses the image in his replies to the seventh set of objections. Descartes's principal concern is not each and every belief but the ways in which he justifies them. It is thus not a (...) stretch to find a kind of ethics of belief in the Meditations, at least with regard to scientia. (Regarding the epistemic challenges of everyday life, Descartes is quite clear in his synopsis that "no sane person ever seriously doubted these things," i.e., "that there really is .. (shrink)

ABSTRACTVoice is often regarded as a stylistic ornament of philosophical writing. I argue to the contrary, exploring how voice operates in philosophical texts and what greater attention to voice promises. I also explore how voice might instruct across cultural identities.

Through a critique of Richard Rorty, I develop a program of self-creation. While Rorty rightly encourages ironic and poetic redescriptions, his feel for this work is disembodied and context-blind. In contrast, I propose an institutionally situated and full-bodied creative exercise which contextually reworks central tropes. Rorty's position is also overly privatized. This hinders 'public' discourse and imprisons marginalized persons within institutionalized identities. Self-creation should not be a solely 'private' affair. Rorty's public/ private distinction has some merit, however. We should, on (...) the whole, primarily treat self-creation as a 'private' endeavor. The end of self-creation should not be legislation. Instead, we should dethrone disempowering identities and reconstruct new ones beyond the reach of policy debates. If we do so, we will proceed with greater sophistication, stability and radicality than would otherwise be the case. This in turn will produce richer selves and offer novel resources to works of 'public' reconstruction. Key Words: community • Dewey • identity • Rorty • self-creation. (shrink)

The ongoing task of self-discovery, which I figure as self-finding, following Emerson, is integral to the human condition. While its results are always fragmentary, self-finding also conducts the currents of life in ways that establish conditions for our lives and those of others. This activity is mistakenly constrained by Charles Taylor, who argues that it remains tied to moral space. Charles Scott’s work shows how moral space can be found in a manner that suspends the necessity of moral space and (...) generates new possibilities. (shrink)

This essay argues that Walter Benjamin’s One-Way Street offers readers a way of being historical that resists and redirects the meaning and significance of dominant symbols and personal experiences. In the interaction among its entries, it also tries to stimulate the growth of those capacities required by projects of social transformation. In Benjamin’s text, “form” is thus less a matter of literary organization than a potentially exemplary mode of political action.

This lively volume explores the theme of friendship in the lives and works of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau.

The ongoing task of self-discovery, which I figure as self-finding, following Emerson, is integral to the human condition. While its results are always fragmentary, self-finding also conducts the currents of life in ways that establish conditions for our lives and those of others. This activity is mistakenly constrained by Charles Taylor, who argues that it remains tied to moral space. Charles Scott’s work shows how moral space can be found in a manner that suspends the necessity of moral space and (...) generates new possibilities. (shrink)

A new ethics of human finitude developed through three experimental essays. As ethical beings, we strive for lives that are meaningful and praiseworthy. But we are finite. We do not know, so we hope. We need, so we trust. We err, so we forgive. In this book, philosopher John T. Lysaker draws our attention to the ways in which these three capacities—hope, trust, and forgiveness—contend with human limits. Each experience is vital to human flourishing, yet each also poses significant personal (...) and institutional challenges as well as opportunities for growth. Hope, Trust, and Forgiveness explores these challenges and opportunities and proposes ways to best meet them. In so doing, Lysaker experiments with the essay as a form and advances an improvisational perfectionism to deepen and expand our ethical horizons. (shrink)

In general, current biomedical models of schizophrenia focus on distinguishing discrete elements that, on their own or in combination with others, might lead to some form of disability. These different and potentially autonomous aspects of the disorder that might disrupt daily activities include positive and negative symptoms as well as disturbances in neurocognitive and psychobiological processes. Such disturbances include genetic vulnerabilities that increase the risk of abnormalities in brain development, and resultant neurocognitive deficits which interfere with the ability to carry (...) out specific tasks.These approaches to schizophrenia, which have... (shrink)

We are inquiring [into] what virtue is, not in order just to know it, but in order to become good.It seems, reading them [Heidegger and Wittgenstein], . . . that some moral claim upon us is levied by the act of philosophizing itself, a claim that no separate subject of ethics would serve to study. . . . [W]hat needs attention from philosophy, is our life as a whole.What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to (...) think what we are doing. Whether amazed, curious, angered, or beset by gnawing doubts, philosophy finds itself with something like Emerson's query, "Where do we find ourselves?" Recoiling even as it relies upon a given, philosophy is always orienting or, rather, reorienting .. (shrink)

Amid its romantic excesses such as "[t]o believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart, is true for all men,—that is genius" (Porte 2001, 121), Emersonian individualism remains a living project, one we would do well to understand more thoroughly and pursue more rigorously. To aid in this recovery, I will, in a translating repetition of Emerson's thought that engages a range of texts, offer eight theses that any successful reconstruction of individualism (...) must embrace. (shrink)

Brian Eno's Ambient 1: Music for Airports is a seminal album in the history of electronic music. Using Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the assemblage, I explore the album's compositional structure as well as its ambient function, by attending to specific tracks and locating the album in musical history, particularly relative to the work of John Cage, La Monte Young, and Steve Reich. In an extended discussion of its ambient function, I argue that the LP offers music for reverie that (...) is capable of initiating processes of potential self-transformation. (shrink)

It is in large part according to the sound people make that we judge them sane or insane, male or female, good, evil, trustworthy, depressive, marriageable, moribund, likely or unlikely to make war on us, little better than animals, inspired by God. These judgments happen fast and can be brutal.The orator must ever stand with forward foot, in the attitude of advancing. His speech must be just ahead of the assembly,—ahead of the whole human race,—or it is superfluous. His speech (...) is not to be distinguished from action. It is the electricity of action.Philosophy has never settled upon a genre. One finds provocative dialogues such as Plato’s Crito. Performatively rich, the dialogue shows Socrates offering Crito, one .. (shrink)

In this book, inspired by Martin Heidegger--who found in poetry the most fundamental insights into the human condition--John Lysaker develops a concept of ur-poetry to explore philosophically how poetic language creates fresh meaning in our ...

Some poems can change our lives; they lead us to look at the world through new eyes. In this book, inspired by Martin Heidegger—who found in poetry the most fundamental insights into the human condition—John Lysaker develops a concept of ur-poetry to explore philosophically how poetic language creates fresh meaning in our world and transforms the way in which we choose to live in it. Not limited to a single poem or collection of poems, ur-poetry arises when, in the interaction (...) of an author's principal tropes, the origin of poetry is exposed as a process whereby words with inherited meaning take on a new poetic life that draws our attention to the "birth of sense"—the manner in which the manifold realities that surround us are revealed. And it is precisely through an experience of the birth of sense that we are able to understand and dwell differently among these realities. To demonstrate ur-poetry in action, the book frequently refers to such poets as Akhmatova, Ammons, Celan, Mandelstam, and Stevens, but it focuses on the work of Pulitzer Prize winner Charles Simic. By addressing the nature of human existence, the origins of sense, and the significance of history in and for human action, Lysaker argues that Simic's writing exemplifies the import that poetry can have for how we understand and live our lives. (shrink)