Search results for 'John M. Taurek' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. John M. Taurek (1977). Should the Numbers Count? Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.score: 870.0
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  2. Yishai Cohen (2014). Don’T Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting. Res Publica 20 (3):245-261.score: 102.0
    Suppose you can save only one of two groups of people from harm, with one person in one group, and five persons in the other group. Are you obligated to save the greater number? While common sense seems to say ‘yes’, the numbers skeptic says ‘no’. Numbers Skepticism has been partly motivated by the anti-consequentialist thought that the goods, harms and well-being of individual people do not aggregate in any morally significant way. However, even many non-consequentialists think that Numbers Skepticism (...)
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  3. Steven M. Cahn & Peter J. Markie (eds.) (2009). Ethics: History, Theory, and, Contemporary Issues. Oxford University Press.score: 99.0
    The most comprehensive collection of its kind, Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, Third Edition, is organized into three parts, providing instructors with flexibility in designing and teaching a variety of courses in moral philosophy. The first part, Historical Sources, moves from classical thought (Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Epictetus) through medieval views (Augustine and Aquinas) to modern theories (Hobbes, Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill), culminating with leading nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers (Nietzsche, James, Dewey, Camus, and Sartre). The second part, (...)
     
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  4. F. M. Kamm (2005). Aggregation and Two Moral Methods. Utilitas 17 (1):1-23.score: 90.0
    I begin by reconsidering the arguments of John Taurek and Elizabeth Anscombe on whether the number of people we can help counts morally. I then consider arguments that numbers should count given by F. M. Kamm and Thomas Scanlon, and criticism of them by Michael Otsuka. I examine how different conceptions of the moral method known as pairwise comparison are at work in these different arguments and what the ideas of balancing and tie-breaking signify for decision-making in various (...)
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  5. Rob Lawlor (2006). Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):149 - 166.score: 66.0
    In his paper, “Should the Numbers Count?" John Taurek imagines that we are in a position such that we can either save a group of five people, or we can save one individual, David. We cannot save David and the five. This is because they each require a life-saving drug. However, David needs all of the drug if he is to survive, while the other five need only a fifth each.Typically, people have argued as if there was a (...)
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  6. John T. Sanders (1988). Why the Numbers Should Sometimes Count. Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (1):3-14.score: 30.0
    John Taurek has argued that, where choices must be made between alternatives that affect different numbers of people, the numbers are not, by themselves, morally relevant. This is because we "must" take "losses-to" the persons into account (and these don't sum), but "must not" consider "losses-of" persons (because we must not treat persons like objects). I argue that the numbers are always ethically relevant, and that they may sometimes be the decisive consideration.
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  7. Derek Parfit (1978). Innumerate Ethics. Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (4):285-301.score: 24.0
    Suppose that we can help either one person or many others. Is it a reason t0 help the many that We should thus be helping more people? John Taurek thinks not. We may learn from his arguments.
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  8. Gerald Lang (2005). Fairness in Life and Death Cases. Erkenntnis 62 (3):321 - 351.score: 24.0
    John Taurek famously argued that, in ‘conflict cases’, where we are confronted with a smaller and a larger group of individuals, and can choose which group to save from harm, we should toss a coin, rather than saving the larger group. This is primarily because coin-tossing is fairer: it ensures that each individual, regardless of the group to which he or she belongs, has an equal chance of being saved. This article provides a new response to Taurek’s (...)
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  9. Michael Otsuka (2000). Scanlon and the Claims of the Many Versus the One. Analysis 60 (3):288–293.score: 18.0
    In "What We Owe to Each Other", T. M. <span class='Hi'>Scanlon</span> argues that one should save the greater number when faced with the choice between saving one life and two or more different lives. It is, <span class='Hi'>Scanlon</span> claims, a virtue of this argument (which is traceable to Frances Kamm) that it does not appeal to the claims of groups of individuals but only to the claims of individuals. I demonstrate that this argument for saving the greater number, indeed, depends, (...)
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